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i 
Abstract  
LBO transactions were structured increasingly aggressive in the years prior to the 
outbreak of the financial crisis (2007), as reflected in rising debt proportions. This was 
followed by many LBO credits experiencing difficulties to adhere to their loan 
documentations. Bank credit functions played a role in this, giving rise to an 
investigation into whether their work could be more effective. To identify areas for 
improvement in their work of evaluating LBO credits and – if such areas can be 
identified – deduce some potential measures how to address them was the aim of this 
research. The research is timely as evaluations of LBO credits continue to be required 
heavily. Many of the credits structured around 2006/2007 will soon require refinancing 
and in parallel new transactions come to the market. 
A literature review on the risk factors and cycles relating to LBOs, the simple 
techniques of portfolio management and LBO credit management practices found that 
all the ingredients required for effective LBO credit management are available. This is 
in conflict with the observation of increasing credit risk inherent in these transactions in 
the years just prior to the outbreak of the financial crisis of 2007. Based on this, 18 
experts were interviewed. The results were analysed quantitatively and qualitatively. To 
enhance robustness, results were discussed with four senior credit executives as well as 
a focus group discussion of the credit function of one bank.   
The exploratory results of this research suggest that there is strong awareness of the risk 
factors in LBOs. The systematic risk in LBOs in form of an LBO cycle however is not 
considered to a significant degree in credit analysis/credit monitoring. Some important 
risk factors also receive relatively little attention in credit analysis/credit monitoring and 
aspects of portfolio management are not used strongly at the level of credit functions.  
Finally, an area of improvement that had been identified was the utilization of results; 
i.e. the need to draw consequences from observations made with view to risk factors.  
Due to the limited scope of the study, updating the results with more recent data as well 
validation and triangulation of results remain recommended.  
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Definitions 
• Acquisition company: The company that acquires (either via a shares purchase of purchase of 
the assets) the Target Company.  
• Aspects of portfolio management: Some measures of portfolio-management that could easily 
be utilised with regards to certain risk factors in LBOs. The term is used within this research 
with regards to the question as to which degree the analysis and monitoring of LBO credits take 
into account some aspects of portfolio management.  
• Available Free Cash-Flow: The amount of cash generated by a business from its core activities 
during a certain period of time less those amounts spent on necessary investments (capital 
expenditure).  
• Bank debt: Debt provided by banks, as opposed to other financiers such HYB-Investors, 
mezzanine investors or shareholder providing loans.  
• Bank of England:  The central bank for the United Kingdom.  
• Business plan: A projection outlining the planned development of key financial parameters over 
a time-span of several years. Parameters typically include sales, EBITDA, debt and cash-flow, 
but also some credit metrics like leverage multiples. 
• BSC/Banking Supervision Committee: A committee comprising members of the central banks 
within the European Union and Bank Regulators.  
• Cash-Flow: The amount of cash generated by a business during a certain period.  
• Category: A collection of qualitative answers that could be summarised by one headline.  
• Collateral: Security provided or pledged as protection against a loan. 
• Credit analysis: Analytical work that is performed as part of a new LBO exposure to be entered 
into or the evaluation of a major amendment of an existing exposure. 
• Credit authority: A delegated competence to take decisions with regards to credits within 
certain limits.  
• Credit duration: A measure of time to evaluate the time required until half of a credit has been 
repaid. The measure is typically used in the bond market to measure the sensitivity of a portfolio 
to interest rate changes. Within this research, it has been suggested for use as a measure of the 
increasing aggressiveness of an LBO cycle.  
 	  
xiv 
• CLO: A debt instrument that is serviced from a portfolio of underlying loans (in this case 
LBOs). The instruments are split into several tranches with different repayment profiles and 
interest rates.  
• Credit management process: Refers to all the activities by credit functions, in particular to the 
credit analysis, credit monitoring and the degree to which these take into account aspects of 
portfolio management.  
• Credit monitoring: Analytical work performed as part of the regular review process of LBO 
credits. 
• Credit opinion: An assessment of the credit risk in LBO transactions, typically culminating in a 
recommendation for the further treatment of credit.  
• Credit Risk: Default risk and recovery risk.   
• Credit risk profile: A description of the aggregate credit risk of a bank based on certain criteria.  
• Deutsche Bundesbank: The central bank of the Federal Republic of Germany.  
• Debt composition: A term referring to how the total debt is subdivided by instruments, 
investors, etc.  
• Debt load: A term used to describe the total debt present in a capital structure, measured either 
in the form of a leverage ratio or provided in absolute measures.  
• Deductive approach: Explaining a phenomenon by first forming assumptions about its causes 
and effects that are transferred into testable hypothesis to be then tested.  
• Default rate: The relative frequency by which borrowers categorized by a certain criteria (e.g. 
the type of credit, such as LBO) have failed to meet their contractual payment obligations within 
a certain time frame.  
• Default risk: The risk that a borrower in an LBO transaction is unable to meet its financial 
obligations in the contractually agreed manner. 
• Degrees of freedom: A concept applied in statistical hypothesis testing. It represents the number 
of variables or group of number of variables that can vary independently without changing the 
overall result of a computation.  
• Distribution free tests: A series of statistical tests used to evaluate similarities between 
distributions of data where the data is not normally distributed. The tests are suitable for data of 
ordinal level. These tests are also known as non-parametric tests.  
 	  
xv 
• EBITDA: A measure of profitability used frequently by practitioners that is close to cash- flow 
as it uses the operating earnings before interest, tax and depreciation.  
• European Central Bank: The central bank for the Euro-zone. Its main objective is to ensure 
price stability within the Euro-zone.  
• Event of Default: Certain performance criteria of the borrower, including but not limited to the 
punctual payment of interest and principal, which if violated entitle the lenders to declare a loan 
due and repayable.  
• Federal Reserve: The central bank for the United States of America. Also abbreviated as ‘Fed’. 
• Financial Distress: A situation where a company has difficulties meeting its contractual 
obligations under its credit contracts. Typically this is the case when payment obligations cannot 
be met, but also violations of other obligations – such as adherence to financial covenants – can 
cause a situation of Financial Distress.  
• FSA: Financial Services Authority – the former UK authority in charge of supervising the 
Financial Services Sector in the UK. The FSA has been separated into two different authorities, 
one being the Financial Conduct Authority and the other one the Prudential Regulation 
Authority. The latter one has the role of a supervisory authority to banks.  
• Firm level recovery rate: The recovery rate achieved by all lenders on an average (weighted) 
basis. This is distinctly different from the instrument-level recovery rate which measures the 
Recovery Rate for certain components of the debt structure.  
• Financial covenants: Contractually agreed financial ratios to which the borrower needs to 
adhere to during the life of a credit or an obligation not to incur additional debt exceeding certain 
threshold levels. A violation of these obligations constitutes an Event of Default.  
• GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Technically the value of all the goods and services produced 
within an economy within a certain timeframe. GDP is used as a measure of overall economic 
activity.  
• High-Yield-Bond: A bond issued by an issuer that has a sub-investment grade credit rating.  
• High net-worth individuals: Individuals that hold significant financial resources to invest.  
 
• HLT: Highly Leveraged Transaction; a term used to describe a transaction that to a substantial 
part employs debt in its capital structure. Sometimes the term is used as a synonym for LBO. 
• Inductive Approach: Looking for the causes or effects of a phenomenon without any 
predetermined assumption regarding the causes or effects.  
 	  
xvi 
• International Monetary Fund (IMF): A supranational institution with several objectives 
related to global finances, including financial stability.  
• Industry state: The overall financial condition of a group of companies within one industry.  
• Interpretivism: An approach to research that allows the researchers’ own view and observations 
to influence results.  
• Junior debt: Debt that ranks below senior debt (bank debt), typically by way of structural 
subordination (i.e. the debt of the banks is closer to the operating assets) and/or by contractual 
subordination (i.e. in a contract the holders of the junior debt agree to restrictions regarding their 
rights prior to senior debt having been fully repaid).  
• Jurisdiction: The country whose legal system would be primarily applicable in the case of 
financial distress or bankruptcy.  
• LBO: The takeover of a company under the control of a PE-firm, where the purchase price is 
largely paid by debt and where the underlying cash-flows of the company acquired are the main 
repayment source. 
• LBO cycle: A pattern by which activity in the LBO market follows pronounced cycles that show 
certain characteristics (i.e. development of purchase prices) and which may repeat themselves 
over time. The overall assumption is that at peak times, LBO transactions exhibit higher credit 
risk.  
• Leverage: Describes the share of debt in the overall capital structure of an LBO transaction. 
Frequently, this is measured by the ratio of debt/ebitda, but other measures are used as well. 
• Leverage multiple: The result of dividing the amount of debt by a financial performance figure, 
typically the EBITDA or a measure of cash flow.  
• Leverage ratio: A ratio using the amount of debt and a financial performance figure. The most 
frequently used is the leverage multiple, but other measures such as debt divided by total capital 
are also used.  
• LRC: Leveraged Recapitalisation. A transaction where a distribution to a shareholder is made in 
the form of a dividend or share-buy-back which is financed via assuming additional debt.  
• Managing Director: Title used in the financial services industry for those professionals that 
have significant experience in their respective fields. Most persons with this title are also 
supervisor/department heads and oversee the activities of larger groups.  
• Operating subsidiaries: Subsidiaries of the target companies engaged in fulfilling important 
operating functions such as production, marketing, distribution, etc.  
 	  
xvii 
• Overall state of the economy: A measure of the performance of the economy relevant to an 
LBO transaction, normally measured as GDP growth.  
• PE-Firm: A firm managing a private equity fund, including investing the funds resources in 
LBOs and monitoring the performance.  
• PIK: Pay-in-Kind. A term used for financial instruments, where there is typically no on-going 
cash-interest payment, but where the principal to be repaid at final maturity is increased each 
period.  
• Purchase multiple: The purchase price of a business divided by a financial measure. Frequently, 
the financial measure is the EBITDA.  
• Portfolio-management: Refers to the analytical work performed to put individual credits into 
perspective against their peer-group to detect trends and patterns in credit quality. The overall 
aim of these activities is to avoid concentration risks and the early recognition of deteriorating 
credits and a deteriorating credit environment.  
• Positivism: An approach to research where knowledge is generated either by empirical 
observation or logical deduction. It assumes that research is free of subjective judgment.  
• Recap: See Leveraged recapitalisation.  
• Recovery risk: The risk that the amount of principal outstanding and/or unpaid interest that can 
be recouped once a default has occurred is low; the expected discount on the amount received 
compared to the principal amount outstanding once default risk has materialised.  
• Recovery rate: The percentage of the principal of a loan that is recovered in the case that a 
default risk has materialised.  
• Research aim: The ultimate goal of a research program to be achieved. This is typically broken 
down into a series of research objectives. 
• Research instrument: A questionnaire specifically developed to measure the views of 
participants relevant to this research.  
• Research objectives: A specific result, typically one of several, that needs to be achieved to 
accomplish the research aim.  
 
• Risk factor(s): Certain characteristics of a LBO transaction that are viewed to increase the credit 
risk.  
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• Scoring level: A numerical expression regarding the importance of a risk factor, its use in the 
credit management process including the utilization of aspects of portfolio management with a 
view to this specific risk factor based on a five-point measurement scale of ordinal data level.   
• Secondary buyout/Secondary transaction/Secondary LBO: An LBO that is being sold to a 
PE-firm for the second time. 
• Second Lien (debt): Debt that has a second ranking claim on the security, which is provided 
with the first rank for the benefit of senior debt.  
• Senior debt: Debt that benefits from the highest ranking in the capital structure of a borrower or 
borrower group. In the case of LBOs, this typically includes the benefits from a first ranking 
security package.  
• Shareholder loan: A loan provided to a company by its owners. Such loans are typically 
contractually and structurally subordinated.  
• Structuring Team: A team of bankers with specific knowhow in acquisition finance that is 
tasked to tailor debt packages to LBO transactions.  
• Sponsor: A term commonly used in the market by practitioners referring to the PE-firm.   
• Sponsor quality: Refers to the ability of a PE-firm/sponsor to successfully lead an LBO 
transaction so that a default is avoided and to the ability of the sponsor to provide support (in 
whatever form) to an LBO transaction if it experiences financial distress.  
• Target company: The company that the PE-firm intends to take over by way of an LBO.  
• Type of transaction: Refers to whether a transaction represents a first-time transaction (primary 
transaction) or whether the business is undergoing an LBO repeatedly (Secondary or Tertiary 
Buyout) or whether the private equity investor is taking out a special dividend (so-called recap).  
• Tertiary buyout/tertiary transaction/tertiary LBO: A company that is being sold to a PE-firm 
for the third time.  
• Transaction Structure: The composition of an LBO with regards to its entire capital structure 
and its legal structure.  
• VAR – Value-at-Risk: A measure of loss that is unlikely to be exceeded within a specified 
measure of probability.  
 
 	  
1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Focus of this Research  
Takeovers of companies utilizing debt to a significant degree to finance the purchase 
price with the involvement of a PE-firm, referred to as LBOs, have increased 
substantially, both in terms of numbers and volume in the years prior to the outbreak of 
the financial crisis in 2007 (ECB, 2007b). With increased transaction numbers and more 
banks being active in the field of providing debt financing for such transactions, 
arguably lending standards became more aggressive (e.g. Deutsche Bundesbank, 2007) 
As a consequence, many LBO transactions experienced financial difficulties. According 
to a survey carried out by Price Waterhouse Coopers (‘PWC’) on 187 PE firms, 75% of 
the portfolio companies had difficulties complying with their financing agreements 
(usually via covenant breaches) and had to renegotiate terms (PWC, 2010). More 
importantly, the survey also reported that there were various instances where funds 
reported that financial creditors had taken over the controlling stake in acquired 
companies (author’s comment: lenders typically have a share-pledge on the acquired 
business) (PWC, 2010). This research focuses on the contribution of the organisational 
unit within banks in charge of analysing (LBO) credits, credit functions, where research 
so far is absent.  The key question is whether there are areas for improvement that 
would make their work more effective. 
1.2 Relevance of this Research 
In the years prior to the outbreak of the financial crisis (2007/2008), the market for 
LBOs has seen rapid expansion (ECB, 2007b), which also led to high volumes and 
numbers of LBO credits. The moving average for four quarters of syndicated loans for 
LBOs in Western Europe was approximately €8bn in 2001.1 By mid-2005 the figure 
was estimated to be close to €29bn and by the third quarter of 2006 it had reached 
nearly €50bn. In parallel, target companies have been burdened with more debt, 
transaction structures became more aggressive and contract standards shifted strongly in 
favour of borrowers (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2007), all of which enhanced the credit risk 
                                                
1	  Figures approximated from a graph in the Financial Stability Review of the Deutsche Bundesbank November 2006, 
using data from Dealogic.	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in these transactions. The phenomenon had been commented on and warnings issued by 
many market observers, including central banks, regulatory bodies or supranational 
organisations. For example, the UK based FSA in 2006 pointed out that there was a 
significant rise in the amount of lending provided to private equity backed companies 
(FSA 2006). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its Global Financial Stability 
Review in October 2007 (IMF, 2007, p. 2) used the words “signs of similar credit 
indiscipline”, comparing the development to that in the US mortgage market. 
Unsurprisingly, the aftermath of the financial crisis that broke out in 2007 and 2008 in 
combination with reduced economic agility around the globe also affected the 
performance of LBO credits. Leveraged loan prices saw drastic erosions from mid 2007 
(e.g. Bank of England, 2007b) and bonds rated BB and below saw their spreads 
widening (e.g. ECB 2007c2, Bank of England, 2007a3 and 2007b4), both indicating a 
market perception of heightened credit risk. The non-investment grade sector (to which 
LBOs typically belong) experienced a strong rise in defaults (ECB 2009b) and rating 
downgrades in the corporate sector accelerated (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2009). In the 
first quarter of 2009, the amount of leveraged senior loans in distress within the 
Eurozone was reported at €15bn (ECB, 2009). Banks held the majority of these loans 
(ECB, 2009). Some remarkable write-downs on exposures had to be digested. Write-
downs of major Western European banks (inclusive of the UK) on leveraged loans (of 
which LBOs are a part) between the second half of 2007 and the first half of 2009 
amounted to approximately US$22bn5 (Bank of England, 2009a and 2009b), which was 
partly driven by the reduced asset prices of loans held on the books in the absence of 
syndication options.  For a group of 521 LBOs in the US between 1980-2006 (all public 
to private transactions), a total of 22% ended either in either Bankruptcy (19%) or went 
through some form of out-of-court restructuring (Ayash, 2013), which further illustrates 
that LBOs show above average propensity to default.  
Although the magnitude of the losses from leveraged loans remains small compared to 
the overall write-downs incurred as a result of the financial crisis (2007/2008), which 
                                                
2	  Based on data provided by Thomson Financial Datastream.  
3	  Supported by a chart naming Merrill Lynch as source of data, showing global corporate bond spreads by rating.	  	  
4	  Supported by a charts naming Merrill Lynch as source of data,	  limited to Sterling Corporate Bonds.	  
5	  Figures approximated from graphs in the Financial Stability Reports of the Bank of England as of June and 
December 2009. 	  
 	  
3 
the ECB stated had reached $710bn globally by November 2008 (ECB, 2008)6, it 
suggests that credit functions could be more effective in their assessment of LBO 
credits.  
To find out how, potential causes for the observed phenomenon – the expansion against 
an increasingly aggressive credit environment - need to be analysed. If causes can be 
identified, they represent an area for improvement and potential measures to address 
them can be formulated. Also, it might be possible that results can serve as an example 
for other specialised lending products, where similar issues might be present.  
A significant body of research exists on the broad reasons for the credit expansion prior 
to the financial crisis of 2007. But this is mainly focused on market dynamics and 
concentrates on the strong liquidity provided by investors in certain segments of the 
market, including collateralised loan obligations (CLOs). So far little attention has been 
paid to the work of credit functions, which are in charge of assessing individual credits 
within banks, including LBO credits. The credit function therefore is one of the many 
forces that affect banks’ credit risk profiles. A survey carried out by the Banking 
Supervision Committee (‘BSC’, 2006 in ECB, 2007a and 2007b) showed that the 
assessment of LBO credits is very detailed. A selective review of the 2006 annual 
reports (which was the last financial year before the outbreak of the financial crisis in 
2007) of a sample of banks active in this segment also frequently describes the analysis 
as very detailed with a strong focus on risk factors such as covenants and corresponding 
credit monitoring.  
The need for comprehensive analysis and monitoring of LBOs, which also considers 
specific wider transaction characteristics and aspects of portfolio management, has been 
recognised for a long time and is by no means just a result of the recent experience. The 
US has historically been the most active market for LBOs and therefore it comes at no 
surprise that this is also where critical comments were made early. Already in 1989 the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (Thomson, in its Economic Commentary, no page 
number) commented on the risk due to significant LBO leverage:  
“…it is therefore essential that the lenders conduct a sufficient analysis of the proposed 
transaction and of the creditor…” 
                                                
6	  Data used partly from Bloomberg.	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“A large part of a bank’s LBO portfolio could conceivably go under if interest rates rise 
dramatically if there is a severe economic downturn.” 
The testimony recently provided in the financial markets suggests that there still exist 
areas where banks’ credit functions could improve in light of the above. Although with 
no direct references to LBOs, a statement by Mora (2012, p. 79) in the Economic 
Review for the second quarter of 2012 by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City also 
highlights this point: 
“The crisis revealed that risk management at banks and other financial institutions had 
shortcomings” 
The academic relevance of the subject can be inferred from the significant research on 
LBOs in general and also from some emerging research on banks activity. Overall, the 
capacity of private equity funds has been reported to exceed USD 3 trillion (Ayash, 
2013) while it remains controversially discussed whether they actually do lead to 
improvements in operating performance. For example, Cohn, Mills and Towery (2014) 
do find evidence that suggests the contrary at least for public-to-private transaction, 
while others do continue to find a relationship between PE involvement and 
improvements in operating performance (e.g. Liu, 2013). As LBOs in general represent 
a large economic phenomenon while at the same time exhibit high leverage, it is 
important that bank credit functions keep in focus the risk drivers in these transactions. 
While generally banks claim that this was the case (see ‘BSC’), a recent study by Cao, 
Mason and Song (2010) provides support that lending practices had become weak at 
least within certain segments of the banking sector during the run-up to the financial 
crisis. Moreover, they were able to show that those banks that experienced lower write-
downs on their loans did reduce their share of the overall LBO lending market and kept 
their lending standards up.  
The research addresses the following research questions: 
• Are there potential areas for improvement in credit functions’ assessment of 
LBO credit risk? 
 
Provided such areas for improvement can be identified, the related second research 
question is: 
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• What potential measures can be deduced from the identification of areas for 
improvement so that the effectiveness of credit functions’ assessment of LBO 
credit risk is enhanced?   
 
These research questions were transformed into a research aim: 
• To identify potential areas for improvement in the credit management process of 
LBO credits by credit functions and – provided they can be identified – to 
deduce potential measures to address them.  
The development of the general research problem and its transformation into research 
questions, the research aim and its objectives are explained in detail in Chapter 3.   
The relevance of this research goes beyond an investigation explaining what has been 
observed. First, despite some negative experiences during recent years, LBOs must be 
expected to stay and therefore credit functions will continue to be confronted with 
evaluating these exposures. There has been a strong historical persistence of LBOs and 
they have been used in several countries. Transaction structures close to those of LBOs 
appeared very early around 1900 (Wright et al., 2006); but as a noticeable form of 
transaction they appeared around the 1980s (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009; similar to 
Wright et al., 2006). Originally, they were heavily concentrated in North America7 and 
in Europe the historically most active market was the UK, where activity also took off 
in the 1980s (Wright, 2006; Mehran and Peristiani, 2010). While the UK remains one of 
the most important markets, accounting for approximately 24% of all European 
investments in 2011 (EVCA, 2012), LBOs are now present in all European countries 
(BVK, 2010; EVCA, 2012). Other than the UK, France and Germany are particularly 
active markets. Also, the relative share of LBOs as part of the M&A market has 
constantly been on the rise. Globally, LBO activity reached 17% of total Merger & 
Acquisition (M&A) activity in the peak year of 2006 (ECB, 2007b). This compares to 
just 3% in 2000 (ECB, 2007b). So purely from a historical or evolutionary perspective, 
it is unlikely that they would simply disappear after at least 30 years of being an 
                                                
7	  (Data from Capital IQ for more than 17,000 LBOs between 1970 and 2007, presented by Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009).	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important part of the financial markets landscape and a history that goes back even 
further.  
Another reason to expect that credit functions will remain confronted with LBOs is that 
PE-firms continue to seek for and to invest large amounts of funds. The total 
investments by European PE-firms in 2011 amounted to approximately €46bn, of which 
roughly €42bn went into buyouts (EVCA 2012). During the first half of 2012, European 
PE funds focusing on buyouts raised €4.4bn ($5.5bn; Prequin, 2012) and globally the 
amount stood at €20.1bn ($25.1bn).8 LBOs have historically been the by far largest 
individual investment category (EVCA, 2012) for private equity. This is likely to lead to 
investment pressure on the side of PE-firms and strong competition in the bidding for 
potential LBO targets.  
Despite pressure to invest, a third driver for more activity is expected to be the pressure 
to divest and return funds to investors. Some funds have a predetermined lifetime and 
are required to return cash to investors upon expiry of this period (Deutsche 
Bundesbank, 2007). This was likely one of the drivers for the never before witnessed 
number of companies being subject to an LBO as a second secondary buyout (i.e. being 
sold to another PE-Sponsor (see also Deutsche Bundesbank, 2007; Kaplan and 
Strömberg, 2009, Bonini, 2012). There was also a trend to even tertiary buyouts and 
recapitalisations (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2007). The circulation of transactions within 
the PE industry has constantly increased. The exit route secondary buyout was ranked 
second in terms of exit forms after strategic buyers, accounting for 24% of total LBO 
transaction volume in 2007 globally.9 However, following the outbreak of the financial 
crisis in 2007 exit opportunities, including the exit via selling to another PE-firm, 
became temporarily more limited. European PE-firms’ exits achieved via a secondary 
buyouts were only about 8% of total exits in 2009 (BVK, 2011), with write-offs of 
about EUR 3,6bn being the single largest exit route.10 But already in 2010, secondary 
buyouts accounted for approximately 1/3 of all exits by European PE-firms (BVK, 
                                                
8	  Converted at 1 $ = 0,759 € based on rates as of 30.6.2012. 
9 Data from Capital IQ, presented in Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009. 	  
10	  Figure includes write-offs on growth investments. However, Buyouts are the part PE investments. Figures relate to total exit 
volumes. 	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2011)11.  This phenomenon of such strong activity within the PE industry is yet 
relatively new as for a longer time horizon, their share was much lower. For example, 
Ayash (2013) illustrated that within a sample of 183 US public-to-private transactions 
that occurred between 1980 and 2006, only 10% were exited via a sale to another PE-
fund. The consequence of this is that a large number of transactions that were closed 
prior to the financial crisis that broke out in 2007 are still operating within an LBO 
framework, either now as a secondary LBO or still under the ownership of the first PE-
firm. This means that banks will continue to be asked for financing of existing 
transactions either as recapitalisations, extensions or as secondary, tertiary buyouts. In 
Europe, funds focusing particularly on secondary buyouts are emerging, with one fund 
that was reported to have closed raising in excess of $7bn in volume (Prequin, 2012). 
Assuming an average equity contribution of 30%-40% shows the significant volume of 
transactions foreseen in this segment of the market.  
Yet, even if an exit of the PE house is not required under the statutes of the funds, the 
debt included in these transactions is approaching its final maturity date and requires 
some form of refinancing. According to the Deutsche Bundesbank (2010), an amount of 
approximately €7612/$100bn of buyout loans (author’s comment: of which LBOs are a 
significant part) will reach their final maturity in 2014 and a similar figure was shown 
for the year 2015.13 Some comments have already been made that LBO structures are 
becoming more aggressive again. The IMF in its June 2011 Market Update of the 
Global Financial Stability Report stated that leverage multiples of leveraged loans were 
experiencing upward momentum again.  
Banks can use the results of this study to critically review the work of their own credit 
functions. If any areas for improvement can be confirmed, the potential measures for 
more effectiveness can be considered as a starting point for further consideration. 
Moreover, the methodology could also be applied to review credit management 
processes for other specialised lending products. Finally, as the results remain 
exploratory and indicative, they offer many opportunities for further research to be 
carried out.  
                                                
11	  See previous note. 	  
12	  Converted at 1 $ = 0,76 € as of 31.12.2010.	  
13 Volumes have been estimated from a graphical presentation included in the Financial Stability Report November 
2010 (page 66 of the German Version of the Report).  
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1.3 Structure of LBOs  
An LBO within this research is defined as a takeover of a company by a private-equity 
firm (PE-firm), where the majority of the purchase price is raised in the form of debt 
and where the underlying earnings (sometimes complemented by asset disposals) of the 
acquired business are meant to be the main repayment source (Deutsche Bundesbank, 
2006). A review of educational literature (e.g. Arnold, 2008), the publications of other 
institutions (e.g. IMF, 2007b), or recognised dictionaries (e.g. Concise Oxford 
Dictionary, 2011), provides a high level of consistency within the definition.  
In order to be able to service the significant debt involved, companies with high cash 
flow stability are typically considered suitable for LBOs (ECB; 2007a). An early study 
carried out by Lehn and Poulson (1989) on US public-to-private transactions found that 
available free cash flow increases the propensity of a company going private and can be 
regarded as early support for the statement regarding the requirement of high cash flow 
stability 
PE-firms invest in LBOs through their funds which are mainly from institutional 
investors and high net-worth individuals. Their funds usually have a predetermined 
limited lifetime (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005/Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009; regarding 
limited lifetime also see Deutsche Bundesbank, 2007). The ECB (2007a, p. 8) describes 
PE as  
“medium to long-term equity financing of unquoted companies or financing of the 
equity tranche of buyouts of public companies”.  
Profits are to be achieved by receiving a higher price when the business is resold and/or 
by accumulating and the taking out of cash from the business based on improved 
operating performance (see for example, Deutsche Bundesbank, 2007). 
While this research focuses on the work of the credit function of banks and therefore the 
main concern is bank debt, some understanding of the overall structural aspects is 
required since there are interdependencies within the debt. Figure 1-1 provides a 
schematic overview of how LBOs were frequently structured.  
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Figure 1-1: Structure of LBOs. Source: Author’s own, adapted from Deutsche Bundesbank (2007) and Salans 
(2010).  
Funds are provided at different levels within the structure and pushed down to the 
acquisition company, mainly via shareholder loans.  The closer funds are to the target 
company, the more they benefit from seniority. A LBO credit within this research refers 
to a loan (or several loans) provided by banks in the form of senior debt to finance an 
LBO. While being exposed to higher credit risk compared to normal corporate credits, 
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within the LBO structure they benefit from a significant degree of seniority. They are 
largely granted to a company (acquisition company) that is close to the target company 
and sometimes to a smaller degree directly to the target company or even its operating 
subsidiary. Any revolving credit facilities are typically advanced at the level of the 
operating subsidiary.  
In addition to benefitting from being close to the assets, they benefit from the security 
packages, which frequently go all the way up to the level just below Holding Company 
I. Second-lien investors are at the same level, but only have a second claim on security 
that is granted, whereas more remote lenders such as junior debt also face structural 
subordination. However, as indicated by the direct arrow from junior debt to the 
acquisition company, conversations with market practitioners have revealed that 
presently these lenders also succeed in becoming lenders to the acquisition company, 
removing the structural subordination, while contractual subordination is maintained. 
An even more recent development is that all the debt (senior and junior) is wrapped into 
one single tranche and the borrower pays a blended rate of interest, falling somewhere 
in between the senior and junior tranche.  During the course of the empirical part of this 
research, market participants commented on this phenomenon, stating that this would 
largely be driven by the historically low recovery rates that were achieved for 
subordinated tranches.  
1.4 The Role of the Credit Function 
The credit function is defined as the organisational unit within banks that is charged 
with analysing and monitoring LBO credits. Figure 1-2 provides a schematic overview 
of how credit functions work and the overall focus of the thesis. Typically, credit 
functions receive requests from the structuring teams, which put together the initial 
credit application. Credit functions are then required to opine on these proposals and to 
approve them or to provide a recommendation for the relevant approval authority. The 
result can also be that some corrective action is proposed or demanded. When dealing 
with new transactions, this is referred to as credit analysis, whereas the on-going 
surveillance is referred to as credit monitoring. 
The focus of the work of credit functions is the credit risk, which within this thesis 
comprises both the default risk and the recovery risk.   
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Default risk describes the risk of an LBO company not being able to meet its contractual 
payment obligations.   
Recovery risk deals with the risk that the amount of debt outstanding that can be 
recouped once a default has occurred is low. 
 
Figure 1-2: Overview thematic scope of this thesis. Source: Author’s own.  
Closely related to the work of credit functions and in part overlapping is credit portfolio 
management. No unique definition of credit portfolio management exists. However, 
owed to the principal business of banks, there has always been a need to manage credit 
exposures effectively by avoiding concentration risks and by early recognition of 
deteriorating credit exposures (e.g. Felsenheimer et al., 2006, p.13). From this, 
conclusions can be drawn regarding the potential impact of individual loans and the 
portfolio as a whole. Active credit portfolio management, as defined in this research, 
analyses the risks also with regards to their correlation and is based on this.  Risks in 
credit portfolios can be adjusted by either using more traditional methods such as 
renegotiating with the borrower, or by taking advantage of more liquid secondary 
markets and the quantum of credit derivatives (similar, Felsenheimer et al., 2006). 
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Credit portfolio management has been high on banks’ agendas in the last few years and 
continues to be so (Ridder, 2009), especially since the mid-1990s (Stegemann and 
Jamin, 2008).  Amongst the drivers behind this are a more liquid secondary market, a 
challenging competitive environment and the serious effect loan losses can have on 
profitability in banks (Dürr, 2008). Yet, banks vary greatly as to how they organise and 
implement CPM within their processes, which ranges from banks with centralised credit 
portfolio management units that do take ownership of assets and are expected to 
generate profits at one extreme to those institutions where this largely rests within the 
risk-taking/risk analysis units (Ridder, 2009; Dürr, 2008; the authors also provide 
descriptions of the features of the individual models).  
The surveillance of exposures based on some criteria has been at the centre of credit 
portfolio management from a historical perspective (Garside et al., 1999) and is actually 
more commonly associated with the work of credit functions. Part of the implications 
during the financial crisis has been that banks were unable to manage the exposures 
simply because there was no market to trade or transfer risks, at least not at a reasonable 
price. Therefore, much of what had previously been possible under active portfolio 
management was no longer available. As a result, more traditional measures have 
increased in importance again. The measures of credit portfolio management are 
referred to using aspects of portfolio-management (APFM), reflecting that the use is 
limited to what can be practically utilised in the work of credit functions. 
One question that might arise at this juncture is why the research focuses on the credit 
function, and does not take a wider view, such as that of a central credit portfolio 
management function. First, credit portfolio management has not strongly focused on 
LBOs; therefore gaining transparency and understanding the risk factors and their use in 
the credit management process is a reasonable starting point.  Acceptance for credit 
portfolio management is also likely to be higher if it starts at this early level. Secondly, 
the most advanced business model where CPM functions do take full ownership of the 
assets are typically formed as profit centres (Ridder, 2009; Dürr, 2008) and therefore 
cannot be allocated within credit functions for potential conflict-of-interest reasons. 
Thirdly, even if a bank chooses to implement a separate credit portfolio management 
function that actively manages the portfolio, this would not preclude credit functions to 
form their own view of the portfolio and to take this into account when evaluating 
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individual transactions. Therefore, the co-existence of several approaches, potentially 
with slightly different goals, is a possibility.  
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
To achieve its research aim, the thesis first reviews the literature related to the risk 
factors in LBO credits. The thesis also introduces some basic aspects of portfolio 
management and highlights the results of a survey relating to LBO credit risk 
management practices. Here, the research finds an inconsistency: On the one hand, risk 
factors in LBOs are well known and allegedly credit risk management practices are very 
detailed and sound. However, on the other hand, if credit risk management was 
adequately focused on the relevant risk factors and sufficiently integrated, then the 
constant drift to more risk (i.e. higher debt multiples, loser covenants, more complexity 
in debt composition) until shortly before the financial crisis (2007) should not have 
occurred. This observation formed the basis for the empirical part of this study. Within 
this, the importance ascribed to individual risk factors and the utilization of these risk 
factors within the credit management process was analysed using a semi-structured 
questionnaire/interview instrument to gain information from the experts about the work 
of credit functions (See Appendix 2, p. 154). The analysis uses a combination of 
quantitative/statistical and qualitative methods. This was necessary for completeness 
and at the same time served as a built-in measure with the aim of enhancing reliability, 
validity and generalizability. As a further step in this direction, the aggregate results 
were discussed with four senior credit executives who were not previously involved in 
the study. Ultimately, the results were presented to the credit function of a bank and 
comments were invited.  
From here on, the structure of the thesis is as follows: 
• Chapter 2 (Literature Review and Research Problem Development, p. 16) 
focuses on the literature relating to risk factors in LBOs, both from a market as 
well as from a transaction specific perspective. The chapter also introduces some 
measures of credit portfolio management that could easily be used by credit 
functions. Regarding the actual practices of credit functions, the literature review 
takes advantage of the results of a survey, carried out by the BSC. The chapter
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concludes with a summary of the findings and the identification of the research 
problem.  
• Chapter 3 (Research Objective and Methodology, p. 52) operationalizes the 
research problem by transferring it into a wider research aim and a series of 
research objectives. It then discusses where the research is allocated within the 
research paradigms and describes the research design and details of the data 
collection process.  This chapter also contains a section on research ethics.
• Chapter 4 (Data Analysis and Research Findings, p. 74) describes how the data 
was analysed and shows the results of the analysis. Results relating to individual 
aspects are discussed and then synthesised. The chapter also explains how the 
results were checked for plausibility to enhance their robustness.
• Chapter 5 (Conclusions, Limitations and Further Research, p. 121) uses the
results from Chapter 4 to draw conclusions. It also contains a summary of the
study, explains how it contributes to knowledge, states the limitations of the
study and makes recommendations for further research.
1.6  Main Results of the Thesis 
The study finds that there are clearly identifiable risk factors in LBO credit risk. Most 
importantly, leverage appears to be the dominant individual driver of credit risk. In 
total, ten risk drivers are identified which are important for default risk and recovery 
risk. These are the LBO cycle, sponsor quality, type of transaction, leverage, financial 
covenants, debt composition, jurisdiction, collateral, industry state and the overall state 
of the economy. 
The research finds that credit functions are well aware of these risk factors. In 
particular, it is viewed that there are cyclical moves in LBO activity (LBO cycle) that do 
cause risk factors to change which can be used as a signal for more risk in the overall 
market. The factors mainly signalling this are leverage, the type of transaction, financial 
covenants as well as sponsor quality.  
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Interestingly, while the importance of the LBO cycle is acknowledged, as is the 
importance of the remaining risk factors, this does not consistently translate to high 
attention to these factors in credit analysis and credit monitoring. The LBO cycle and 
sponsor quality are factors that receive little attention in these areas. Also, generally, the 
use of the risk factors overall is less present in credit monitoring then in credit analysis.  
The research also suggests that aspects of portfolio-management such as concentration 
measures or classification of the risk factors into categories are not used to a large 
extent at credit function level while this could improve the effectiveness of the credit 
management process.  
The research then argues that the discrepancy between the importance of the risk factors 
and their use in credit analysis and credit monitoring as well as the limited use of 
portfolio-management with view to the risk factors represent areas of improvement. 
These have been defined as follows from this research:  
• Inclusion of systematic risk as represented by the LBO cycle.  
• Completeness of credit risk evaluation; ensuring that all the risk factors are 
viewed in accordance with their evidenced importance for the default and the 
recovery risk.  
• Systematic integration of credit analysis, credit monitoring and credit portfolio 
management which is a pre-requisite for a to be accomplished.  
• Utilization of results for credit decisions, as otherwise the above remains purely 
analytical without any practical relevance.  
A short discussion on how these could be addressed conceptually is included as the final 
part of the research; but before any of these would be addressed and practical 
implementation would the considered triangulation of results and further validation 
would be required as the research had some limitations including limited sample size 
and timing lags (see Section 5.4, p. 132).   
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Chapter 2: Literature Review and Research Problem Development 
2.1 LBOs and Similar Transactions 
This section discusses some of the similarities and differences between LBOs and 
similar transactions, namely MBOs and LRCs. This was viewed necessary as later 
sections partly utilize research on these transactions and this literature review makes 
inferences for LBOs from this.   
LBOs in general are a considerably researched subject and have received much attention 
from the academic community as well as from industry researchers or market experts 
alike. Sometimes research is focused on the related transaction category of Management 
Buy-Outs (MBOs) instead of LBOs and sometimes the term Highly Leveraged 
Transactions is found. This typically includes MBOs, LBOs as well as LRCs.  
An LBO has been defined as a takeover of a company under the control of a PE-firm in 
the introductory section. Management typically receives some participation in these 
transactions. By comparison, MBOs typically describe the takeover of a company under 
the control of the management, while it is also not uncommon to find the term MBO 
without making it clear whether this includes the cases where PE-firms play a role (i.e. 
LBO) or not. Moreover, also in an MBO, there is typically significant debt financing 
involved. The definitions overlap. The Oxford Concise English Dictionary actually 
relates the term leveraged buyout (i.e. LBO) to the purchase of the company under the 
control of management (Oxford Concise English Dictionary, 2011).  
 
An LRC, by contrast, is marked by existing shareholders taking distributions in the form 
of dividends or equity reimbursements (similar, Gupta and Rosenthal, 1991), which are 
frequently funded by a debt instrument. The border between these three types of 
transaction is not clear-cut, even leaving aside the definitions found. Many transactions 
would fit into more than one category, even if rigid definitions were used. For example, 
a significant number of LBOs actually paid out large debt-funded dividends to their PE-
firms in the years 2005-2007. Utilizing research by Gupta and Rosenthal (1991) 
regarding the differences between LRC and LBOs, the similarities and differences 
between those transactions and an MBO can be summarised as shown in the following 
table.  
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Similarities and differences between MBOs, LBOs and LRCs 
Aspect  MBO LBO LRC 
Significant increase in 
debt load and 
deterioration in debt 
protection metrics 
Strong Strong Strong 
Increased pressure on 
management to focus on 
cash-flow 
Strong Strong Strong 
Increase in Management 
Ownership/Employee 
Ownership  
Strong Medium None* 
Principal-Agent 
Relationship Mgt. and 
Shareholders 
Little conflict, interests 
aligned 
Reduced potential for 
conflict, due to 
management 
participation in equity 
Unchanged 
Default would hurt 
management’s personal 
wealth 
Strong Strong Not directly 
Table 2-1: Similarities and differences between MBOs, LBOs and LRCs. Source: Author’s own; aspects utilised 
research by Gupta and Rosenthal (1991). * Gupta and Rosenthal view this point as strong also in 
LRCs. Gupta and Rosenthal do not comment on all these aspects.  
There are strong similarities and there are likely to be similarities in the determinants of 
default within those transactions, which is why this broadened focus of including 
research relating to MBOs and LRCs and making inferences is permissible. Where the 
character of the transaction is important for interpreting results, this will be taken into 
account.   
Regarding the research on the general performance of LBOs (or MBOs/LRCs) and the 
drivers of default, much academic and industrial research is available and has been 
utilised. Industrial research is frequently much more focused on recent market 
developments or currently observed phenomena, although the methods used to derive 
conclusions are likely to be less technical. Its inclusion was deemed useful since it can 
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provide additional data points. Potential reservations are flagged accordingly in the 
relevant sections. 
2.2 Performance of LBOs and Credit Implications 
A natural starting point for a section dealing with LBOs is therefore the question of 
whether they tend to be successful transactions overall. From the viewpoint of the PE-
firm, this would mean that they would actually be able to make a (significant) profit 
from these transactions. For banks providing the financing of these transactions the 
criteria of success would be less demanding, since from their perspective the avoidance 
of default is sufficient. As long as they are repaid and receive their interest payments in 
the contractually agreed manner, the transaction might be viewed a success, albeit from 
a broader conceptual perspective this is questionable, as will be discussed further below.  
Even if this criterion of meeting contractual payment obligations is accepted for a 
moment, what needs to be taken into account is that in many cases this is contingent on 
certain assumptions about growth in cash-flows and profitability being met. Demiroglu 
(2008) was able to show that debt was sized with a view to forecast EBITDA-growth. 
This means that some increase in operating performance is required to avoid default or 
at least that there is limited headroom for adverse change.  
If the performance of LBOs was not satisfactory overall, this would raise the 
fundamental question as to why banks would participate in such a business by providing 
debt and taking a disproportionate level of risk. Views on whether LBOs lead to 
improvements in operating performance vary (see below; e.g. Bergström (2007) or 
Harris et al. (2005) vs. Cohn, Mills and Towery (2013)). The studies quoted below are 
presented to shed some light on this issue.  
A number of studies have provided support for the claim that LBOs generate value and 
at least provide increases in cash-flows, which is what banks are mostly concerned with. 
For example, Guo et al. (2011) evaluated the performance of 192 LBOs in the US, all of 
which took place between 1990 and 2006. For a subset of 94 companies with adequate 
data on the post buyout performance, they found significant returns between the buyout 
and the value after the outcome (IPO, trade-sale, secondary LBO, chapter 11, still 
private) driven by tax benefits, operating performance improvements and valuation 
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developments. Regarding operating performance, they highlight that the improvements 
they measure post buyout are less than those shown by studies using earlier data and are 
frequently only close to those of those of benchmark firms. Still, the contribution from 
operating performance to the increased valuation is substantial.  
The holders of the equity, i.e. the PE-firm, would typically initiate governance changes 
(Halpern et al., 2008) since ultimately they are the principals and the managers 
represent their agents. Guo et al. (2011) found that the improvements are positively 
related to changes in the CEO.   
Acharya et al. (2013, see below) have also researched whether there is an improvement 
in performance driven by the involvement of a PE-firm (sponsor), which they were able 
to confirm. I interpret their research to further support the positive performance of 
LBOs, provided an experienced PE-firm is present. It also suggests that the quality of 
the sponsor is an important aspect.  The improvements in performance are mainly seen 
to stem from the exercising of close monitoring and control by the PE-firm (e.g. Gao, 
2014, similarly Demiroglu 2008, Cotter and Peck 2001), the unification of interests 
between management and shareholders following the LBO and the disciplining effect of 
debt which forces management to focus on cash flow generation (see also e.g. Jensen 
1986). However, Bergström et al. (2007) point out that according to Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) debt on its own cannot change the returns to the company’s stakeholders. 
Therefore at first glance the argument of a positive effect of debt could be viewed 
inconsistent with the view established by Modigliani and Miller (1958). However, the 
proponents of LBOs usually do not attribute the value increase to the debt itself, but to 
the effects that debt has for management. Therefore, it could be possible that other 
incentives to focus on cash flows in the same manner as LBOs do would lead to similar 
results.  
Industry research frequently outlines the superior performance of LBO transactions 
based on how they actually improve profitability. An interesting practitioner’s point of 
view was presented by Ernst & Young (2007) which showed that average 
improvements EBITDA for PE-led firms was 16%, compared to 10% for publicly 
traded companies.  
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While such studies according to the practitioner’s view have their value and provide 
first indications, some further aspects ought to be considered before conclusions are 
drawn. A first point is that value enhancements might be the result of improvements in 
profitability and productivity, but could also result from general positive market 
sentiment or overall industry effects.  
Some studies have taken account of industry-effects, such as Guo et al. (2011). 
Typically, these studies compare the performance of LBOs vs. the public companies 
within the industry or by allocating any surplus generated to components (such as 
industry performance or productivity improvements). Studies focusing on a number of 
operating financing measures and relating them to industry-performance in some form 
are preferable over simple profitability comparisons. Bergström et al. (2007) conducted 
such a study on a number of LBOs in the Swedish market. Their selection of measures - 
EBITDA-Margin, Return on Capital and Sales Growth can be interpreted as measures 
for profitability (EBITDA-Margin), productivity (Return on Capital) and growth 
potential (Sales growth). They found that LBOs outperformed their peer-group on the 
first two measures (both in absolute and industry adjusted measures). 
A much earlier study than that undertaken by Bergström et al. (2007) was performed by 
Kaplan (1989), who investigated a total of 48 buyouts (public to private transactions in 
the US) with a view to whether they produce significant improvements in operating 
performance. Overall, the analysis was supportive of improvements in earnings and 
cash flows, albeit the former only show a remarkable upward move in the third year 
following the buyout. Also, earnings ratios to sales and to assets (the latter to take into 
account changes in the asset base) show improvements. Importantly, positive changes 
were recorded also when adjusting for industry changes.   
A common issue when using financial ratios for measurement purposes is that they are 
subject to various influences. While controlling for industry-effects is useful, it is not 
possible to take all potential external effects into account (for example the beneficial 
effects of currency moves) or those at the management’s discretion (e.g. valuation 
assumptions which affect asset-based ratios).  
A way to avoid this is to look directly at the productivity within the value chain of 
business. Harris et al. (2005) tested the performance of operating plants in the UK that 
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were part of a management buyout in the period from 1994 to 1998, covering 979 
MBOs and almost five thousand plants. They concluded that productivity improves as a 
result of a buyout, in particular labour efficiency and total factor productivity. However, 
as sources they identified action driven by the management and cuts in the labour force. 
In contrast, Bergström et al. (2007) did not find support for significant labour force 
reductions.  Smith (1990) who analysed 58 UK LBOs that took place between 1986 and 
1997 also did not find significant reductions in employment levels, albeit cash flows 
were significantly improved.  
Similar to Harris et al. (2005), Liechtenberg and Siegel (1990) analysed the effect of 
buyouts (LBOs including MBOs) on total factor productivity. Their database included 
12.000 plants for buyouts that took place between 1981 and 1986. They were able to 
show that buyouts that occurred from 1983 onwards have shown significant 
productivity gains.  
While the studies referenced above tend to support the improvements in performance in 
LBOs, the view is not unchallenged. Ayash (2013) conducted a study based on US 
LBOs. The analysis did not reveal any significant difference in the changes in 
profitability following an LBO when compared to their industry peers. Operating profit 
in relation to assets was higher in the first four years following the buyout, but then 
showed a remarkable reduction in the fifth year. However, Ayash demonstrated that 
working capital management significantly improves following an LBO and that LBO 
firms reduce investments and show lower growth in assets, employment and even in 
sales.  The findings of Ayash could be interpreted that firms post LBO are managed 
with more focus on cash flow generation. Potential causes for this could be the 
requirement to operate under a higher debt burden (Jenssen, 1986) or additional 
expertise brought into a transaction by an experienced PE house (e.g. Acharya 2013).   
As Ayash has, Cohn, Mills and Towery (2014) have also used data from US corporate 
tax return to investigate potential changes in the performance of LBO. Their sample size 
consists of 317 LBOs that occurred between 2005 and 2007; all the companies in their 
sample were public companies prior to the LBO. As measures they use pre-interest 
return on assets and on sales as well as a measure of economic value and cannot find 
significant improvements in these measures post LBO for the entire sample. In contrast, 
when they focussed the analysis solely on those LBOs that continued to publish 
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financial statements, they discovered some improvements on performance, in particular 
based on industry-adjusted measures. Their observation regarding asset growth and 
sales growth does not provide a clear trend towards reductions, as was the case for 
Ayash (2013).  
Liu (2013) did an examination of 501 US LBOs that were public to private transactions 
during the years 1986 to 2011. Interestingly, he finds improved performance of 
transactions that were concluded in up to the 1990s. However, for transactions post 
2000 no significant improvement has been detected. This observation can be reflected 
upon against the increasing aggressiveness of transactions post 2000 and the rise in 
secondary and tertiary transactions.  
Cohn and Towery (2013) performed a study based on US tax returns for a total sample 
of 408 LBOs that were private prior to the LBO between 1995 and 2007. In this study, 
the author’s find some improvements in operating performance compared to the year 
prior to the buyout. However, contrary to Cohn, Mills and Towery (2014) they find very 
significant increases in sales within this group of LBOs and point out that these firms 
already have relatively high leverage when being acquired. The authors measured this 
by dividing the debt by the assets and show that the companies in this sample have this 
ratio at 59.6% prior to the buyout and 70.8% thereafter which compares to 36.6% and 
74.8% for firms that are private prior to the buyout. It is argued that private companies’ 
growth could be inhibited by a lack of funding options and that the involvement of PE 
removes this constraining factor.  
Credit implications result based on whether LBO transactions actually do lead to 
performance improvements. If that is the case, then business plans showing growth in 
EBITDA can still be considered acceptable from a credit risk standpoint whereas if on 
the whole LBOs do not lead to operating improvements, this would suggest that the 
credit risk deteriorates based on the leverage and this is not mitigated by other 
improvements; hence they would simply be transactions with higher default risk. For 
recovery risk, this would mean that there is no improvement in the Economic Value and 
therefore during the lifetime of the transaction, improvements in equity cushions could 
not be expected. 
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2.3 Risk Drivers in LBOs 
The previous section has established that LBOs are generally suitable for debt 
financing, but also highlighted that the risk-reward profile for banks providing these 
funds is likely to be skewed heavily to the risk side. Therefore, credit functions 
managing these exposures must review the credit risk in detail. The credit risk 
comprises the default risk and the recovery risk. Factors driving one or both of these 
components of credit risk are referred to as risk factors.  
This section deals with these risk factors. Recovery risk is much less researched 
generally. Many studies on recovery rates use data from banks (e.g. Grunert and Weber, 
2008) or rating agencies (Khieu and Mullineaux, 2009). While there is sufficient 
research on recovery rates in general, it is typically not tailored specifically to LBOs. 
Inferences from the general literature on recoveries needed to be made for this reason.  
Linking the two areas together and making inferences, all the factors that are evaluated 
for default risk are also interpreted in terms of their relevance for recovery risk.    
The identified risk factors that will be discussed in more detail below are: 
• Sponsor Quality
• Type of Transaction
• Leverage
• Financial Covenants
• Debt Composition
• Jurisdiction
• Collateral
• Industry State
• Overall State of the Economy
• LBO Cycle
The LBO cycle as an overarching risk factor that is marked by changes in the individual 
risk factors and therefore discussed last within this section.  
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The factors jurisdiction, collateral, industry state and overall state of the economy are 
only considered in terms of recovery risk. In developed countries the legal system as 
reflected in the factor jurisdiction comes into play when a default has occurred or is 
likely in the near future. This is the same for collateral. It should not be assumed that 
jurisdiction and collateral have an influence on the risk of default.  
 
The risk factors industry state and overall state of the economy also influence the 
default risk. Yet, this feature is likely to be present for all borrowers, not simply for 
LBOs. However, as LBOs show an above propensity to financial distress based on their 
highly leveraged capital structure, the issue of the impact on recovery is more important 
and this is likely to be different for LBOs than for other corporate borrowers (as will be 
discussed below).  
 
The factors investigated for recovery risk overlap in part with those proposed by Böttger 
et al. (2008). In their working paper, they recommended a total of six factors for the 
inclusion in recovery estimation models, which is a focus different from the one of this 
thesis. Yet, all of the factors that are being discussed with view only to recovery risk are 
amongst their proposal, as is debt composition (which they relate to capital structure 
and seniority). As they are focused solely on finding input variables to recovery models, 
they do not discuss any of their factors with view to default risk.  
2.3.1 Sponsor Quality  
The influence of sponsor quality on the credit risk for an LBO can be summarised by 
two factors. The first relates to the control that a PE-firm exercises. Due to their high 
return requirements, they narrowly follow their transactions and where necessary make 
changes to management and/or board composition. In broad terms the implications for 
this study would be that:  
 
• If sponsor quality influences the performance of the business, it serves to lower 
the default risk. 
• If sponsor quality enhances the operating performance, enterprise value 
increases and has an impact on the recovery risk. 
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• Recovery risk could also be impacted if high quality sponsors do actually help 
resolve financially distressed situations.  
 
Generally, financial sponsors enable companies to take on more debt, whether this is 
simply because of their knowledge about funding options available or because lenders 
take comfort from their involvement. Gao (2014) analysed whether there is value-
creation in LBOs from the influence of the financial sponsor and from debt. While he 
did not find a contribution from debt, Gao found substantial contribution derived from 
the influence of PE firms in LBOs. Liu (2013), in contrast, uses various measures for 
PE reputation but finds no significant relationship with performance but finds that 
LBOs with a high reputation sponsor are more likely to be exited successfully, which 
also is important for bank credit risk.  
 
Cohn and Towery (2013) show that private companies subject to an LBO were already 
operating under high leverage which increased further following an LBO and that sales 
increased substantially thereafter. This at least indicates that lenders attribute some 
value to the involvement of PE firms.  
 
Also, high reputation sponsors appear to be more selective than those with less positive 
reputations. Cao, Mason and Song (2010) have analysed how sponsors have acted 
during the years prior to the financial crisis, when credit was easily obtained. They 
found that high reputation sponsors had focused more on better quality companies 
(authors comment: lower default risk companies) and actually chose transactions that 
had more covenants. Both of which indicate that they are influential on the risk of 
default.  
 
As part of his analysis on the impact of sponsor reputation on the financing structure, 
loan contract terms and valuations, Demiroglu (2008) demonstrated that LBOs with the 
involvement of a high reputation sponsor would show fewer cases of financial distress. 
Consistent with this, Acharya et al. (2013) found that mature PE-firms in particular are 
able to generate superior returns, which is attributed to their active engagement and 
specific skills in the transactions, which influences operating performance. This is also 
in line with Brinkhuis and De Maeseneire (2012), who demonstrated that high 
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reputation sponsors do receive higher leverage. If this is the case, the bankers providing 
this leverage obviously view the reputation of the sponsor as a factor that mitigates risk.  
 
Cotter and Peck (2001) performed a similar analysis. They tested whether companies 
benefitted if a buyout specialist holds a controlling stake. They found that transactions 
that benefited from a buyout specialist (author’s comment: typically a PE investor who 
is able to exercise close monitoring of performance and if required takes corrective 
action) were less likely to encounter financial distress. Interestingly, this was the case, 
albeit the credit terms imposed on them were frequently less demanding, which would 
normally be expected to increase the risk of default. On the other hand, they found that 
the transactions that were not controlled by specialised PE-firms (for example, classical 
MBOs) experienced improvements in their operating performance if debt terms were 
tight, which suggests that the argument that pressure caused by debt increases 
performance is particularly important for this category of buyouts. Put differently, this 
means that covenants (or constraining debt terms) are a useful instrument to enhance 
performance and reduce default risk (see below), but experienced PE-firms that get 
actively involved are a more important driver and therefore they do overcompensate the 
shortcomings that the capital structure or debt documentation might have from a 
banker’s point of view.  
 
Denis (1994) provided a case-study which compared the performance of Kroger’s 
recapitalisation and Safeway’s LBO. The comparison was suitable as both businesses 
were active in grocery stores. Denis explains the different approaches to restructuring, 
which in the case of Safeway are more focused on aligning interest between principals 
and agents (such as performance oriented compensations and increased monitoring) 
whereas Safeway focused on finding liquidity in the company by selling assets or 
cutting capital expenditure. In his analysis Denis shows that returns to investors and 
improvements in operating performance were higher in the case of the LBO.  
 
The argument that specialised PE-firms would also protect the interest of debt investors 
was also tested by Opler (1993). Opler found that the presence of a specialist LBO 
focused PE-firm also reduces the interest payable, which is supportive of the claim. The 
argument was recently substantiated by a study on yield-spreads of companies that had 
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private equity involvement performed by Huang, Ritter and Zhang, 2013. The authors 
conclude“…reputational concerns alleviate their (author’s insertion: PE firms) 
incentive to expropriate the bondholders of their portfolio companies”, (Huang, Ritter 
and Zahng, 2013, p. 31).  
 
The important role of a PE investor, as outlined in those studies, can be reflected upon 
against a recent piece of collaborative research between Boston Consulting Group and 
IESE Business School (IESE, 2008). Their study points out that increasingly those PE-
firms that generate superior returns also get involved in the fundamentals of the 
business.  
 
While Cohn, Mills and Towery (2014) do not find support for operating improvements 
from operational involvement of the PE firm (nor from other explanations), they 
provide some data that shows that financial sponsors make notable contributions to 
LBO-companies even post LBO to help their portfolio companies when needed. The 
total post LBO contribution they report is 8.55% and 2.66% during year one and two 
after the buyout. The commitment of the PE firm to their portfolio companies is further 
supported by Cohn, Mills and Towery’s observation that dividend distributions to PE 
houses are generally relatively limited. Therefore, sponsor quality needs to include the 
willingness and ability of the sponsor to commit additional funds or not to take out 
dividends.  
 
There are measurement issues involved in sponsor quality. It is first usually surrogated 
by the sponsor’s reputation, which is measured by some sort of market share criteria. 
However, in summary the existing research supports that the quality of a sponsor has an 
influence on the default risk and the recovery risk of LBO transactions, since there 
seems to be evidence of them enhancing performance. If the line of argument put 
forward by Opler (1993) is valid, this would suggest that this also has an impact on 
recovery rates. PE-firms would step in if financial problems arose and potentially 
provide additional funds to rescue the business.  
 
Hotchkiss et al. (2012) have analysed how PE firms handle financial distress and found 
that PE backed firms exit the crisis state more quickly and re-emerge as on-going 
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businesses more frequently than their non-PE peers. Once controlling for industry and 
company specific aspects, they also found that there are no differences in recovery rates. 
This suggests that PE firms are dealing with such situations very rationally with a focus 
on minimising the cost of the crisis.   
2.3.2 Type of Transaction 
The reasoning why the type of transaction could have an impact on the credit risk in 
LBOs can be summarised as follows: 
• It is assumed that much of the upside potential has been lifted during the
primary buyout, therefore there is less left for the secondary buyout.
• In order for the first-time buyer to achieve an adequate return, the purchase price
of a secondary buyout needs to be higher than that paid in the first time
transaction, which leads at least to higher debt levels in absolute terms.
• If both of the above are correct, then this would suggest a lower recovery rate
since there would be more debt sharing in the value of collateral or the enterprise
value.
Wang (2012) analysed the rationale for secondary buyouts. One of the potential 
rationales he put forward were efficiency gains, as is a rationale for LBOs in general. 
While absolute cash-flow levels (as well as EBITDA) rise following a secondary buyout 
these are accompanied by lower efficiency as measured by EBITDA/sales or in relation 
to assets. Testing further potential explanations regarding the rationale, the author 
concludes that the best arguments are in favour of private equity firms using the 
opportunity of favourable debt market conditions while the equity markets are inactive 
as an exit route. Bonini (2012) found marginal to no improvements in operating 
performance in secondary buyouts, while at the same time showed that they retain less 
liquidity and have higher debt levels compared to primary transactions. Bonini (2012) 
also points out that the source of return for the investor is a different one. In primary 
transactions, this is mainly generated through the exit price, whereas in secondary 
transactions this is based on distributions during the life of the investments. This 
 	  
29 
increases the vulnerability of these transactions to adverse changes in their operating 
environment compared to primary deals (Bonini 2012).   
 
Sousa and Jenkinson (2010) find that secondary LBOs have weaker operating 
performance than those transactions where the exit from the PE-firm was achieved via 
an IPO. They also show a decrease in return on assets, which they state is indicative of 
the company operating less efficient. This is consistent with Wang (2012). However, on 
operating cash flows the improvements are stronger for secondary transactions, which is 
attributed to reductions in capital expenditure.  
 
Axelson et al. (2013, 2010) found that secondary LBOs have more leverage. Brinkhuis 
and De Maeseneire (2012) tested whether there are differences in leverage measures 
between primary and secondary buyouts. Their hypothesis is that primary transactions 
have more leverage. Consequently, a greater amount of debt can be borrowed against 
future improvements projected in a primary LBO. They found that secondary buyouts 
are significantly more leveraged than primary transactions. This is consistent with the 
view that practitioners take. Now, as leverage is an important driver of defaults, then by 
implication secondary buyouts exhibit higher credit risk. At least a further indication for 
more risk in secondary (or tertiary transactions) can be obtained from the research 
undertaken by Guo et al. (2011, 2009). In their analysis of the returns on LBO 
transactions (measured as any cash flows received during the holding period and the 
terminal value, divided by the purchase price when the transaction took place in the case 
of post buyout returns), they found that in particular in transactions where the exit is 
established via a secondary LBO a large part of the gain in capital can be attributed to 
changes in operating performance. The part of the return that can be attributed to 
operating performance is larger in secondary LBO exits than for exits established via 
trade sale or IPO. This provides support for the assumption that in secondary 
transaction, additional improvements in operating performance are more difficult to 
achieve as a larger part might already have been achieved (which the first-time buyer 
realizes when the secondary buyout takes place). However, the evidence regarding 
secondary LBOs is not conclusive yet and research into this area is just emerging. 
Bergström et al. (2007) did test whether secondary LBOs have less operating 
improvements than primary transactions. While their regression results shows the 
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expected sign for this, the relationship is not significant and therefore cannot be 
confirmed.  
2.3.3 Leverage 
The impact of leverage on default risk and recovery risk is rarely disputed. Given that 
there is support for the fact that LBOs increase value, they are also accompanied with 
increased credit risk. This is consistent with the basic principle of corporate finance that 
return is a function of risk. If LBOs outperform their peer-group, then it comes as no 
surprise that they show more risk. Funding a company with debt creates a contractually 
enforceable payment obligation, usually in the form of on-going interest requirements 
and in terms of repayment instalments. In the previous section it was summarised that 
the debt incurred in these transactions is one of the drivers of value increase. 
Conceptually, increasing debt reduces the cash available at the management’s discretion 
and by creating a fixed payment obligation leads to more efficient management (Jensen, 
1986). The use of debt is one of the suspected value drivers in LBOs. However, its 
actual contribution is controversial. For example, Gao (2014) was not able to show that 
debt positively contributes to value enhancement. In contrast, Lie (2013) did find that 
improved performance was associated with higher leverage (amongst others).   
 
Generally, the higher the level of debt, the higher these obligations and the more likely 
they might be missed. In the case of the default of the borrower, debt providers are 
likely to lose a significant part of the principal amount that they have advanced, while in 
the case of orderly performance their upside is limited to contractually agreed interest 
payments. In this regard, Hotchkiss et al. (2012) recently made an important 
observation. Their results can be interpreted as such that leverage on its own is a driver 
of default risk, but not the inclusion in an LBO as such since they found that there is no 
difference in the rate of default of PE owned firms and similarly leveraged non-PE 
firms. However, Hotchkiss et al. (2012) show that PE owned firms as such show higher 
rates of default than other leveraged borrowers, but are unable to confirm this once 
variances in leverage measures are taken into account.  
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Guo et al. (2011, 2009) outline that during the last upswing and high in LBO activity 
transactions were not structured as aggressively in terms of debt levels as the 
transactions that appeared during the 1980s, but they would still carry a high default risk 
(debt representing approx. 70% of total capital).  Also, Guo et al. point to increasingly 
aggressive structures for transactions completed post 2005.  
 
High debt loads are also stated to be a main risk factor by expert institutions, such as 
central banks or regulators. The Bank of England in its report dated July 2006 stated 
that leverage multiples have gone up substantially and that purchase multiples have 
reached record high levels. In the same year the FSA stated that lending to private 
equity backed firms “may not, in some circumstances, be entirely prudent” and that 
some defaults appeared likely (FSA, 2006, p. 7). The Deutsche Bundesbank in 2006 
stated that the leverage ratios that have been reached would likely result in some 
insolvencies and declared the sharp rise in the ratio as a warning sign. A much earlier 
study by Smith (1990) also stated that too high leverage levels in LBOs may even cause 
companies with progressing operating performance to face difficulties.  
 
Andrade and Kaplan (1999) used a sample of 31 transactions that took place between 
1980 and 1989 and subsequently became financially distressed.  They analysed them in 
terms of the causes of the financial problems experienced. They used three criteria as 
qualifying for financial stress: Insufficient EBITDA to cover interest expenses, debt 
restructuring requests or a default. For the sample companies, the authors investigated 
whether and if so, to what extent, the default (measured as the quantum of cash 
insufficiency) is caused by industry performance, firm specific performance, changes in 
interest rates and debt levels. They found that firm performance actually somewhat 
reduces the effect on the shortfall in cash, since the firms in the LBO sample performed 
better than their industry peer-group on average. This is consistent with the conclusion 
drawn previously that LBOs do lead to performance improvements. In terms of default 
risk, the clearly dominant contributor to a cash shortfall within the Andrade and Kaplan 
study is leverage.  
 
Prior to Andrade and Kaplan, Asquith et al. (1994) utilised the same type of test and 
applied it to 102 US companies that went into financial distress after issuing a high-
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yield bond. Their financial distress criterion was defined as a company generating 
insufficient EBITDA to cover interest expenses for two consecutive years. They come 
to a different result, with firm specific factors showing the strongest contribution to cash 
shortfall. This is likely to stem from the companies in the Asquith et al. sample having 
had some financial difficulties already when the high-yield bonds were issued. This can 
be deduced since Asquith et al. (1994) described that their sample firms were normally 
negative at the level of the EBITDA in the year of issuance and performance 
(EBITDA/assets) was below the industry-median. Both were not the case for the 
companies in the Andrade and Kaplan sample. In Andrade and Kaplan, companies were 
EBITDA positive and outperformed their industry peer group (albeit they were 
distressed). Although firm specific factors played by far the most important role in the 
study by Asquith et al. (1994), leverage still contributed 21% to the cash shortfall.  
 
Khieu and Mullineaux (2009) found that the leverage (as a borrower characteristic) a 
firm has before it defaults actually impairs recovery rates.  
 
The debt quantum in relation to cash-flow or earnings is even more important as this 
must be able to sustain swings in earnings and cash-flow generation throughout the time 
horizon since excess cash-flow is not typically used to reduce debt. Cohn, Mills and 
Towery (2014) are able to show that LBOs do not reduce leverage significantly in the 
years following the buyout and argue that it appears to reflect an intended and long-
lasting capital structure.  
2.3.4 Financial Covenants 
Financial covenants are components of the loan contract. They come into play in two 
forms. The most frequent form is that of a maintenance covenant, whereby the borrower 
needs to maintain certain minimum and/or maximum financial ratios. Typically, there 
are four maintenance covenants present in LBOs:  
 
• Debt restriction (expressed as a multiple of a profitability/cash flow measure). 
• Interest coverage ratio (requiring a measure covering interest expenses to be at 
least x-times the interest expenses). 
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• Cash flow coverage ratio (requiring that operating cash flow covers the cash-
debt service at least x times). 
• A cap on the annual amount allocated to capital expenditure.  
 
Alternatively, so-called incurrence covenants only prohibit the borrower from taking on 
additional debt beyond a certain level.  
 
A violation of a financial covenant constitutes an event of default, which entitles the 
lenders to call the loan (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2007). The arguments put forward for 
the impact of covenants on credit risk can be summarised as follows: 
 
a) They provide a tool for the close monitoring of transactions and early 
recognition of adverse developments. 
b) They convey a strong lever for negotiations, since they provide lenders with 
control in the case of violation. 
 
Some research into this area exists and is largely supportive of the impact of financial 
covenants on the credit risk. Demiroglu (2008) found that financial covenants reduced 
the default risk.  Liu (2013) was able to show that tighter financial covenants are related 
to improvements in operating performance. Covenants are considered to be important 
tools in monitoring transactions by market participants (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2007). 
Acharya et al. (2007) argued that due to the covenant-lite structures towards the end of 
the last LBO cycle, recoveries would likely to be lower.  Khieu and Mullineaux (2009) 
stated that due to covenants being included in structured loans, recoveries are higher. 
Carey and Gordy (2007) investigated recovery rates for firms in bankruptcy in the US. 
On average, they found a sample mean of 50% for firm-level recovery, with bank debt 
achieving significantly higher recoveries at 79%. Most interesting for the purpose of 
this document is that they were able to demonstrate statistically that the share of bank 
debt very strongly increases recovery rates and dominates other factors. Accordingly, 
they view bank covenants to establish relevant rights (consistent with what has been 
stated above) that support recovery rates.  
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2.3.5 Debt Composition 
Debt composition refers to the point that LBOs typically contain several layers of debt 
(e.g. Axelson et al., 2013; Deutsche Bundesbank, 2007; see also Figure 1-1, p. 9). The 
reason why these are considered to impact on credit risk in LBOs is that a diverse 
lender-group is expected to show diverging interests and can make negotiations 
regarding amendments or restructuring more difficult (see also Halpern et al., 2008). 
This may actually be necessary before an actual (payment) default has taken place, 
therefore impacting the default risk. Post default, this could lead to difficulties in 
negotiating the restructuring consensually, causing an inefficient process and the 
dilution of recovery rates. 
 
Halpern et al. (2008) studied the effects resulting from changes in governance vs. those 
in the financing structures on the default risk of HLTs. For this purpose, they analysed a 
sample of 72 HLTs, of which half related to leveraged recapitalisations and half to 
LBOs, all of which took place between January 1985 and January 1990. They tested the 
hypotheses that companies were less likely to encounter financial distress or bankruptcy 
if they changed their governance or alternatively used less public debt and more private 
debt. Whereas the bankruptcy criterion had simply been defined as the actual filing, 
they used the term financial distress when a company failed to satisfy one or more of its 
financial covenants.  They found that the post transaction debt loads between LBOs and 
LRCs are not significantly different and therefore any difference in the occurrence of 
bankruptcy is likely to stem from other reasons. Moreover, they discovered that in 
LBOs changes to their governance parameters (shareholdings of management, CEO and 
board-changes) are quite common, in particular when PE-firms were involved. 
However, they did not find a significant relationship between governance changes and 
the presence of financial distress. In contrast, they found that financial distress is related 
to the inclusion of debt that cannot easily be restructured. Their assumption is that debt 
is more difficult to renegotiate if it is publicly traded, as this will mean a dispersed 
lender-base. The Deutsche Bundesbank (2006) reported results from a survey that banks 
thought differences in investment horizons and the ranking of different classes of 
lenders could be the source of difficulties in terms of restructuring transactions. This 
mirrors what the academic literature says from an expert’s point of view.  
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Structures that contain a significant part of bullet repayments and no on-going interest 
payment requirements (Pay-In-Kind) where interest is added to the repayment amount 
have become common in recent years (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2006). However, at some 
point this obligation has to be met. These structures reduce the immediate pressure on 
the business, but create a high refinancing-risk towards the end of a transaction. Also, it 
has been argued that shorter maturities/higher repayment obligations help management 
focus on cash-generation (Demiroglu, 2008), which would be consistent with the 
arguments put forward by Jensen (1986). By implication, that would mean that longer 
maturities would have a contrarian effect. There would be less need to focus on cash-
generation and less discipline would be required from the management. This naturally 
increases the risk of an LBO, since less cash accumulation means lower headroom to 
meet interest and principal repayments as well as potential prepayments in times of 
adverse business conditions.  
Regarding recovery rates, a permissible conclusion is that if the total transaction value 
is higher, then there is most likely a higher level of absolute debt. This can be inferred 
since debt correlates with purchase prices (as documented by Axelson et al., 2013). In a 
scenario of financial distress this means the quote to be received is likely to be lower 
which adversely impacts recovery rates.  
Bos et al. (2002) see seniority, debt composition and the debt cushion as important  
contributors to recovery rates. They define the debt cushion as the percentage of debt 
that ranks below the level of a specific instrument.  
Taken together, it can be inferred that the debt structure has an impact on the default 
risk as well as the recovery risk in such transactions.  
2.3.6 Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction refers to the question of which country’s legal system is mainly applicable 
should a situation of financial distress occur. This is an aspect that comes into play 
when a default has occurred or is imminent. The legal system applicable has an impact 
on the options available for restructuring, as different jurisdictions offer different routes 
to resolve crisis situations. Also, the way in which rights and security may be enforced 
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differs substantially between countries (Westbrook et al., 2010). This naturally applies 
to all corporates, but for LBOs the aspect is particularly relevant because a situation of 
financial distress is more likely to occur and the transactions are heavily collateralised, 
normally including a share-pledge of the target company and all the companies in the 
structure that contain debt in whatever form, including mezzanine debt (e.g. Salans, 
2010).   
Franks et al. (2004) investigated a total sample of 2,280 small-to-medium sized firms 
that had defaulted, using data from ten banks. These banks were located in Germany, 
France and the UK. One of the key findings is that there were substantial jurisdictional 
differences in recoveries, with the UK achieving 75% recovery on average, Germany 
61.4% and France just 52.9%. A further interesting observation is that they find higher 
recoveries for informal workout procedures compared to the cases where companies 
actually file for bankruptcy. This difference is small for the UK, but very large for 
France (mean workout 81.9% vs. 45.7% in formal bankruptcy). In this regard, an 
interesting comment the authors make is that some UK banks have specialised 
departments that come into play based on a predicted default and that there are 
substantial intra-country differences between banks. This suggests that banks can 
actively manage their recovery prospects and highlights the need for sensitivity in the 
mind-set of credit analysts regarding the emergence of financial distress and its 
consequences for recovery risk. Inferences can also be made to the importance of 
financial covenants as they are important monitoring tools and could trigger transfer of 
a credit to a specialised department.  
As part of the study performed by Grunert and Weber (2008; see below), they also 
provide an overview of prior studies on recovery rates, differentiated by country. This 
overview also indicates that there are differences between jurisdictions.  
The explanation behind the differences in recovery rates is assumed to be in the creditor 
friendliness of the system. This is assumed very high for the UK for example. Cao et al. 
(2010) use an index in their analysis of creditor rights and their influence on LBOs. 
Their results suggest that LBOs in countries that exhibit strong creditor rights show 
lower acquisition premiums (amount offered over the stock price prior to the LBO). 
This observation they refer to LBO sponsors being less able to extract value from the 
target. Both, lower premiums (i.e. more conservative purchase prices compared to 
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current market value) and less ability to extract value can be assumed to lead to better 
recovery once default occurs. This interpretation is consistent with the findings of 
Franks et al. (2004).  
2.3.7 Collateral 
An important study by Grunert and Weber (2008) focused on the recovery rates of 
commercial lending in Germany. They used bank data on 120 companies that defaulted 
between 1992 and 2003. They found that collateral is among the most important factors 
influencing recoveries. Khieu and Mullineaux (2009) also found collateral to be one of 
the most important drivers. 
Franks et al. (2004) also found that collateral is an important driver of recovery. 
Interestingly, the impact of collateral appears to be higher in those countries that 
generally tend to have lower recoveries, since the most important influence was 
observed in France.  
An earlier study by Gupton et al. (2000) focused on 181 US loans that had a liquid 
pricing at the time when the default occurred. The results were consistent with those of 
Franks et al. (2004) and with the remaining studies regarding collateral. They also 
identified collateral as a substantial driver of recovery rates and that it limited the 
influence of the industry sector. Some caution is required so, as Gupton et al. use the 
price of the loan one month post the default and not the actual recovery, which might 
not be a good predictor (Acharya et al.; 2007).  
2.3.8 Industry State 
Acharya et al. (2007) researched whether the defaults of firms in industries that can be 
regarded as distressed achieve lower recovery rates, using data on defaulted firms in the 
US from 1982 to 1999. They were able to confirm this, which is partly attributable to 
the limited ability of peer-firms in the industry to buy such assets.  They argue that this 
relationship is largely influenced by high asset specificity, debt-levels employed in the 
industry and a limited number of firms within an industry. The implication for the credit 
management process is that analysts need to think of the industry in wider terms and 
form a view on whether there would be sufficient buyers for the assets of a company 
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and about the industry structure as a whole.  As far as the general relevance of a sector 
for recovery rates is concerned, they found they were highest for the utilities sector. 
However, the recovery rates measured between other sectors were not statistically 
different from each other. This is consistent with Franks et al. (2004) who argued that 
the sector of the borrower (in their sample; see above) is by far less relevant than other 
factors (predominantly collateral).  Khieu and Mullineaux (2009) also found a negative 
impact of industry distress on recoveries, but also found differences in recovery rates 
between sectors.  
Industry state appears to play a role for recovery risk, although in very specific 
circumstances. The most important aspect here appears to be whether there would be 
interested competitors to buy the assets of the defaulted company.    
2.3.9 Overall State of the Economy 
Bos et al. (2002) flagged that average recovery was remarkably lower during a sub-
period with rising defaults (1998-2001) when compared to their entire horizon of 
investigation (1988-2001). This can be interpreted as recoveries being lower during 
recessionary times and also being lower for industries in financial distress, since both 
would be observed during rising default rates. 
Khieu and Mullineaux (2009), contrary to some other studies (e.g. Grunert and Weber; 
see below), found that solid macroeconomic conditions enhance recoveries, whereas 
industry distress has the opposite effect. They also found significant differences 
between sectors.   
In contrast, Grunert and Weber (2008) did not find support for the assumption that 
macroeconomic conditions are an important aspect of recovery rates; neither did 
Acharya et al. (2007).  
Franks et al. (2004) found that the overall economic conditions had some relevance, but 
other factors were much more important in their influence on recovery rates (as 
discussed above). They highlight that the relevance comes into play with view to 
realizing collateral, such as real estate, as depressed economic conditions can put 
pressure on asset prices.  
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In summary, there is some evidence that the overall state of the economy plays a role in 
recoveries, but it appears not to be amongst the most important drivers, which is based 
on rather mixed evidence. 
2.3.10 LBO Cycle  
The discussion up to this point has been focused on the individual characteristics of 
LBOs and their impact on credit risk. This sub-section now discusses whether there are 
cyclical patterns in LBO activity, which influence the appearance of these risk factors.  
Overall, LBO activity and the specific exposition to risk factors is perceived to follow 
pronounced cycles, where high returns attract new money and drive up prices and 
reduce yields accordingly (Kaplan and Schoar; 2005; see also Kaplan and Strömberg, 
2009). A consequence of this is that in order to keep yields at an attractive level, more 
leverage needs to be applied, which by definition increases the default risk by imposing 
additional contractual obligations on target companies. Axelson et al. (2013, 2010) 
describe three peak-levels for leverage throughout the LBO cycles that they identified to 
have taken place in the late 1980s and 1990s as well as between 2006 and 2007.14 
However, even more compressed time-frames indicate a degree of cyclicality in the 
LBO market.  
Purchase multiples in turn are strongly correlated with leverage and a number of 
indications exist that the latter are driven by the ability of the market to absorb 
transactions. This for example can be inferred from Axelson et al. (2013), who 
performed a highly representative analysis (mainly LBOs in the US and Europe which 
took place between 1980-2008; the majority of the transactions being concentrated in 
the 2001-2008 bracket) and found a clear link between the debt load and purchase prices 
and demonstrate increases of debt loads in LBOs if there is a high availability of credit. 
The chart on the following page illustrates the cyclical development of purchase 
multiples and debt multiples in LBO transactions.  
                                                
14 Leverage is typically measured by dividing the amount of debt by the EBITDA of the company. 
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Figure 2-1: LBO Cyclicality, Transaction and Debt Multiple Development. Source: Author’s own computations, 
Ernst & Young (2013).  
Brinkhuis and De Maeseneire (2012) also found a significant negative correlation 
between the spread in the leveraged loan market and the amount of leverage used, 
providing support for the argument.  Such a negative correlation was also found by 
Demiroglu (2008), as was a correlation between purchase multiples and the use of debt.  
 
Since the above studies suggest that the availability of debt financing is a major 
determinant of pricing and leverage in LBO transactions, debt market liquidity can be 
viewed as an important consideration of default risk in LBOs. As leverage is a risk 
factor that influences recovery prospects, the point in the LBO cycle when a transaction 
is closed is likely to have an influence on its recovery rate in case that default risk 
materialises. 
 
An important and related question is whether leverage is also determined by firm 
characteristics; which conceptually should be a fundamental driver of capital structure. 
Axelson et al. (2013), Brinkhuis and De Maeseneire (2012) as well as Demiroglu (2008) 
also followed this question, but with differing results. Axelson et al. (2013) found that 
firm characteristics such as operating risk (cash-flow volatility) or profitability and 
growth opportunities can explain leverage in a public-peer group of companies, but not 
in LBOs. For the public peers-group they use, they find that leverage decreases with 
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higher business risk and growth opportunities as well as with rising profitability. 
Brinkhuis and De Maeseneire (2012) also investigated this issue based on an initial 
sample of 126 European LBOs (slightly lower numbers for different measures due to 
data availability). Their findings were also consistent with those of Axelson et al. 
(2013), as they found several characteristics capable of explaining leverage in public 
companies, but they failed to do this for LBO firms. Taken to the extreme, this suggests 
that business fundamentals play a subordinated role in the structuring of LBO 
transactions with obviously important implications for credit assessment. In contrast, 
Demiroglu (2008) presented results to indicate that firm characteristics in LBOs are 
related to leverage. This discrepancy was already present when Axelson et al. (2008) 
had found a lack of explanatory power in a much smaller sample (153 LBOs). Relating 
to this smaller sample, Demiroglu commented that this discrepancy might be due to the 
fact that he (Demiroglu) only used public-to-private transactions and was therefore 
likely to be able to take account of firm characteristics more exactly. In contrast, 
Axelson et al. (2013, 2010) have matched the LBOs to industries and estimated their 
characteristics by assuming the median value for the industry as relevant for the LBO. 
Demiroglu’s argument is plausible, but the size of the study by Axelson et al. makes this 
unlikely to prevail.  
 
Based on a sample of 107 LBOs in the US (timeframe 1981 to 1990), Roden and 
Lewellen (1995) also found that firm specific characteristics play an important role in 
explaining the capital structure of LBOs. Pointing in the same direction, Opler and 
Titman (1993), using a sample of 180 LBOs that took place between 1980 and 1990, 
were able to show that companies are more likely to undergo an LBO when there is 
high cash flow and in parallel investment opportunities are depressed. This suggests that 
mature industry players with stability and good visibility on cash flows are the typical 
LBO candidates, which is an interpretation that is consistent with that of the ECB 
(2007a).  Therefore, their study suggests that firm characteristics do play a role. Roden 
and Lewellen focus on public-to-private transactions. The majority of the transactions in 
the examples studied by Axelson et al. (2013) and Brinkhuis and De Maeseneire (2012) 
were private transactions. Mehran and Peristiani (2010) also found that firms that 
undergo a buyout show stronger free cash-flow and are more levered than public peers. 
In addition, they found buyout companies to have lower market/book ratios (author’s 
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comment: which can be viewed as an indication of low growth prospects) but high 
profitability.  
 
Much earlier, Kaplan and Stein (1991) looked at a number of 124 MBOs in the US and 
concluded that prices had risen towards the end of the 1980s, but that the risk in the 
transactions (based on variability measures) had not reduced. This at least provides 
support for the hypothesis that towards the end of a LBO cycle, firm characteristics play 
a less important role when transactions are structured. This would provide further 
support for the assumption that re-distribution risk is the more important aspect (see 
below).  
 
An alternative possible explanation for the discrepancies in the studies mentioned is that 
they use largely different periods, which only partly overlap. The studies by Axelson et 
al. (2013, 2010) and Brinkhuis and De Maeseneire (2012, 2009) were more recent and 
therefore capture a large part of the most recent LBO cycle up to the year 2006/2007. 
Also, by this time, the business model of arranging banks was strongly focused on 
redistributing the risk (FSA, 2006; Deutsche Bundesbank, 2007). This possibility of 
redistributing the risk is being stated as a potential reason for bankers to reduce their 
efforts in transaction screening and surveillance (Acharya, 2007), which was supported 
by the high leverage contained in some of the transactions during the peak of the LBO 
cycle (similar to Acharya 2007).  The ECB (2007a) in describing the results of a study 
by the Banking Supervision Committee (BSC) also stated that strong competition 
(authors comment: which arises with large liquidity in the market) could have led some 
participants in the market to exercise more tolerance in terms of lending standards and 
credit analysis. The same survey highlights the importance of an ability to sell down 
risks, and banks viewed the warehousing risk (i.e. the inability to sell down loans) as a 
primary concern. In 2007 the ECB highlighted that major arranging banks sell 50% of 
an exposure within five days from the commitment and the Bank of England gave a 
figure of 70% exposure that major UK banks sell down within 120 days from 
commitment of a leveraged loan.  
 
At this point, a comparison to a previous cyclical peak shows some interesting common 
features (see also Acharya 2007 for a comparison of cycles). Kaplan and Stein (1991) 
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studied a sample of 124 MBOs that took place between 1980 and 1989. As part of their 
analysis, they also investigate the pricing of LBOs. While pricing is not that relevant for 
this research, an interesting point worth noting here is that they found a great level of 
homogeneity within the pricing of LBOs and as potential reasons point out that larger 
arranging banks are able to sell down exposures to smaller banks. So the ability to 
redistribute risks has also played a role in this LBO cycle.  
 
In addition to the debt load, ample liquidity in the debt market also appears to lead to 
softening of other contractual features of LBO financing. The first one to mention here 
is the structure of the debt, which shifted towards the bullet structures in the years prior 
to the 2007 (Axelson et al., 2010).  Brinkhuis and De Maeseneire (2012) highlight the 
use of the amortising tranche A and increasing use of tranches B and C (authors 
comment: which are typically eight and nine years bullet tranches), while second-lien 
debt has risen in use. Demiroglu (2008) also pointed this out.  
 
The study mentioned previously by Axelson et al. (2013, 2010) also measured whether 
leverage is associated with the loosening of credit terms, utilizing data from a quarterly 
survey by the Federal Reserve. The authors point out that this qualitative assessment 
also captures covenants. Since they were able to confirm that there is a relationship 
between more relaxed lending terms and leverage, this serves as further support for the 
claim that covenant standards decrease during cyclical upturns in the LBO market. 
Acharya et al. (2007) also comment on the larger fraction of covenant-lite structures in 
the most recent LBO cycle compared to the previous one. The reduced importance of 
financial covenants since 2003 and a positive relationship of the restrictiveness of 
covenants with credit spreads had also been observed by Demiroglu (2008) or 
Demiroglu and James (2010).  
 
Finally, the latest LBO cycle has also produced a never before witnessed number of 
transactions that have already undergone an LBO (secondary or tertiary buyout or 
recapitalisation; consistent with Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009), which are suspected to 
show higher propensities to default and lower recoveries.   
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2.4 Portfolio Management Tools at Credit Function Level 
There exists a very large quantum of literature regarding credit portfolio management, 
but the largest part is focused on technical-mathematical models or takes a whole-bank 
perspective. The focus is typically on diversification and correlation implications, 
leading to discussions of Value-at-Risk (VAR) and Conditional-Value-at-Risk (CVAR) 
measures. Such papers have their merits, but are of limited use for this research and 
their applicability for credit functions is very limited.  Their results are best used within 
central credit portfolio management functions that look at the entire portfolio of asset 
classes, of which LBOs would be part.  
The focus of this research on the risk factors and how credit functions use them or 
should be using them would not be consistent with an evaluation of the technical-
mathematical literature that exists on CPM as a whole. Additionally, the overall focus 
within credit portfolio management has shifted substantially in recent years. In 
particular has there been a strong focus on active credit portfolio management, i.e. 
adjusting the risk to a desired level. In 1999 Garside et al. described the evolution from 
passive credit portfolio management to active credit portfolio management. They state 
that historically, credit portfolio management focused on monitoring credit exposure by 
some sort of categorisation and potentially some exposure limits, but following the 
losses that banks experienced in the 1980s and 1990s, more sophisticated models using 
diversification and correlation assumptions have been developed.  
Against this, since the financial crisis that emerged in 2007, there have also been 
comments and suggestions that indicate a renaissance of more simplistic measures to at 
least supplement the more advanced measures. A quote found in the magazine titled 
RISK (Vol. 21, p. 83) from a senior credit portfolio management professional illustrates 
this:  
“If you get lost in the model, sight is lost of what is happening outside the model. 
While re-thinking the models is appropriate, they need to be linked to more 
traditional measures…including simple ones such as gross limits”.  
Quotes like this highlight that while it is viewed as useful to have highly developed 
technical models, the view of the individual credits and some traditional measures and 
how to include these in the credit management process still is important. This is the area 
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of work typically performed by credit functions. Literature focusing on rather simple 
measures is typically written by the consultancy community. Yet, it was possible to 
derive one measure from an academic study by Cotter and Peck (2001).  
An obvious consequence from the experience made during the financial crisis that 
started in 2007 is that individual exposures need to be reflected against their impact on 
the overall portfolio, including concentration limits, while at the same time, these need 
to be practical to use (Thomson, K.; 2008; KPMG Basel Briefing). In its simplest form, 
a concentration analysis is simply breaking down the LBO portfolio using some kind of 
criteria, such as: 
• %-age of secondary/tertiary transactions within the portfolio. 
• %-age of exposures by jurisdiction. 
• %-age of exposures by PE-firm. 
A systematic review of these factors would make any concentration of the portfolio 
visible for credit functions and the impact of individual exposures on the total portfolio 
could be evaluated.  
Two slightly more sophisticated measures were discussed by Percy-Dove (2008). These 
were average rating and credit duration. For the purpose of this research, they can 
actually, despite their undisputed shortcomings, be of high practical use. As the most 
simplistic measure she outlines (weighted) average rating of exposures within the 
portfolio. A rating (internal) is a relative measure of the risk of default and an average 
shows the central tendency of such a measure within a portfolio. Naturally, this in 
isolation does not reflect concentration risks. However, this can still provide very 
valuable insights from the viewpoint of a credit function when assessing new risks. For 
example: 
• The development of the average-rating over time can flag developments in the 
credit quality.  
• If exposure weighted ratings are used the impact of a newly assessed risk on a 
portfolio can be evaluated. 
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• It is possible to simulate the impact of a single credit deteriorating on the overall 
average portfolio rating. I.e. what happens if credit X receives a significant 
down-grade? If used in this way, the measure can provide information on the 
impact of risk concentrations.  
A further measure that can be of practical use at the level of a credit function is credit 
duration. Duration is a measure commonly used in the bond market to measure 
sensitivity to interest rate changes. It represents the point in time when half of an 
investment has been returned to the investor, since at this point the investment would be 
immune to changes in interest rates (what is lost is gained by reinvesting on the other 
side). Percy-Dove also comments on this measure but in terms of the impact on the 
portfolio from a rise in credit spreads. Her criticism is that the measure assumes that 
credit-spreads widen by the same amount across the term-structure, which is an 
unrealistic assumption. However, the measure can still be used and provides valuable 
information for the purpose of analysing and tracking a default risk in LBO 
transactions. First, uncertainty rises with time. The longer the duration of a 
credit/portfolio, the higher the uncertainty is. Secondly, this can be related to the 
observation made earlier that at hike times of an LBO cycle, amortisation profiles 
become more relaxed which leads to duration-expansions. Hence, the monitoring of the 
duration of credits and the portfolio can provide valuable insights into the LBO cycle.  
Since the preceding parts of the literature review have shown that the structure of the 
debt appears to be an influential factor on the credit risk and that structures change 
during the LBO cycle, a measure of seniority and changes to the seniority also appears 
to be useful. The study referenced earlier by Cotter and Peck (2001) provides a seniority 
measure that can actually be utilised for the purposes of this research. They classify the 
seniority of the debt on a scale of one to five, with one being the highest seniority and 
five being the lowest. The individual classes of debt in the structure are multiplied by 
their scale value and the total sum of this is divided by the total debt in the transaction.   
The example on the following page illustrates the use of the seniority measure.  
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Illustration of seniority measure 
 
Total Volume Measure Transaction A Transaction B Transaction C Total 
Highest ranking 1 20 5 5 30 
Second highest 2 0 0 5 5 
Third highest 3 0 5 20 25 
Fourth highest 4 0 0 0 0 
Equity like 5 0 0 0 0 
Total   20 10 30 60 
Seniority Measure 1 2 2,5 2 
Table 2-2: Illustration of seniority measure. Source: Author’s illustration and interpretation, using seniority 
measure developed by Cotter and Peck (2001).  
As becomes evident, transaction C receives a higher score on the seniority measure, 
indicating that there are substantial quantities of debt ranking below the senior. This 
measure could, for example, be used again for the analysis of concentrations or 
developments over time to reflect changes in the portfolio and/or to signal changes in 
the market.  Given the importance of debt composition for recovery risk (Bos et al., 
2002), such a measure can also be used to gauge the recovery prospects of the portfolio.  
2.5 LBO Credit Risk Management Practices  
The only results that were found relevant to this research dealing with LBO risk 
management practices within banks were those resulting from a survey carried out by 
the Banking Supervision Committee (BSC) of the European System of Central Banks in 
2006 in response to the strongly rising activity in the LBO market by that time.  
The key results of the survey can be summarised as follows: 
• Overall, credit analysis and credit monitoring is performed incorporating many 
aspects of the risk factors. 
• Within the analysis most of the attention is given to the cash-generating abilities 
of the business, i.e. the business-fundamentals and testing of downside 
scenarios.  
• Leverage was viewed a factor of importance, albeit not in isolation.  
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• While covenants are important for monitoring purposes, on their own they do 
not provide for adequate monitoring. 
• The analysis is largely based on historical data.  
• Some banks do use a rating for each transaction. 
• Some banks use limits for LBO exposures in aggregate/on a transaction basis, 
but some completely resist any limits. 
• Collateral evaluation is part of the analysis in most cases, but normally its 
importance is viewed as much lower than that of business-fundamentals. This is 
explained by the LBO business being a cash flow based business.  
• Monitoring is undertaken on a permanent and a credit-by-credit basis.  
• Only a few banks report that monitoring takes into account portfolio 
considerations. 
• In addition to covenants, further downside tests are performed in terms of the 
cash-generating ability of the company and to test headroom under covenants.  
However, concerns about the credit work with regards to LBO credits have already been 
articulated in 2007. Then, the IMF (2007a, p. 15) wrote: 
“…anecdotal evidence suggests the due diligence being performed by some 
investors (author’s insertion: of LBO credits) may be weakening”.   
Cao, Mason and Song (2010) provide evidence that goes in the same direction as 
outlined by the IMF. They bifurcate a sample of banks into high and low write-down 
banks and outline that in particular the latter had relaxed their lending standards during 
the years prior to the crisis. In parallel, these banks had significantly increased their 
market share and provided funding for lower quality borrowers.  
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2.6 Literature Summary and Synthesis  
The literature review has pointed out: 
• Generally, LBOs are considered to lead to improvements in performance and 
hence are an asset class suitable for debt finance (Section 2.2, p. 18). However, 
in particular more recent studies have found that this effect is lower than in 
previous studies or may not be present.  
• Albeit with varying degrees of evidence, there is a well-established base of 
research regarding the risk factors in LBO transactions (Section 2.3, p. 23).  
• Particularly regarding recovery risk, inferences had to be made. Research 
appears to be more advanced on the default risk component (Section 2.3, p. 23).  
• There is significant support for the existence of an LBO cycle and this 
influences risk factors. Consequently, risk factors can signal the market 
becoming more or less risky for debt providers and the status of the LBO cycle 
should be an integral part of the credit risk management process (Section 2.3.10, 
p. 39). 
• Although most of the literature relating to credit portfolio management takes a 
whole-bank perspective and is for portfolio management groups, some simple 
measures of portfolio management exist and are deemed to be capable of 
improving the overall transparency of the LBO portfolio, the early recognition 
of developments in the credit environment and the performing of impact analysis 
(Section 2.4, p. 44) 
• Overall, the survey by the BSC suggested that credit analysis and credit 
monitoring for LBO exposures is extensive and detailed, focusing on many 
aspects of the transaction (Section 2.5, p. 47).  
Improvements in operating performance have been suggested by a number of studies 
and practitioners alike. Guo et al. (2011) found that about 18.5% of the measured post-
buyout returns were attributable to operating performance and cash flow generation is 
influenced by discipline and created by debt and governance changes. Acharya et al. 
(2013, 2008) were able to demonstrate that experienced PEs can generate returns in 
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excess of those of the average. Bergström et al. (2007) were able to show that 
profitability and efficiency improve following an LBO based on peer-group 
comparisons. Kaplan (1989) investigated operating performance improvements in the 
US and was able to identify strong uplifts in operating income and cash flow, in 
particular during the early years following a buyout. Practitioners also support the claim 
that LBOs show strong operating improvements, as exemplarily demonstrated by the 
study quoted from Ernst and Young. Avoiding the difficulties in using financial ratios, 
some studies have rather focused on operating efficiency at a plant level. Harris et al. 
(2005) and Liechtenberg and Siegel (1990) used such formats, considering total factor 
productivity. These studies have also shown substantial improvements in productivity.  
Following the literature on LBO performance in general, the risk factors and the LBO 
cycle, the discussion highlighted some aspects of portfolio management. However, in 
general, modern portfolio management techniques have not focused on specialised 
products (Stegemann and Jamin; 2008; Dürr 2008). Also, following the experience 
gained during the financial crisis that began 2007, there has been some advocacy, in 
particular from risk management professionals, to at least take more simple measures of 
credit portfolio management that are easy to use on board again (e.g. Thomson, 2008). 
For this purpose, four simple measures have been suggested. These are concentration 
limits, average rating, credit duration and a seniority measure. Finally, the literature 
review summarised some results of a survey carried out by the BSC, which also covered 
the credit practices of large European banks in terms of LBO credits. In a very 
condensed form, the survey highlights that in general considerable effort is made to 
perform credit analysis and to monitor LBO credits, but that portfolio considerations 
potentially did not play a very important role.   
2.7 Development of the Research Problem 
The literature review showed that the ingredients for effective LBO credit management 
are present: 
a) LBOs being a tested model to lead to improvements.
b) Risk factors in LBOs generally being well researched (particularly in
terms of default risk).
c) Availability of simple measures of portfolio management.
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d) Detailed and extensive analysis of LBO credit risks (with potentially 
some shortcomings regarding the use of portfolio management).  
 
Surprisingly, at least to the author, the phenomenon that was observed in the years prior 
to the outbreak of the financial crisis (2007/2008) is not consistent with what has been 
found above: LBO structures became more aggressive and the credit market was able to 
absorb ever larger volumes of these exposures (e.g., Bank of England regarding the UK 
Bank; 2007b/Deutsche Bundesbank, 2007). While being cognizant that many 
explanations and contributors might be present, the role of credit functions as the unit in 
charge of analysing these credits within banks is worth analysing, as it appears that their 
work shows potential for improvement. This is the central research problem to be 
investigated as part of this thesis.   
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Chapter 3: Research Objectives and Methodology 
3.1 Developing Research Objectives 
To be able to decide on what methods and techniques to be used to answer the research 
question, i.e. how the research is designed, the first step was to transform the research 
question (and the aim) into more specific research objectives. These are then the basis 
for the decisions relating to data collection and analysis and place the research in a 
theoretical context.  
The research aim was represented by two research questions where the second question 
(“What potential measures can be deduced from the identification of areas for 
improvement within credit functions’ assessment of LBOs’ credit risk?”) is contingent 
upon the first one (“Are there potential areas for improvement in credit functions’ 
assessment of LBOs’ credit risk?”). The word potential in the research aim takes into 
account the exploratory nature of the research and some limitations in relation to data 
availability. The main findings of the literature review together with the comments 
received by interviewees are used to derive some potential measures to address potential 
areas for improvement in the work of credit functions. 
Several potential explanations can be provided for the observed phenomenon. These are 
discussed below here and research objectives addressing these are provided. The final 
research objective is then to draw conclusions from the findings with regards to the 
identification of areas for improvement.  
Recognition of risk factors: While a number of risk factors have been identified, credit 
functions may not be cognizant of them or judge them differently with regards to their 
importance. Alternatively, the most recent LBO wave may have flagged additional risk 
factors that have not been covered by the literature so far and are only known about 
now. A lack of awareness of the risk factors or their importance would automatically 
result in them not being considered sufficiently in the credit management process and 
therefore would constitute an area for improvement. This can be addressed with the 
following research objectives: 
• Research objective A1: To investigate whether there is an awareness of the 
LBO cycle and whether its importance is recognised. 
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• Research objective A2: To investigate which (other than the LBO cycle) risk 
factors are viewed as the most important ones for credit risk in LBOs.  
• Research objective A3: To analyse how the risk factors identified in the 
literature review are judged in terms of importance for the credit risk. 
 
Inconsistency between importance and use of risk factors: The literature has flagged the 
risk factors. It could be that credit functions are aware of them, but still do not use them 
in the credit management process or at least do not use them to the degree that their 
importance would suggest. If this were the case then it would represent another area for 
improvement. This can be expressed by the following research objectives:  
 
• Research objective A4: To investigate the risk factors credit functions mainly 
focus on when assessing LBOs.  
• Research objective A5: To investigate if there is consistency in terms of the 
importance of risk factors and their use in the credit management process. 
Low level of integration: The literature synthesis also reported survey results that the 
work on LBO credits is very detailed and takes into account many aspects of these 
transactions. However, there might be a lack of integration between the various aspects 
of the credit management process; including the use of aspects of portfolio 
management. For example, in order to provide a sensible basis for decisions relating to 
portfolio management, credit monitoring would have to constantly feed information for 
this, which is also to be utilised in credit analysis. A low level of integration would 
represent an area for improvement.  
 
• Research objective A6: To investigate whether the credit management process 
is sufficiently integrated to take advantage of aspects of portfolio management.  
 
Finally, logical deduction suggests that the above areas might offer potential for 
improvement, yet it could be that none of the above applies. Being exploratory research, 
the research has to cater for this aspect as well.  
 
 	  
54 
• Research objective A7:  Are there any (additional) weaknesses and areas for 
improvement present in credit functions’ management of LBOs?  
 
Ultimately, this research aims to derive some potential measures to address these areas 
for improvement to enhance the effectiveness of the work on LBO credits by credit 
functions:  
  
• Research objective B: To integrate the results from research objectives A1-A7 
and deduce potential measures to address identified areas for improvement.  
What is important to note is that research objective B is not intended to provide 
recommendations. This is for two reasons. First, before any of such could be expressed, 
further validation and a form of triangulation would be required (see Sections 5.4 and 
5.5, pp. 132, 133). Secondly, not every finding may apply to every credit function. 
These ideas therefore provide solidly deduced starting points to consider; i.e. should 
enable credit functions to identify any areas for improvement in their own work more 
swiftly and allow them to find ways to address them where applicable. In individual 
circumstances, some of these may prove to be relevant and irrelevant in others. Further 
research may also refute some of them, while others may be confirmed and additional 
ones added. This is reflective of the exploratory nature of the research.  
3.2 Research Paradigm and Research Design 
The research methodology is also influenced by the research paradigm. The two 
opposing paradigms found in business research are positivism and interpretivism (Collis 
and Hussey, 2009). In the former, knowledge is produced based on empirical evidence 
or logical derivation (Roberts et al., 2009). In contrast, the latter allows subjective 
interpretation for observed phenomena. Due to the nature of the data produced, 
positivist research typically uses a deductive approach (using quantitative data) whereas 
interpretivism typically follows inductive analysis (using qualitative data), although this 
is not an absolute necessity. This research contains elements of both paradigms as 
reflected in the research design.  
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 .   
Figure 3-1: Overview of research design.  Source: Author’s own.  
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The research design has to be appropriate to achieve the research aim and its objectives. 
The research design is illustrated in Figure 3-1. The initial observation was that in the 
years prior to the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007, LBO structures became 
increasingly risky for lenders. Despite this, lending to LBOs increased sharply both in 
terms of cumulative volumes and transaction size. Lending practices had received some 
criticism and following the outbreak of the financial crisis the consequences projected 
by some market experts (see Introduction) materialised. To study the phenomenon and 
the role of the credit function, the relevant literature was reviewed. The synthesis of this 
was that all the ingredients for the effective management of LBO credits are present, but 
this did not appear to be consistent with what had actually happened, as described 
previously (indicated by the grey dotted arrows in Figure 3-1). Already in 2006, 
warning statements about high leverage were made by the Deutsche Bundesbank (2006) 
or the FSA (2006), but the market yet expanded and leverage multiples continued to go 
up (see Ernst & Young, 2013, Figure 2-1, p. 40) and in 2009 problems started to unfold 
with high amounts of distressed leveraged credits on the books (ECB, 2009, see 
Introduction) and many of these transactions requiring amendments or restructurings 
(PWC, 2010). From this, the research problem, the research questions and the research 
aim were developed. The research questions were transformed into an overall research 
aim.  
As a preparatory step to the research design, several potential explanations for the 
phenomenon under study have been offered from logical reasoning. It was then argued 
that if these can be confirmed, then they would be an area for improvement and how to 
address them should be part of the potential measures to be deduced. This follows a 
positivist and deductive approach; attempts were made to find support for the potential 
explanations. While some explanations were offered, it was recognised that there might 
be further, less obvious ones present. This also had to be catered for and also required 
some interpretivist elements. Also, the potential explanations included analysis of 
qualitative interview data, which has an interpretative element. At a later stage the 
findings were combined to show interdependencies between them, which also follows 
an inductive, interpretative approach. Once this has been established, measures to 
address any areas for improvement are deduced by logical reasoning and interpreting 
results received from interviewees at a conceptual level.  
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Related to the paradigms to be followed is the question of the methods of data collection 
and analysis. The desired data analysis influences the data collection and what kind of 
data is produced also influences the number of analysis techniques.  
As a data collection method, semi-structured interviews were viewed the most 
appropriate since the method ensured a high response rate, which was particularly 
relevant in terms of the small sample size of 18 participants and as it was possible to 
collect quantitative and qualitative data with this method. More details relating to data 
analysis are provided in Chapter 4. 
The mixed method approach was also considered most appropriate to make the results 
more robust. In exploratory research with limited sample sizes, reliability is always an 
issue. It is possible that follow-up studies on larger samples come to different results. 
Validity calls for the study measuring what it is intended to measure in order to provide 
responses to the research questions (also see e.g. Collis and Hussey, 2009). Validity can 
be enhanced if the data is collected in different formats and analysed via different 
techniques. This was applied within this study as both quantitative and qualitative data 
was collected and analysed with the results actually supporting each other (see Section 
4.1, in particular Section 4.1.4, pp. 74, 83). Moreover, the risk of measurement error 
was largely mitigated by carefully testing the questions and having had another expert 
in the field commenting on them (see Section 3.3.2, p. 59) as part of the pilot phase. 
Validity of the results (and generalizability) was further enhanced by two measures 
which were a) the discussion of the results with four independent experts and b) a group 
presentation to a bank’s credit function.  
Therefore, similar to what is typically found in studies structured under Grounded 
Theory, the study has many alterations between inductive and deductive methods. In 
terms of quantum, the positivist approach dominates but the key element of the research 
findings that ties individual results together to show interdependencies had to follow an 
inductive, interpretative approach.   
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3.3  Data Collection 
3.3.1 General Instrument Decision 
The decision to analyse the data via semi-structured interviews resulted from the overall 
requirement for the data to be analysable in qualitative and quantitative form and at the 
same time served to ensure a full response rate due to the limited sample size. This 
meant that the interview-questionnaire had to consist of open questions as well as data 
that would typically be found in a survey, where participants were asked to rate their 
views on certain aspects on a scale. 
Dürr (2008) has adopted a similar approach in his doctoral thesis regarding credit 
portfolio management. The arguments outlined by Dürr (2008, p. 199) can be echoed 
for the purposes of this research. Dürr referenced the subject of his research to be 
marked by “high complexity”, “comparably small sample size” and “very limited access 
to the field of ACPM by means of publicly available sources”. Other researchers have 
also used interviews and surveys to perform analyses of LBO related subjects.  For 
example, Acharya et al. (2013, 2008) included an interview approach in their study on 
the effects of corporate governance and private equity performance (trying to find the 
distinguishing factors for superior returns).  In a working paper by the Frankfurt School 
of Finance and Management, Bannier and Müsch (2008) use a multiple-choice survey 
(similar to the proposed survey-part in this research) to investigate the effects of the 
financial crisis (starting 2007) on the German LBO market for small and mid-cap 
transactions. Market expert institutions have used surveys on specific subjects of the 
LBO market, for example the BSC used a survey approach to investigate LBO lending 
by banks (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2006; ECB, 2007a). While using a quantitative 
approach themselves, Bergström et al. (2007) highlighted the complexities of the 
subject and the difficulties in quantifying certain effects.  Broadening the scope of the 
research from LBO related to finance related research, an interesting statement was 
made in a paper by Tucket (2011a; 2011), who studied the role of stories on financial 
markets. He argued strongly in favour of interviews as a way to generate data directly 
from individuals acting as “economic agents”, since those who take action in the market 
actually define how markets work and react (Tucket, 2011a). A similar case can be 
presented for this study. Credit functions consist of individuals and their view of risk 
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factors and their use in the credit management process will determine how credit 
functions work in the marketplace.  
3.3.2 Instrument Development 
The research aim was broken down into a number of research objectives, which had to 
be covered as part of the data collection process. The table below matches the research 
objectives to the questions in the interview-questionnaire. 
 
Matching of research objectives against questions  
contained in the questionnaire  
Research objective Question(s) mainly 
addressing the research 
objective  
Several research objectives generically:  1.1 (aimed at starting the 
discussion) 
4.0  
Research objective A1: To investigate whether there 
is an awareness of the LBO cycle and whether its 
importance is recognised. 
 
1.2 in combination with 
questions 2.2-2.10.  
Research objective A2: To investigate which (other 
than the LBO cycle) risk factors are viewed as the 
most important ones for credit risk in LBOs. 
 
1.3 in combination with 
questions 2.1-2.10.  
Research objective A3: To analyse how the risk 
factors identified in the literature review are judged in 
terms of importance for the credit risk. 
1.4 / In combination with 
questions 2.1-2.10.  
Research objective A4: To investigate the risk 1.5 / 2.1. 
 	  
60 
Matching of research objectives against questions  
contained in the questionnaire  
factors’ credit functions mainly focus on when 
assessing LBOs. 
Research objective A5: To investigate if there is 
consistency in the view on the importance of risk 
factors and their use in the credit management process. 
 
2.1-2.10 (Scoring levels) and 
cross-checked with question 
1.2.  
Research objective A6:  To investigate whether the 
credit management process is sufficiently integrated to 
take advantage of aspects of portfolio management.  
 
 
2.1-2.10 and cross-checked 
with question 1.3.  
Research objective A7: Are there any (additional) 
weaknesses and areas for improvement present in 
credit functions’ management of LBOs?  
 
 
2.1-2.10 / 3.0. 
Research objective B: To integrate the results from 
research objectives A1-A7 and deduce potential 
measures to address identified areas for improvement.  
 
 
Critical evaluation of the 
foregoing results.  
 Table 3-1: Matching of research objectives against questions contained in the questionnaire. Source: 
Author’s own.  
3.3.3 Testing and Validating the Research Instrument 
Once a first version of the questionnaire had been produced, it was carefully tested with 
the following aims: 
• Ensure content validity and simultaneously aim to improve the questionnaire. 
 	  
61 
• Provide a first set of data for the research in order to assess its suitability for 
analysis.  
• Provide a first induction for the researcher in conducting those interviews.  
The test was conducted in two stages. The first stage was the provision of the 
questionnaire to a senior credit executive for commentary in December 2010. This 
senior credit executive has more than 20 years of experience in various credit roles and 
supervisory responsibility for several department heads who lead analytical groups. 
Following this person’s comments, some changes were made to the sequence of the 
open questions and in some aspects these were made more precise.  
The second step was to test the instrument in a live-format. For this purpose, three 
individuals with substantial experience in LBO credit were selected and interviews were 
performed.  
The most important amendment made as a result of this relates to the descriptors and to 
the questions where people were asked to provide a scoring level for the degree to 
which risk factors are taken into account in the credit management process. The change 
is illustrated below by comparing the original question and the descriptions and the 
amended version.  
Original Question and Descriptors (exemplary extract): 
What role does risk factor XYZ play in credit analysis, credit monitoring and portfolio 
management?  
 
Rating: Very 
significant 
role 
 
(5) 
Significant 
role 
 
 
(4) 
Considered, 
sometimes 
significant 
role  
(3) 
Factor 
considered, 
but not 
significant 
 (2) 
No role at 
all 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
Role in: 
Credit 
Analysis 
     
Credit 
Monitoring 
     
Portfolio 
Management 
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Amended Question (exemplary extract):  
“To what degree do you think risk factor XYZ is taken into account when credit analysis 
or credit monitoring activities are performed and to what degree do credit analysis and 
monitoring take into account aspects of portfolio management relating to this risk 
factor (i.e. point in the cycle, concentration of transactions by vintage year etc.)?” 
 
Rating “taken into 
account” 
To a very 
high degree 
(5)  
To a high 
degree  
(4)  
To some 
degree  
(3) 
To a very 
limited 
degree  
(2) 
 
 
Not taken 
into account 
at all  
(1) 
 
 
Credit Analysis      
Credit Monitoring      
Analysis/Monitoring 
takes into account 
considerations of 
portfolio management 
     
 
This amendment was made because the original wording of the question and the 
descriptors for the scale were felt to be misleading. In particular, the question relating to 
portfolio management proved to be potentially misunderstood in a sense that the 
interviewees would relate to a central credit portfolio management function rather than 
the specific activity performed by credit functions.  
Other than the above, a further outcome from the test was that there was a significant 
time requirement, with the initial interview taking almost three full hours. This was 
attributed in part to additional explanations being required, but also to some issues 
relating to staying focused. Once the changes had been made and more discipline 
applied, the interview time was reduced substantially, lasting between 45 minutes to 
approximately 2 hours, with the majority running between 75 and 90 minutes.  
Further results of these initial interviews were that the data could generally be analysed 
using some descriptive statistics and some interpretations. Originally, it was intended to 
present the results of this test as pilot study results. Later, this idea was aborted for the 
following reasons:  
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• Given that there were only three participants in this testing phase, the data did 
not warrant any meaningful statistical analysis. 
• Even interpreting the results of qualitative questions would be difficult based on 
the limited number.  
Instead, the results were interpreted to suggest that the potential explanations were at 
least plausible and that the data can be analysed, provided that the number of 
participants is increased. Therefore, it was decided to analyse the results of these three 
participants together with the whole sample. The concern that these three people 
answered slightly different questionnaires is mitigated by the fact that these interviews 
took substantial time and that the intention of what was to be measured was explained at 
length and therefore their responses relate to what was actually meant to be measured, 
avoiding any misunderstanding that there might be in the wording.   
3.3.4 Sample Selection and Details 
Credit functions are difficult to reach and banks’ willingness to participate in such 
research projects is typically limited. Access to the participants was only possible 
because of the personal contacts of the researcher and therefore this acted as a 
convenience sample. This sample consisted of 18 participants. 
The use of a convenience sample creates issues in two areas. First, it might impact the 
objectivity and neutrality of the researcher. Specific care had been taken to protect this.  
The second issue with using convenience samples is that they may not be representative 
and the data might be skewed towards the views of the specific group and not lend itself 
to generalization. This is an inherent issue in research based on small sample size, 
which is frequently the case for indicative and exploratory research. This was viewed as 
acceptable because of: 
• The focus of the study 
• The varied background of the participants 
• The uniqueness of the opportunity 
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• The exploratory nature of the study 
• Practical considerations 
Each of these points is expanded on below.  
Focus of the study:  
Participants were asked to respond to the various questions with what they viewed 
would be the market practice for credit functions and each participant him or herself 
was the unit of analysis. This is a substantial difference to studies where each unit of the 
sample is an organisation, that have the aim of finding out how specific organisations 
do something, or alternatively, those that try to find out how the market works by 
sampling the (entire) market directly by asking a representative sample of organisations 
to participate. Such studies are valuable, but results should also be treated with caution. 
First, access is often problematic in such studies. Organisational involvement is unlikely 
to be received from a sufficiently large number of institutions. Secondly, and in the 
view of the researcher, a much more severe drawback is that the answers are likely to be 
controlled in some way. There would be a risk that the participating organisations 
would aim to answer the questions in a way that creates a positive picture about them. 
Thirdly, even if an organisation answers the questions to the best of its knowledge, this 
could still be different to how it is actually done in practice in general and also by the 
organisation itself. All of this is overcome by the approach taken in this research.  
 
Background of participants 
Dictated by the focus of the research, the most relevant consideration in relation to 
participant selection for validity and reliability was the ability of participants to judge 
how something is done in general by credit functions. That is:  “what do the analysts 
actually focus on and how much weight do they assign to the relevant risk factors in the 
credit management process?”  
An informed view of this can be formed by either having done the work of the credit 
function personally or from having significant professional interaction with credit 
functions or a combination of both.  
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Since the research is not organisation specific, the cumulative personal experience of 
participants is worth considering when judging the validity of the research. The 
different positions of participants meant they had a more varied view of how something 
is done in the marketplace. Also, the interaction with credit functions is likely to be 
higher if people have experience from several employments, since there might be 
different interlocutors from each type of employment.  
Most of the participants have had more than ten years of cumulative experience in the 
credit business, with significant exposure to LBOs. The participants have held 33 jobs 
in total in which they had significant exposure to the LBO credit business. Of these 33 
jobs, 21 were at banks. These 21 jobs at banks were at a total of nine different banks, all 
of which were large players in the European LBO market in the last ten years with 
significant exposure to the German market. 
Table 3-2: Summary of background of participants. Source: Author’s own. 
The Column NoE LBO Ex. shows how many jobs the participants have had with some 
exposure to LBOs. The column “Thereof Banks” shows how many of these were at 
banks and the column “Banks” in the title above shows at which bank in anonymous 
form. For example, a total of four participants in the study had worked for bank A in the 
past or are working for bank A presently.  
NoE LBO
Ex. Thereof Bank Banks
Participant 1 Finance Lawyer 2 0 n/a
Participant 2 Rating Analyst 2 1 A
Participant 3 Credit Function Analyst 1 1 B
Participant 4 Rating Analyst 2 0 n/a
Participant 5 Rating Analyst 3 2 C, D
Participant 6 Deputy Department Head Credit Function 1 1 B
Participant 7 Debt Advisor 3 2 B, C
Participant 8 Credit Function Analyst 1 1 B
Participant 9 Department Head / MD Credit Function 1 1 B
Participant 10 Credit Function Analyst 1 1 F
Participant 11 MD Structuring Team 2 2 A, G 
Participant 12 MD Structuring Team 2 1 A
Participant 13 Senior Syndication Professional 2 2 A, C 
Participant 14 Senior Syndication Professional 2 2 A, H
Participant 15 Debt Advisor (Previously MD Structuring) 2 1 C
Participant 16 Department Head / MD Credit Function 1 1 F
Participant 17 Debt Advisor (Previously MD Structuring Team) 3 2 I, H
Participant 18 Finance Lawyer 2 0 n/a
33 21 A - I: 9 
Summary Background of Participants
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Regarding geographic distribution based on ultimate headquarters of these banks, four 
were based in Germany, two in Italy, one in France, and two in the UK (with one bank 
where the European headquarters is based in the UK while the global headquarters was 
outside the UK). With the exception of one interviewee who was based in London, 
participants were located in Germany. Credit functions of these banks were partly 
located at the German headquarter of these banks, at a German operation where the 
ultimate headquarter was outside Germany or at the foreign headquarter directly. Also, 
for at least three banks in the sample the German headquarters was ultimately in charge 
for the credit management of all the LBO credits undertaken in Europe.   
Based on the last position prior to the interview, the composition of the participants can 
be broken down as follows: Bankers (ten; 67%), rating analysts (three; 17%), debt 
advisors (three; 17%) and finance lawyers (two; 11%). One participant had assumed a 
different role (with no direct LBO exposure) shortly before the interview; all other 
participants were in the functions described above at the time of the interview. The 
group of bankers can further be broken down into credit analysts (six), structuring 
professionals (two) and syndication professionals (two).  
Credit analysts are those working directly at credit functions. Within the group of six 
analysts, two interviewees were actually heads of credit function teams. Hence, their 
experience came from their own work as analysts and from their observation as 
supervisors of other analysts and their view on how their colleagues in the market 
perform their work.  
Syndication professionals are viewed as particularly knowledgeable about the market 
since their task is to sell exposures in tranches to other market participants. To achieve 
this, they typically get involved at the early stages of the structuring of transactions, 
which need to receive sanctioned by credit functions at a later stage. At this stage, they 
try to make sure that the structure that is designed is sellable in the market. As such, 
they have a great level of appreciation as to what the most critically viewed risk factors 
are and what credit functions focus on. This applies to both their own organisations as 
well as to potentially participating banks in the market. 
Structuring professionals work closely with credit functions since they need their 
transactions to get approval or to at least be supported by them. Moreover, at least in the 
67 
past, many transactions were lead-arranged by more than one bank (typically two-four) 
and the ultimately designed structure of the transaction had to meet the requirements of 
all banks involved (and potentially participating banks at a syndication stage). 
Therefore, they also have specific knowledge about the aspects relevant to credit 
functions and of how this is done in the market.  
Rating analysts are frequently asked by credit functions about particular aspects of 
certain credits or the market in general. They also produce research on individual credits 
on market developments, which requires deep knowledge of the subject. From the type 
of questions they receive, they can also make informed judgments about which risk 
factors are viewed as highly relevant and what people focus on in the credit 
management process. Within the group of rating analysts interviewed, one person solely 
focused on LBOs and spent the majority of his time on structural developments in the 
market. The other two rating analysts had a specific sector focus. Two of the rating 
analysts have also had significant LBO exposure from previous roles within banks.   
Finally finance lawyers get involved as advisors to arranging banks and to participating 
banks, typically with their interlocutors being the credit function or the structuring 
function. Further, due to their involvement in restructuring negotiations, they get to see 
transactions that went into default and from this develop a solid understanding of the 
risk factors that credit functions (should) focus on.   
Relating to the employment at the time of the interview, of the 18 participants, a total of 
ten were employed with four banks and seven were concentrated between two banks, 
reflecting some concentration. The impact of this is limited because of the nature of the 
research not focusing on specific organisations and the fact that of the ten employees, 
six have had experience at other banks from previous roles. In addition, the total 
number of different banks that participants had worked for was as nine. While this 
indicates some overlap, participants sometimes worked at those banks at different times 
from one another.  
With some exploratory research having smaller sample sizes and frequently being 
concentrated on a single organisation, there are also good arguments in favour of 
validity. In comparison, the standard organisation focused research frequently also uses 
a limited sample size. Dürr (2008) focused on 22 organisations. The Deutsche 
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Bundesbank and the Financial Services Supervisory Authority in Germany carried out a 
survey on LBO credits with six German Banks active in the field as part of their 
contribution to the wider BSC study (2006). The overall BSC survey did include 41 
banks.  
 
Uniqueness of opportunity 
Access to a group with the characteristics as utilised in this study is typically not 
available to researchers. The participants were all at least at their mid-career stage, with 
some of them holding management positions and working to tight schedules. Publicly 
available information on the subject is very limited.  A sufficiently large number of 
participants from a random request to a large number of organisations was unlikely to 
be obtained. Bryman and Bell (2007) state that using convenience samples is acceptable 
in those circumstances where their use offers a good opportunity which may otherwise 
not be available.  This was exactly the case here.  
Practical considerations  
Ultimately, this research aimed to deliver results that can be used by credit functions in 
a practical manner. As such, the results would never be final in a sense that what will be 
suggested represents an end-point. In contrast, results must be expected to continuously 
develop or might actually be overturned by new research. Recognizing that 
circumstances for research are never perfect, this was not deemed a sufficient reason to 
refrain from carrying out this study.  
3.3.5 Interview Process 
Interviews with the 18 participants were carried out during the period between March 
2011 and April 2012. The majority of the interviews was carried out between January 
2012 and April 2012.  
This rather long timeframe for gathering empirical data is owed to specific 
circumstances. First, the time requirement to analyse the interview data was rather long, 
in particular during the early stages of the process. More importantly, a very time 
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consuming aspect was simply the availability of the participants. Several interviews that 
had been scheduled were required to be re-arranged, sometimes more than once, due to 
important work commitments of the participants. This led to significant deviations from 
the originally envisaged interview timetable. Such delays are commonplace in research 
that is contingent on participants who ultimately act altruistically by participating. The 
potential impact this could have on the timeliness of results is mitigated by the research 
focusing on the full cycle prior to 2007 and the later plausibility checks carried out with 
the independent senior credit executives.  
 
Table 3-3: Interview Time Schedule. Source: Author’s own.  
Of the 18 participants, 17 were first contacted by telephone. One person could not be 
reached via phone and the first contact was made via email. During these first contacts, 
the broad purpose of the research was explained and appointments scheduled.  
Interviewees were offered to receive the questionnaire in advance, which most of them 
requested.  
Places for the interviews were chosen to avoid the participants having to travel. Of the 
18 interviews, fourteen took place at participants’ places of work and two at cafes near 
their places of work. This is a total of 16 interviews that were conducted in a face-to-
face type of setting. Two interview appointments with participants that lived and 
Participant 1 Finance Lawyer March 2011
Participant 2 Rating Analyst March 2011
Participant 3 Credit Function Analyst  April 2011
Participant 4 Rating Analyst January 2012
Participant 5 Rating Analyst January 2012
Participant 6 Deputy Department Head Credit Function January 2012
Participant 7 Debt Advisor Janaury 2012
Participant 8 Credit Function Analyst February 2012
Participant 9 Department Head / MD Credit Function February 2012
Participant 10 Credit Function Analyst February 2012
Participant 11 MD Structuring Team February 2012
Participant 12 MD Structuring Team February 2012
Participant 13 Senior Syndication Professional March 2012
Participant 14 Senior Syndication Professional March 2012
Participant 15 Debt Advisor (Previously MD Structuring) March 2012
Participant 16 Department Head / MD Credit Function March 2012
Participant 17 Debt Advisor (Previously MD Structuring Team) March 2012
Participant 18 Finance Lawyer  April 2012
Schedule of Inteview Dates 
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worked at a significant distance from the researchers’ residence had to be postponed at 
short notice. Finding an alternative date for these two interviews to be done in person 
would have had a further detrimental effect on the timetable. Therefore, these two 
interviews were conducted by telephone. Telephone interviews can be arranged with 
less cost and more conveniently for those involved but have the obvious disadvantage 
that parts of the communication (i.e. reactions to certain questions, or interactions 
during the interview) cannot be fully captured. Therefore, from a research perspective 
the data is somewhat less open to interpretation; however the research notes did not 
differ significantly from those resulting form the in-person interviews.   
The researcher interviewed all the participants personally. One interviewee brought a 
more junior colleague along. However, as they agreed on the answer before formally 
confirming it to the interviewer, they were counted as one participant in the sample 
counting.  
All interviews took place in German. Typically, interview-based research takes 
advantage of recording so that the researcher can go back to the raw-data several times 
to ensure the interpretation is correct and to reflect on the data again after some time has 
passed. A drawback of recording is that some interview candidates may not be 
comfortable with it at all and ultimately decide not to participate. As this was an 
exploratory study, it was important not to lose participants. For the reasons of this 
research being exploratory in nature and to the best of the knowledge of the researcher 
the first of its type, it was also considered important that the answers received by the 
participants were as open as possible and not controlled. Therefore, the decision was 
taken not to use recording.   
Instead of recording, handwritten research notes were taken during these interviews. 
These were not strictly verbatim what the participants had said, but instead focused on 
the main highlights during each interview and the views expressed during any 
discussions. Sometimes these contained small graphs when a subject was discussed with 
participants and a graph was used for illustration or to re-iterate that what the 
interviewee was expressing was properly noted. As soon as possible after the interviews 
– usually the same day to ensure the data was still fresh on the researcher’s mind – 
English summaries were produced. These took into account the written notes but also 
the memory account of the researcher. These summaries on average were about 1,000 
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words on average (up to 1,500 words in some cases) in length. These summaries were 
then used as the raw-data to allocate responses to response categories (Example 
included in Appendix 3, p. 169).  
This method of data collection certainly has a risk of bias and also of data loss in the 
process. But the disadvantages associated with recordings the interviews were viewed to 
severe to follow this route. To mitigate the risk of biases or data loss, the researcher 
made every effort to keep neutral during the process. Since more than half of the 
questionnaire required respondents only to allocate a scoring on a scale of 1-5 there was 
sufficient time to do this. Two examples of the English language summaries are 
included in Appendix 3 (p. 169).   
3.4  Research Ethics 
Ethical aspects are an important part of a research programme. The researcher acted 
with honesty and integrity at all times and has taken measures to ensure these principles 
are adhered to. Specific measures were designed to ensure professionalism and to 
maximize objectivity and neutrality to the greatest degree possible. This relates 
particular to the use of a convenience sample.  
3.4.1 Disclosure of Support   
Any support that the researcher received was disclosed in advance to the university. In 
line with the university regulations, the researcher does not view any of the support 
received to be in conflict with the requirement that the thesis be substantially the 
candidate’s own work. 
During the majority of this research project and in particular during the empirical part, 
the researcher was himself employed in a credit role within a bank, albeit without any 
involvement in LBO credit risk while the empirical research was conducted. The 
researcher was able to accumulate overtime hours and take time off in compensation for 
these hours to allocate time to the research project. This proved to be particularly useful 
where parts of the research project had to be performed during normal business hours. 
Also, the researcher had access to a good corporate library, where parts of the literature 
could be obtained. While this is no different from using another academic library, it was 
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a clear advantage to have the library in the same building as the candidate’s place of 
work.  For the avoidance of doubt, the library did not assist in the selection or 
evaluation of literature in any way. 
3.4.2 Ensuring Informed Consent 
The researcher’s employment in a bank and support received from his employer was 
disclosed to participants openly prior to each interview to cater for any concerns that the 
data could be shared with colleagues of the researcher. Assurances were given that the 
researcher had control over access to data and that participant’s interests would be 
considered (see below).  
3.4.3 Protection of Participants’ Interests 
The participants’ interests had to be protected and the potential disadvantage due to 
some participants receiving the results later than others (namely those outside the 
researcher’s organization, see above) had to be balanced or mitigated. The researcher 
had full control over access to the thesis during the research project and draft research 
results were only made available in aggregated format to certain people in order to get 
feedback or for validation purposes (last time in 2012). No information pertaining to or 
received from individual interviewees was disclosed. In addition, the research was 
based on a series of carefully designed research rules (see questionnaire, Appendix 2, p. 
154). 
The research was not aimed to be specific to any organization and the interview 
questionnaire stated that participants should express their views about what they see as 
the market practice. Despite this, the research rules encouraged participants to seek 
approval from their employer in case they thought their participation could be an issue. 
To the best knowledge of the researcher, no participant thought this was necessary. 
3.4.4 Preserving Participants’ Anonymity and Confidentiality 
Assurances were given that the information provided by the participants was only 
processed in an anonymous format. For this purpose, the names of the participants were 
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not recorded on the questionnaires or in the research notes. Regarding confidentiality, 
the participants were informed that their participation in the research would remain 
confidential and would not be disclosed to anyone unless they specifically consented to 
this. For this purpose, the participants were requested to choose whether they agreed to 
have their name as a participant mentioned in the thesis, only to be disclosed to Heriot-
Watt-University or for it to remain completely confidential. All participants agreed at 
least to the disclosure of their identity to Heriot-Watt-University and agreed to be 
contacted by the university and to confirm their participation, while some agreed to be 
mentioned in the thesis.   
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Chapter 4: Data Analysis and Research Findings 
4.1  Data Analysis 
Based on the mixed data generated this study used techniques for quantitative and 
qualitative data analysis. The former mainly related to scale data, and the latter to 
interview data.  
4.1.1  Analysis of Quantitative Data (Scale Data) 
Scale data is analysed quantitatively using: 
• Descriptive statistics
• A Distribution-free test (Friedman Test)
The analyses were conducted using a standard statistical software package, which is 
also briefly described below.  
Descriptive Statistics 
In a first step, data was organised and summarised in tables. The questionnaire 
contained questions that asked participants to score a certain risk factor with view to:  
• The importance of risk factors for default risk.
• The importance of risk factors for recovery risk.
• The degree to which risk factors are used in credit analysis.
• The degree to which risk factors are used in credit monitoring.
• The degree to which credit analysis and credit monitoring take into account
aspects of portfolio management (with view to the specific risk factor).
The data resulting from the questionnaire in response to these aspects was organised in 
tables, which show the following: 
• The total number of data-points per question and across a category. This is 18 in
most instances, but in a few instances participants did not answer a certain
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question. In these cases, there might be fewer than 18 data points in response to 
a specific question.  
• The absolute number of times a scoring level was assigned to a risk factor as 
well as the percentage distribution of risk factors relating to the aspects 
mentioned above.  
• Statistical measures of location and dispersion that include the highest and the 
lowest scoring levels as well as the range between them as a measure of data 
dispersion. Median, mode and arithmetic mean levels have also been provided.  
• The percentage distribution of the scoring levels assigned for each risk factor as 
well as in total to any category (i.e. importance for default risk, importance for 
recovery risk, use in credit analysis, use in credit monitoring and the degree to 
which credit analysis/credit monitoring take into account aspects of portfolio 
management with view to the risk factors) across all the risk factors is shown 
illustrative bar-charts.  
The relative distribution of scoring levels for each risk factor with view to the 
importance for default risk and recovery risk addresses several research objectives. 
These are research objectives A1 (To investigate whether there is an awareness of the 
LBO cycle and whether its importance is recognised), A2 (To investigate which - other 
than the LBO cycle - risk factors are viewed as the most important ones for credit risk in 
LBOs) and A3 (To analyse how the risk factors identified in the literature review are 
judged in terms of importance for the credit risk). If the LBO cycle and the other risk 
factors identified receive high scoring levels, this supports that there is awareness of 
them. Those frequently receiving high scoring levels are likely to be viewed the most 
important ones (A2), except additional ones which may exist and which are addressed 
as part of the analysis to open questions. The scoring levels assigned also show how the 
risk factors are judged in terms of relative importance, one against the other, which can 
be compared to the conclusion of the discussion in the literature review and in part 
research objective A5 (To analyse how the risk factors identified in the literature review 
are judged in terms of importance for the credit risk).  
Showing the frequency distribution for the scoring levels assigned for the degree to 
which risk factors are used in credit analysis and in credit monitoring shows if some 
receive considerably more attention than others. This addresses research objectives A4 
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and A5. Those which receive the highest scoring levels are obviously the ones credit 
functions mainly focus on, as articulated by research objective A4 (To investigate the 
risk factors credit functions mainly focus on when assessing LBOs). Research objective 
A5 (To investigate if there is consistency in the view on the importance of risk factors 
and their use in the credit management process) is addressed here in a number of ways. 
Intuitively, one would expect that those rating factors that receive high scoring levels 
with regards to their importance also receive high scoring levels on the degree to which 
they are used. Following the same argument, due to their importance, analysis and 
monitoring would take advantage of measures of portfolio management to a significant 
degree. Such differences are shown if the data distributions are compared, for example, 
comparing the distribution for the importance of the LBO cycle on credit risk with that 
for its use in credit analysis. However, such an analysis must truly be viewed as 
intuitive. For example, if it had been found that most participants rated the LBO cycle 
highly in terms of its importance and low regarding its use in the credit management 
process, this would be interesting as it could indicate that the LBO cycle is not receiving 
the attention that its importance would suggest. The difficulty is that the scale measures 
different aspects. Participants were asked to score the importance of risk factors on the 
credit risk and the degree to which they are used. The scoring level descriptors were 
different. For example, a participant may score the importance of a certain risk factor as 
five and its use in the credit management process as a three. This appears to be an 
inconsistency, but the participant may actually believe that the scoring level of three on 
the use of a risk factor is the most appropriate for a factor that is rated at five for its 
importance. Research objective A5 is more directly and with less difficulty addressed 
when comparing the scoring levels for the degree of use in credit analysis and credit 
monitoring, since the scales and the descriptors here are the same. Any discrepancy here 
would actually point at different attention being given to a risk factor in each of the 
parts of the credit management process.  
Bar charts are used to illustrate the relative frequency of the total distribution of scoring 
levels assigned for each risk factor and the total within each category.  
The distribution of the scoring levels relating to their use in credit analysis and credit 
monitoring shows the degree of use in aggregate across the rating factors. If it was 
discovered that overall their use is low, this would require further investigation but 
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would also be of high relevance for research objective B and the second part of the 
research aim (to deduce potential measures to address any area for improvement), as 
this would suggest that more intensive use would be beneficial given the high 
importance. Also, comparisons between the distribution of scoring levels for the use of 
risk factors in credit analysis and in credit monitoring can be compared to judge 
whether the risk factors are used more prominently in one area compared to another. 
This would address research objective A5 (To investigate if there is consistency in the 
view on the importance of risk factors and their use in the credit management process). 
The analysis of the distribution of the scoring levels across all risk factors supplements 
this analysis (A5), since intuitively it would be expected that he scoring levels for the 
importance of the risk factors for default and recovery risk match those relating to the 
degree to which these factors are used in the credit management process. Also, if 
aggregated scoring levels for the use of risk factors were higher in credit analysis then 
in credit monitoring for example, this would indicate that credit monitoring makes less 
use of the risk factors as a whole.   
Ultimately, the relative distribution of scoring levels for the degree to which aspects of 
portfolio management relating to the risk factors are used in credit analysis and credit 
monitoring shows whether this is to a greater or a lesser degree. A low degree can 
indicate that the potential resulting from this is not fully utilised. This addresses 
research objective A6 (To investigate whether the credit management process is 
sufficiently integrated and taking advantage of aspects of portfolio management)  
The measures of dispersion were included to aid the analysis. For example, a high range 
can indicate that the views on certain risk factors are controversial.  
 
Research objective A7 (Are there any (additional) weaknesses and areas for 
improvement present in credit functions’ management of LBOs) as well as research 
objective B were assessed purely qualitatively.  
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4.1.2 Distribution free Tests 
To further back up the analysis derived by the bar charts and the descriptive statistics 
more statistical analysis was considered advisable. While much of this can be observed 
from the tables and bar-charts, there was a desire to check if any potential similarities or 
differences for the rating factors on each dimension would be statistically significant. 
For example, all participants were asked to rate the importance of each LBO risk factor 
for the default risk. By way of example, participants were asked how they would rate 
the importance of financial covenants for the default risk on a scale of 1-5. In the same 
way, they were asked to rate the importance of leverage for the default risk. So all the 
factors were rated based on their importance for the default risk using an identical scale. 
Therefore, it is possible to statistically analyse if there are differences between the 
scoring levels for the risk factors in total. For example, are financial covenants 
considered to exert more influence on the default risk than leverage? If the factors were 
equally important, there would not be any statistically significant difference. This 
procedure was deemed useful for all the dimensions that were analysed. In terms of a 
hypothesis, this results in the following: 
Scoring levels for the importance of risk factors for default risk:  
Ho (DR): There is no difference between the scoring levels assigned to the 
individual risk factors for their importance for default risk.  
Ha (DR): There is a difference in between the scoring levels assigned to the 
individual risk factors for their importance for default risk.  
Scoring levels for the importance of risk factors for recovery risk:  
Ho (RR): There is no difference between the scoring levels assigned to the 
individual risk factors for their importance for recovery risk.  
Ha (RR): There is a difference between the scoring levels assigned to the 
individual risk factors for their importance for recovery risk. 
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Scoring levels for the use of risk factors in credit analysis:  
Ho (CA): There is no difference between the scoring levels assigned to use 
of individual risk factors in credit analysis.  
Ha (CA): There is a difference between the scoring levels assigned to use of 
individual risk factors in credit analysis. 
Scoring levels for the use of risk factors in credit monitoring: 
Ho (CM): There is no difference between the scoring levels assigned to use 
of individual risk factors in credit monitoring 
Ha (CM): There is a difference between the scoring levels assigned to use of 
individual risk factors in credit monitoring 
Scoring levels for the degree to which credit analysis and credit monitoring take 
into account aspects of portfolio management relating to the risk factors: 
Ho (APFM): There is no difference between the scoring levels assigned to the 
degree to which credit analysis and credit monitoring take into 
account aspects of portfolio management relating to the risk 
factors.  
Ha (APFM): There is a difference between the scoring levels assigned to the 
degree to which credit analysis and credit monitoring take into 
account aspects of portfolio management relating to the risk 
factors. 
The analysis mentioned above addresses several research objectives. A2 and A3 are 
addressed by Ho (DR) / Ha (DR) and by Ho (RR) / Ha (RR). If the alternative hypotheses 
are confirmed, this suggests that some risk factors are viewed as considerably higher or 
lower than others. Those receiving higher scoring levels are the most important ones 
(other than potentially those that were not part of the literature review, but resulted from 
the open questions in this regard).  
Along the same line of argument, A4 is addressed by Ho (CA) / Ha (CA) as well as Ho 
(CM) / Ha (CM). If the alternative hypothesis is confirmed, some risk factors are likely 
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to receive more or less attention than others and answers to research objective A4 can 
be derived. If the null hypothesis can be confirmed, this suggests that the risk factors 
receive equal attention.  
Research objective A5 is partly addressed. As outlined above, the importance of the risk 
factors and their use in the credit management are different dimensions. While 
numerically using the same scale, they are measuring different things and the 
descriptors are different as well, therefore a comparison between the scoring levels has 
its limitations and thus the analysis of such should predominantly use descriptive 
statistics. However, if for example it is found that there is consistency in the scoring 
levels for the importance of risk factors but no consistency in their use in credit analysis 
or credit management, this at least suggests more divergence of views in the latter and 
points towards some potentially inconsistent use compared to the importance ascribed to 
the risk factor. As with the scatter chart comparison, this analysis requires 
supplementation by qualitative analysis.  
Research objective A6 is addressed by Ho (APFM): / Ha (APFM). If the null hypothesis 
is rejected, this shows there is divergence in the degree to which credit analysis and 
credit monitoring take into account aspects of portfolio management relating to the risk 
factors. It has been argued that for most risk factors they could and should easily be 
taken into account. Therefore, if there are differences in relation to this, this suggests 
that at least for some of the risk factors the use of aspects of portfolio management in 
credit analysis and credit monitoring can be increased.  
As part of the analysis, it was also required to identify any drivers of inconsistencies in 
scoring levels within one dimension.  
The decision to use distribution free tests was driven by the nature of the data. First, it 
was an ordinal scale, secondly it was related to a small sample and thirdly a normal 
distribution with values being roughly equally distributed around the mean cannot be 
assumed from the descriptive statistics. For these circumstances, a series of so-called 
distribution free tests, also known as non-parametric tests, is available. Generally, these 
tests use ranking procedures by assigning a rank to the observations. If the data for each 
of the test variables were similar, then the sum of the ranks would be close to zero.  
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The data did not stem from a random selection process, which is typically required for 
hypothesis testing. A counter-argument is that in practice almost all data is derived by 
some convenience considerations, even if a larger ground sample exists. Ultimately, 
while there are no doubt shortcomings of the statistical testing of the data, it was still 
viewed to be beneficial and justifiable for the following reasons: 
• The entire research set up was exploratory and indicative. The statistical 
techniques are only one supporting element in the analysis, whereas at least an 
equal share of the data was derived from qualitative responses to questions and 
descriptive statistics.   
• While the sample was based on a convenience selection procedure, the 
background of the participants varied significantly 
Tests for multiple comparisons that are typically recommended are the Kruskall-Wallis 
Test and the Friedman Test. The Friedman Test is recommended for data that is 
depended. The data in this report was viewed as dependent, since participants were 
asked to provide scoring levels for various risk factors, i.e. their rating of one factor is 
likely to influence the rating of another.  For the Friedman Test, the level of significance 
has been chosen at 10%. The results also report the critical value and the computed 
value for the test statistic, which are referred to as Q-Values within the Friedman Test. 
The critical value references the value below which the null-hypotheses is accepted at 
the chosen level of significance. If the computed value is above the critical value, the 
null-hypothesis is rejected. The p-values are also reported, which show the strength of 
the rejection or the acceptance of the hypothesis. The smaller the p-value is, the stronger 
is the support to reject the null hypothesis. As the test shows very low p-values in all 
instances and therefore provides clear indications for strong rejections, no other levels 
of significance are shown for the Friedman Test. The term DF in the test statistic 
references the degrees of freedom. This represents the number of groups that could be 
varied without influencing the overall result. In this case, each rating factor represents a 
group of values. The degrees of freedom are calculated as the number of groups minus 
one.  
Finally, it was considered worthwhile to investigate what is driving the rejection of the 
null hypothesis where it was observed. That is, for example, if the results showed that 
the scoring levels for the importance of the risk factors are not consistent, if the 
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inconsistencies in the scoring level were particularly present with view to one or a few 
risk factors. To compare multiple pairs of data concurrently, a Nemenyi Procedure 
comparing individual sets of data within the total data group was used. As p-values are 
not shown for this test, the results are reported at different levels of significance to show 
their statistical strengths.  
The Friedman Test and the Nemenyi-Procedure were carried out with a standard 
software package, called XLStat. These were created using the describing-data function 
within the software application.  
The procedure for carrying out the distribution free tests was the following: First, raw 
data was included in Microsoft Excel. Then, XLStat was started. The menu “non-
parametric tests” was opened and the choice made to compare two samples or multiple 
samples respectively. Then the data to be compared was selected and the Friedman Test 
as well as the Nemenyi Procedure for multiple individual comparisons was chosen. The 
results were carefully sense-checked by comparison with the frequency distributions 
shown.  
4.1.3 Analysis of Qualitative Data  
The interviews were semi-structured, giving some latitude to participants about the 
areas they wanted to comment on specifically. This and the set-up of the questionnaire 
resulted in generally quite rich data being generated for the fully open questions in 
section one, which were all intended to put matters into a broader context and help to 
improve the validity of the study. Less qualitative data was generated from those 
questions where participants were also requested to provide a scoring level. However, 
the length at which interviewees responded to individual questions varied significantly. 
Most of them provided more information on the questions in the first section of the 
questionnaire (Appendix 2, p. 154), but some were very short on these and provided 
more information on the specific questions relating to the individual risk factors, despite 
these questions predominantly asked for scoring levels to be provided.   Following the 
production of summaries from each interview, responses were carefully checked as to 
which topic they would mainly touch on or how they could best be categorized. Such 
categories were derived for each question in the questionnaire and they were constantly 
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updated during the research process. Based on the first interview, a first set of 
categories was derived. If in later interviews, additional categories emerged they would 
be added and sometimes category labels had to be changed during process.  
The data generated this manner was kept in a word file for every question. Where a 
response did fall into a certain category, a count-entry was included in the categories. 
Where viewed beneficial, comments were added into the field as well such as from 
quotations. An extract from the file that was used during the research process is 
included in Appendix 3, p. 169.  
Within the responses, some interviewees did mention aspects that fall into more than 
one category. Therefore, the total frequency by which a category was mentioned is 
shown in relation to the total number of category mentions. This is shown as “category 
hits”. The number of participants who have mentioned a certain category is also shown 
in the column “Participants mentioning category”. This may exceed 100% or be below 
100% when interviewees addressed more than one category in their response or when 
not all participants answered the questions (mainly the responses to the specific 
questions on risk-factors, where the focus was on the scoring).  
Based on the example of two summaries form the research interviews, the procedure is 
illustrated with view to question relating to the LBO cycle in Appendix 3, p. 169.  
4.1.4 Combining the Results of the Data Analysis 
The first step to arrive at the research findings was to shift away from the question-by-
question approach that had been applied. This approach was necessary to ensure that all 
the data is considered, but leads to a silo-type of analysis and it is not capable of 
providing linkages.  
Therefore, in this phase of the study the focus was to interpret the data concurrently 
with regards to the research objectives. The results of the quantitative analysis relating 
to each research objective were combined with the data derived from the qualitative 
analysis.  
For each of the research objectives, the results of the data analysis are illustrated and 
then discussed. Where appropriate, the data from the frequency distribution of response 
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categories is displayed and sometimes quotes from the participants or extracts from the 
research summaries were used to amplify certain results 
While the research was designed to enhance validity and robustness of results, it was 
based on a relatively small group of participants. For this purpose, it was considered 
useful to expose the key findings of the analysis to further experts for a final plausibility 
check. Therefore, the results were then exposed to four independent senior credit 
executives and separately to the credit function of one bank. Finally, the overall findings 
were illustrated using an interdependency-graph, illustrating how the individual findings 
are likely to influence each other. From this, research objective B was then achieved.  
4.2  Research Findings 
4.2.1 Results Relating to the Awareness and Importance of the LBO Cycle   
The first research objective (A1) is related to whether there was awareness of the LBO 
cycle and whether its importance is recognised. The literature review highlighted that 
many of the risk factors appear to be influenced by cyclical moves in the LBO market. 
Accordingly, if it was recognised as important, the LBO cycle should play an important 
role in credit analysis and credit monitoring and this could take into account aspects of 
portfolio management. The LBO cycle was addressed in this research by questions 1.5 
and 2.1 in the questionnaire. The results are displayed in the table on the following 
page.  
The majority of the participants thought that an LBO cycle would exist and that they 
had a clear view of the signals that would indicate an increasingly aggressive LBO 
cycle. The dominant signals were clear increases in leverage multiples (i.e. suggesting 
higher debt loads), accompanied by banks’ ability to distribute risks to the syndication 
market. Yet, seven participants mentioned that documentation standards would erode 
during an increasingly aggressive cycle. 
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 Table 4-1: Overview of major interview results regarding the LBO cycle. Source: Author’s own.  
Some exemplary extracts from the research notes (all from different participants) are 
illustrated here: 
 “…(the cycle) is very important, for example as structures get more aggressive and 
covenants allow more headroom (-> Weaker documentation standards)…mechanisms to 
control risk erode. Credit risk did include evaluation of the chances to redistribute risk 
– when able to syndicate risk acceptance rises (-> More risks being distributed)” 
“…one (author’s insertion: signal) is the development of purchase price multiples. In an 
upward cycle, you rarely find transactions that are able to de-lever in a no growth 
scenario…If purchase multiples go up, so does leverage” 
“…Cycle certainly exists, reflected in higher (debt) multiplies”. 
The signals that were mentioned relating to the ability to recognise the point in the LBO 
cycle is consistent with what the literature review had flagged (Section 2.3.10, p. 39); or 
Axelson et al., 2010; Acharya et al., 2007; Deutsche Bundesbank, 2007 and 2006; 
Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Kaplan and Stein, 1991). These can also be reflected against 
the categories mentioned in response to question 1.1, which asked participants to 
describe the experience that banks have had in the LBO market during the last decade 
and particularly as a result of the financial crisis of 2007/2008 (for full results see 
Appendix 3). The question was not specifically asking about the LBO cycle, but yet the 
Existence of a cycle:
Signals: 
More risks being distributed: 
Increase in leverage multiples:
Increase in purchase prices:
Weaker documentation standards:
More secondaries/tertiaries:
LBO of unsuitable businesses:
Credit Management Process: 
Lack of consistent / systematic monitoring at 
credit function level:
Mitigated by other factors:
Overview of major interview results regarding the LBO Cycle
No. category 
hits % category hits
% of interviewees 
mentioning 
category
15.00 20.55% 83.33%
11.00 15.07% 61.11%
11.00 15.07% 61.11%
5.00 6.85% 27.78%
7.00 9.59% 38.89%
4.00 5.48% 22.22%
2.00 2.74% 11.11%
10.00 13.70% 55.56%
8.00 10.96% 44.44%
73.00 100.00%
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most frequently stated categories were the cyclicality in the LBO market as well as a 
focus on risk distribution.  
 
 Table 4-2: Overview of major interview results regarding banks’ experiences. Source: Author’s own.  
Interestingly, only two participants mentioned that more aggressive markets would also 
be accompanied by businesses subject to an LBO which are not suitable for this kind of 
financial structure, i.e. would not show the required stability in their cash flows. This is 
consistent with the observation made by Axelson et al. (2013) or Brinkhuis and De 
Maeseneire (2012) who have shown that frequently the capital structure of LBOs cannot 
be explained by using companies’ fundamentals.  
“Yes, cycle exists, signs are decreasing covenants (Documentation Standards), 
Unsuitable businesses are still used for LBOs (LBO of unsuitable businesses) and 
Higher Multiples (Leverage)”. 
“Yes, cycle exists, Leverage rises in aggressive markets (Leverage) and quality of 
transactions deteriorates (fundamentally and structurally). Structurally (Weaker 
documentation Standards), fundamentally (Unsuitable Business). 
The surprising element is that this response category was found so infrequently. 
Regarding the experience that banks have had, there was also a significant mention of 
rising defaults as well as that more banks entered the market. Sometimes, these new 
participants were considered to have a lack of understanding for LBOs, but were yet 
welcome asset takers. The following comment from an interviewee illustrates this:  
“Some (authors insertion: smaller asset takers) thought they understood the business, 
but in fact they did not and entered this businesses with a rather simple view of the 
credits, taking large tickets”.  
No. category 
hits 
% category 
hits
% of 
interviewees 
mentioning 
category
Cyclicality in the LBO market: 9.00 29.03% 50.00%
Main focus on the ability to distribute risk: 9.00 29.03% 50.00%
Significant number of defaults: 7.00 22.58% 38.89%
Lack of understanding for the business: 6.00 19.35% 33.33%
31.00 100%
Overview of major interview results regarding banks' experiences 
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This supports the claim that in such times there is an increasing ability to distribute risks 
since new players would enter the market seeking participations. Also, there appears to 
be a strong trend to follow the market because it would take more effort to reject 
transactions, as several people commented about upward cycles.  
The awareness and recognition of the importance of the LBO cycle is also evident in the 
scoring levels assigned for the importance on default risk and recovery risk which were 
clearly concentrated in the scoring levels of four and five (Table 4-4, p. 92; Table 4-5, 
p. 93; Figure 4-1, p. 92 and Figure 4-2, p. 93).  
At the same time what is noticeable is that the scoring levels assigned for use in credit 
management and monitoring are skewed towards the middle point of the scoring scale. 
This means that they are only taken into account to some degree and also the utilization 
of portfolio management aspects with regards to the LBO cycle remains moderate (p. 
106). 
This is somewhat surprising, since the signals for the LBO market that participants have 
mentioned can easily be observed but would clearly require that developments within 
the portfolio would need to be reflected and that credit analysis and credit monitoring 
would feed such information to portfolio management and vice versa. Elaborating on 
the inclusion of the LBO cycle as part of the credit management process, a frequently 
found statement was that there would be no systematic consideration of this and that the 
LBO cycle would typically be mitigated by other factors. What this was supposed to 
describe was that while one is aware of the LBO cycle, a decision about each 
transaction would be made according to its own features and the LBO cycle would not 
play an important role in this regard. One participant’s comment in this regard was:  
“The point in the LBO cycle is not a sufficient reason to decline a transaction.” (->Lack 
of systematic consideration) 
“This requires anticipation of certain aspects over time (author’s insertion: regarding 
the wider market) and is not done (author’s insertion: At the level of the individual 
transaction). No portfolio-aspect is taking place with view to timing (author’s insertion: 
relating to vintage year’s of LBOs).  
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“The cycle reflects macro-developments and as such has no influence on the risk. What 
is important is the business model. There is no focus on the development of the cycle”.  
What this suggests is that there is a belief in one’s own ability to consistently choose 
those transactions that would be better from a credit risk viewpoint than the majority of 
the aggressive cycle, as for example indicated by the last quote above. The evidence, 
however, suggests that many people thought they had this ability but were not proved to 
be correct when looking at the high number of transactions that required some form of 
restructuring (e.g. PWC, 2010).  This is further supported by the answer received to the 
question about what banks could do better. Here a total of 20 responses were classified, 
of which 45% of participants mentioned that a more independent, long-term view 
regarding LBO credits would be a way to improve LBO credit risk management. This 
suggests that much of the activity of the boom that lasted until about 2007 was driven 
by cyclical momentum and not much attention was paid to this.  
Summary of research findings relating to the awareness and importance of the LBO 
cycle:  
• There is an awareness of the existence of the LBO cycle and its relevance for the 
credit risk. Most of the risk factors that were tested were mentioned initially.   
• Despite its importance, the LBO cycle only receives moderate attention in the 
credit management process and is largely driven by the view that one can choose 
those transactions that show more acceptable risk profiles even in aggressive 
LBO markets.   
• There appears to be no systematic monitoring of the LBO cycle based on easily 
observable factors (see above).  
• It appears to be recognised that during the last peak cycle and the period leading 
to this, there was some “follow-the-crowd behaviour”.  
4.2.2 Results Relating to the Awareness and Importance of Risk Factors  
The results presented in this sub-section address two of the research objectives: 
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• Research objective A2 (To investigate which risk factors – other than the LBO 
cycle - are viewed as the most important ones in credit functions’ assessment of 
LBOs’ credit risk). 
• Research objective A3 (To analyse how the risk factors identified in the 
literature review are judged in terms of importance for the credit risk).   
These objectives were mainly addressed by question 1.2 and the questions asking 
participants to assign a scoring level for the importance of the individual risk factors. 
Questions 1.1 and 3.0 did serve to highlight potential additional risk factors that may 
have emerged but which were not yet covered in the literature. Questions 2.1 – 2.10 
were designed to see how the importance of those risk factors found in the literature 
were judged in terms of their importance for credit risk. By combining the results 
related to these two questions it is also possible to check their consistency.  
 
 Table 4-3: Overview of major interview results regarding main risk factors. Source: Author’s own.  
Exemplary extracts from the research notes: 
“…little attention has been given to debt capacity” (author’s insertion: based on the 
company’s business model -> issues with business fundamentals). 
“Strong cash-flow volatility” ->(issues with business fundamentals), also relating to 
industry factors (-> industry state).  
“Secular industry changes are important…and the evaluation of the business model”.  
No. category 
hits
% category 
hits
% of 
interviewees 
mentioning 
category
Issues within the business fundamentals: 13.00 27.66% 72.22%
Leverage: 11.00 23.40% 61.11%
Industry state: 8.00 17.02% 44.44%
Deal structure: 5.00 10.64% 27.78%
Specifically for Recovery Risk 
Collateral: 3.00 6.38% 16.67%
Industry state: 3.00 6.38% 16.67%
Deal structure: 2.00 4.26% 11.11%
Jurisdiction: 2.00 4.26% 11.11%
47.00 100.00%
Overview of major interview results regarding main risk factors
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“Leverage, structure and the market position of the company”.   
The most frequently mentioned aspect during the interviews was issues with the 
fundamentals of a business, with little differentiation between default risk and recovery 
risk. This was interesting for two reasons. One is that this is likely to be of high 
relevance, also in non-LBO credits. Arguably, this might be the case for other risk 
factors pointed out as a result of the literature review as well. However, it is being 
argued that these issues are at least particularly relevant in LBOs, since they operate 
under significant debt burdens and therefore have a higher risk of default per se, which 
also increases the necessity to consider recovery risk. Secondly, at least parts of the 
literature as well as the experience of the years 2006-2007 indicate that business 
fundamentals were not adequately considered in terms of the structuring of LBOs (see 
above). Therefore, the strong focus on business fundamentals either presents an illusion 
that they are a driver of the capital structure or a belief in one’s own ability to choose 
those transactions where the capital structure is actually consistent with the business 
fundamentals.  
One participant commented on this as follows:  
“we believe to be able to make forecasts, which we are of course. However, there is a 
natural tendency to think in linear relationships and not enough consideration is given 
to secular changes that may take place.”  
The comment highlights that there appears to be an overestimation of one’s own ability 
and that systematic factors experience little consideration. This is supported by the 
relatively few people that mentioned that in an upward cycle there would be more 
businesses being subject to an LBO which are not suitable for this kind of financing (see 
Section 4.2.1; p. 84) and also a claim being made regarding mitigating the LBO cycle 
by individual transaction characteristics.  
Eleven participants mentioned leverage as a prime risk driver, which is consistent with 
the literature (Section 2.3.3, p. 30). Interestingly, industry state was also amongst the 
factors that were frequently mentioned. The literature review only discussed this with 
regards to recovery risk, but the participants also stated it would also be a driver of 
default risk. This aspect was not considered in the literature review of this study, as it 
was deemed to be widely applicable to any credit exposure. However, there is some 
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validity in the argument, as for example the definitions of LBOs in the literature 
frequently make references to stable cash flows as a requirement. The factor is 
interpreted to be largely overlapping with business fundamentals, which was confirmed 
during the interviews.  
In total, six of the ten risk factors identified in the literature review were mentioned 
explicitly. As seen in the previous sub section, the LBO cycle was also recognised to be 
present and viewed of high importance for default risk and recovery risk, therefore at 
least as far as importance of risk factors is concerned there is consistency amongst those 
mentioned and those found in the literature.  
Another interesting observation from the data is that the risk factors were rarely directly 
related to recovery risk. Even collateral, the most obvious and least contested driver of 
recovery risk (see Section 2.3.7, p.37) was only mentioned three times.  This was 
commented on by one participant by explaining that recovery risk would only come into 
play when default has materialised or was about to materialise and this was not a valid 
assumption in credit analysis. If that was the view, the transaction would be declined 
initially. An entry following a comment form a participant in the research notes 
illustrates this:  
“Recovery Risk is clearly under-represented in credit analysis and monitoring; not the 
domain of classical credit functions (not used to perform this kind of analysis).”  
No risk factors in addition to those found in the literature were recorded other than those 
already discussed (i.e. management). This suggests that there was no emergence of new 
risk factors in the cycle that ended in 2007. 
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Table 4-4: Importance of risk factors for default risk. Source: Author’s own. 
Figure 4-1: Percentage distribution importance of risk factors for default risk. Source: Author’s own.
LBO
Cylce
Sponsor 
Quality
Type of 
Transaction Leverage
Financial 
Covenants
Debt 
Compos. Totals
Number of Data Points 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 108.00
Frequency Distribution 
Scoring 5 10.00 5.00 7.00 16.00 4.00 6.00 48.00
Scoring 4 3.00 10.00 8.00 2.00 9.00 8.00 40.00
Scoring 3 5.00 3.00 1.00 0.00 5.00 0.00 14.00
Scoring 2 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 5.00
Scoring 1 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Importance of risk factors for default risk
Measures of Location / 
Dispersion 
Highest rating 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
Lowest rating 3.00 3.00 1.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 1.00
Range 2.00 2.00 4.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00
Arithmetic mean 4.28 4.11 4.06 4.89 3.94 3.89 4.19
Median 5.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Mode 5.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 5.00
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
80% 
90% 
100% 
LBO Cylce Sponsor Quality Type of 
Transaction 
Leverage Financial 
Covenants 
Debt Compos. Totals 
Scoring 1 0.00% 0.00% 5.56% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.93% 
Scoring 2 0.00% 0.00% 5.56% 0.00% 0.00% 22.22% 4.63% 
Scoring 3 27.78% 16.67% 5.56% 0.00% 27.78% 0.00% 12.96% 
Scoring 4 16.67% 55.56% 44.44% 11.11% 50.00% 44.44% 37.04% 
Scoring 5 55.56% 27.78% 38.89% 88.89% 22.22% 33.33% 44.44% 
Percentage distribution importance of risk factors for default risk   
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 Table 4-5: Importance of risk factors for recovery risk. Source: Author’s own.  
 
 Figure 4-2: Percentage distribution importance of risk factors for recovery risk. Source: Author’s own. 
What becomes evident when looking at the charts above is that overall the majority of 
the risk factors are viewed to be of high or very high importance (rated four or five) for 
both the risk of default and the recovery risk. This is consistent with most of them being 
initially mentioned during the open questions. A total of 81% of all the scoring levels 
assigned were at a level of four or five for default risk and this was also the case for 
79% of all ratings assigned for recovery risk.  
Looking at the individual risk factors first gives the impression that the scoring levels 
for recovery risk are more dispersed. However, there were more scoring levels to be 
assigned for the importance of risk factors on recovery risk than there were for the 
LBO 
Cylce
Sponsor 
Quality
Type of 
Transaction Leverage
Financial 
Covenants
Debt 
Compos. Jurisdiction Collateral 
Industry 
State
Overal State 
of Economy Totals 
Number of Data Points 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 180.00
Frequency Distribution 
Scoring 5 7.00 6.00 6.00 17.00 4.00 12.00 13.00 10.00 9.00 4.00 88.00
Scoring 4 7.00 6.00 6.00 0.00 5.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 7.00 10.00 54.00
Scoring 3 3.00 4.00 3.00 1.00 5.00 0.00 1.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 25.00
Scoring 2 1.00 1.00 3.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 8.00
Scoring 1 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00
Importance of risk factors for recovery risk 
Measures of Location / 
Dispersion
Max. 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
Min. 2.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 1.00
Range 3.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 4.00 4.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 4.00
Arithmetic mean 4.11 3.83 3.83 4.89 3.33 4.50 4.67 4.28 4.39 3.94 4.18
Median 4.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 3.50 5.00 5.00 5.00 4.50 4.00 4.00
Mode 4.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 4.00 5.00
0%!
10%!
20%!
30%!
40%!
50%!
60%!
70%!
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90%!
100%!
LBO Cylce! Sponsor 
Quality!
Type of 
Transaction!
Leverage! Financial 
Covenants!
Debt 
Compos.!
Jurisdiction! Collateral ! Industry 
State!
Overal State 
of Economy!
Totals !
Scoring 1! 0.00%! 5.56%! 0.00%! 0.00%! 16.67%! 5.56%! 0.00%! 0.00%! 0.00%! 0.00%! 2.78%!
Scoring 2! 5.56%! 5.56%! 16.67%! 0.00%! 5.56%! 0.00%! 0.00%! 5.56%! 0.00%! 5.56%! 4.44%!
Scoring 3! 16.67%! 22.22%! 16.67%! 5.56%! 27.78%! 0.00%! 5.56%! 16.67%! 11.11%! 16.67%! 13.89%!
Scoring 4! 38.89%! 33.33%! 33.33%! 0.00%! 27.78%! 27.78%! 22.22%! 22.22%! 38.89%! 55.56%! 30.00%!
Scoring 5! 38.89%! 33.33%! 33.33%! 94.44%! 22.22%! 66.67%! 72.22%! 55.56%! 50.00%! 22.22%! 48.89%!
Percentage distribution importance of risk factors for recovery risk   
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importance of default risk. In total, ten factors were evaluated with regards to recovery 
risk, but only six in terms of default risk. 
The Friedman Test for testing whether there is consistency in the scoring levels first 
rejected this for both the default risk and the recovery risk since the critical values had 
been exceeded. The low p-values also indicate a very strong case for rejection.  
Table 4-6: Friedman Test importance of risk factors for default risk. Source: Author’s own (using 
XLSTAT) 
Table 4-7: Friedman Test importance of risk factors for recovery risk. Source: Author’s own (using XLSTAT) 
The statistical representation of these results is: 
Ho (DR): There is no difference between the scoring levels assigned to the 
individual risk factors for their importance for default risk. -> 
Rejected. 
Ha (DR): There is a difference in between the scoring levels assigned to the 
individual risk factors for their importance for default risk. -> 
Accepted.  
Ho (RR): There is no difference between the scoring levels assigned to the 
individual risk factors for their importance for recovery risk. -> 
Rejected. 
Friedman Test importance of risk factors for default risk
Q (Observed value) 21.477
Q (Critical value) 9.236
DF 5
p-value (two-tailed) 0.001
alpha (Level of significance) 0.1 
Friedman Test importance of risk factors for recovery risk
Q (Observed value) 41.837
Q (Critical value) 14.684
DF 9
p-value (two-tailed) <0.0001
alpha (Level of significance) 0.1  
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Ha (RR): There is a difference between the scoring levels assigned to the 
individual risk factors for their importance for recovery risk. -> 
Accepted.  
Table 4-8: Significant differences based on a Friedman Test and a Nemenyi Procedure (default risk). 
Levels of significance: *at 10%; **at 5%, ***at 1%. Source: Author’s own (using XLSTAT). 
Table 4-9: Significant differences based on a Friedman Test and a Nemenyi Procedure (recovery risk). 
Levels of significance: *at 10%; **at 5%, ***at 1%. Source: Author’s own (using XLSTAT). 
For the scoring levels assigned to the importance of risk factors for default risk, this is 
clearly driven by leverage, which is consistently rated at the high end of the scale. A test 
where leverage was excluded from the distribution (not shown) actually led to 
acceptance of the hypothesis.  
Regarding the importance for recovery risk, the picture is more diffused. Regarding 
leverage, the same explanation applies as that provided for the comparison of the 
scoring levels for the importance of default risk. The second risk factor that appeared to 
have received scoring levels that are different from the rest is financial covenants, which 
received relatively low scoring levels. Participants explained that this would be based 
on covenants no longer providing any protection once a default has occurred. It was 
recognised that financial covenants would provide a strong point for negotiations, but 
Significant differences based on a Friedman Test and a Nemenyi Procedure (default risk ) 
LBO 
Cycle
Sponsor 
Quality
Type of 
Transaction Leverage
Financial 
Covenants
Debt 
Composition Jurisdiction Collateral
Industry 
State
LBO Cycle No
Sponsor Quality No
Type of Transaction No No
Leverage No Yes* No
Financial Covenants No No No Yes***
Debt Composition No No No Yes** No
Jurisdiction
Collateral
Industry State
Overall State Economy
Significant differences based on a Friedman Test and a Nemenyi Procedure (recovery risk) 
LBO Cycle
Sponsor 
Quality
Type of 
Transaction Leverage
Financial 
Covenants
Debt 
Composition Jurisdiction Collateral
Industry 
State
LBO Cycle
Sponsor Quality No
Type of Transaction No No
Leverage No Yes** Yes*
Financial Covenants No No No Yes***
Debt Composition No No No No Yes*
Jurisdiction No No No No Yes No
Collateral No No No No No No No
Industry State No No No No No No No No
Overall State Economy No No No Yes** No No No No No
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some people elaborated that they would have to be exercised prior to a default 
occurring: 
“Technically, covenants influence default risk, this is how they are structured. However, 
they are set far before payment default occurs. In practice, there is no focus (author’s 
insertion: with view to covenants) on recovery risk.”  
“…(author’s insertion: influence) high because it educates management to exercise 
discipline. No influence on recovery levels.” 
“…Recovery risk: Some importance, also recovery risk only comes when default has 
occurred” 
“Covenants serve as a warning signal, but are unlikely to cause a real (author’s 
insertion: payment default)…also, for recovery risk this is not viewed to have an 
impact. Once a transaction is in default so that recovery plays a role, all covenants are 
in breach anyway.”   
Summary of research findings relating to the awareness and importance of risk factors:  
Overall, the research findings relating research objectives A2 and A3 can be 
summarised as follows: 
• The initial mentioning of six (seven including the LBO cycle) of the risk factors 
that the literature review has flagged points to a solid level of awareness.  
• Albeit the risk factors are viewed as very important for recovery risk, few 
instances were recorded where the risk factors were specifically related to 
recovery risk with regards to the open questions. This indicates that recovery 
risk may not be the main concern for credit analysts.  
• There were no additional risk factors mentioned other than business 
fundamentals. It was argued that this is equally relevant for any kind of credit 
risk and that in particular in LBOs, there is a higher risk that the capital structure 
will not match the business fundamentals. A similar observation was made for 
industry state.  
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• The high levels assigned for each of the risk factors regarding their importance 
for default risk and recovery risk states that most of them are viewed as 
important drivers of LBO credit risk. Differences exist in the evaluation as to 
how important individual risk factors are for default risk and recovery risk. The 
statistical procedure testing the consistency between the scoring levels assigned 
led to a rejection of the null hypothesis. This rejection was based on the scoring 
levels of a few individual risk factors. Taking this into account, the scoring 
levels for the importance of risk factors are viewed very consistently regarding 
default risk. However, for recovery risk the picture is more differentiated as in 
particular financial covenants are not considered to have a strong impact.  
4.2.3 Results Relating to the Use of Risk Factors in Credit Analysis and Credit 
Monitoring  
The analysis so far indicated that knowing where the risks are was well established, 
despite the fact that recovery risk may not be at the forefront of participants’ minds.  
The presence of the LBO cycle and its relevance has also been confirmed. 
Consequently, what had to be addressed next was the question of which factors, if any, 
are used in the credit management process and to what degree.  
This relates to the following research objectives: 
• Research objective A4: To investigate the risk factors’ credit functions mainly 
focusing on assessing LBOs.  
• Research objective A5: To investigate if there is consistency in the view on the 
importance of risk factors and their use in the credit management process. 
These research objectives were addressed by questions 1.3 in comparison to questions 
1.1 and 1.2 and the scoring levels were requested as part of questions 2.1 – 2.10 for each 
of the risk factors. The table below shows the distribution of the categories found as part 
of the open question.   
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 Table 4-10: Overview of major interview results regarding the main risk factors used in CA/CM. 
Source: Author’s own.  
The results generated from open question 1.3 for this research objective show very high 
consistency with those relating to the most important risk factors. An aspect newly 
introduced in the general part was the comparison of an LBO company’s performance 
against historical data and the business plan. What is also consistent is that there are few 
references to recovery risk as such, with two participants mentioning sponsor quality as 
a factor that receives significant attention in credit analysis and credit monitoring with 
regards to assessing recovery risk. Also, only one person identified collateral as a risk 
driver, which again supports the lower attention given to recovery risk. The significant 
mention of business fundamentals supports what was stated earlier, that there is a view 
that credit functions are able to evaluate whether the business fundamentals match the 
capital structure.  
For each of the risk factors, participants were also asked to assign a scoring level 
regarding the degree to which they thought the respective factor would be used within 
credit analysis and credit monitoring. 
No. category 
hits
% category 
hits
% of 
interviewees 
mentioning 
category
Business fundamentals: 13.00 30.23% 72.22%
Leverage: 10.00 23.26% 55.56%
Industry state: 8.00 18.60% 44.44%
Performance against plan / historical performance: 5.00 11.63% 27.78%
Deal structure: 4.00 9.30% 22.22%
Specifically on Recovery Risk: 
Sponsor: 2.00 4.65% 11.11%
Collateral: 1.00 2.33% 5.56%
43.00 100.00%
Overview of major interview results regarding the main risk factors used in CA / CM
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 Table 4-11: Use of risk factors in credit analysis. Source: Author’s own.  
 
 Figure 4-3: Percentage distribution use of risk factors in credit analysis. Source: Author’s own.  
 
 Table 4-12: Use of risk factors in credit monitoring. Source: Author’s own.  
LBO 
Cylce
Sponsor 
Quality
Type of 
Transaction Leverage
Financial 
Covenants
Debt 
Compos. Jurisdiction Collateral 
Industry 
State
Overal State 
of Economy Totals 
Number of Data Points 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 180.00
Frequency Distribution 
Scoring 5 0.00 1.00 0.00 14.00 6.00 6.00 3.00 7.00 5.00 3.00 45.00
Scoring 4 6.00 6.00 10.00 4.00 7.00 9.00 8.00 3.00 10.00 9.00 72.00
Scoring 3 7.00 8.00 4.00 0.00 4.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 1.00 4.00 37.00
Scoring 2 5.00 3.00 4.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 4.00 1.00 2.00 24.00
Scoring 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 2.00
Use of risk factors in credit analysis 
Measures of Location / 
Dispersion
Max. 4.00 5.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
Min. 2.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 1.00
Range 2.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 4.00
Arithmetic mean 3.06 3.28 3.33 4.78 4.00 4.11 3.50 3.72 3.94 3.72 3.74
Median 3.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Mode 3.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
0%!
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40%!
50%!
60%!
70%!
80%!
90%!
100%!
LBO Cylce! Sponsor 
Quality!
Type of 
Transaction!
Leverage! Financial 
Covenants!
Debt 
Compos.!
Jurisdiction! Collateral ! Industry 
State!
Overal State 
of Economy!
Totals !
Scoring 1! 0.00%! 0.00%! 0.00%! 0.00%! 0.00%! 0.00%! 5.56%! 0.00%! 5.56%! 0.00%! 1.11%!
Scoring 2! 27.78%! 16.67%! 22.22%! 0.00%! 5.56%! 5.56%! 16.67%! 22.22%! 5.56%! 11.11%! 13.33%!
Scoring 3! 38.89%! 44.44%! 22.22%! 0.00%! 22.22%! 11.11%! 16.67%! 22.22%! 5.56%! 22.22%! 20.56%!
Scoring 4! 33.33%! 33.33%! 55.56%! 22.22%! 38.89%! 50.00%! 44.44%! 16.67%! 55.56%! 50.00%! 40.00%!
Scoring 5! 0.00%! 5.56%! 0.00%! 77.78%! 33.33%! 33.33%! 16.67%! 38.89%! 27.78%! 16.67%! 25.00%!
Percentage distribution use of risk factors in credit analysis   
LBO 
Cylce
Sponsor 
Quality
Type of 
Transaction Leverage
Financial 
Covenants
Debt 
Compos. Jurisdiction Collateral 
Industry 
State
Overal State 
of Economy Totals 
Number of Data Points 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 180.00
Frequency Distribution 
Scoring 5 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 23.00
Scoring 4 5.00 5.00 3.00 5.00 10.00 7.00 4.00 2.00 4.00 7.00 52.00
Scoring 3 3.00 5.00 4.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 6.00 49.00
Scoring 2 9.00 7.00 7.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 7.00 6.00 3.00 1.00 43.00
Scoring 1 1.00 1.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 0.00 2.00 13.00
Use of risk factors in credit monitoring
Measures of Location / 
Dispersion
Max. 4.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
Min. 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00
Range 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 4.00
Arithmetic mean 2.67 2.78 2.33 4.39 3.89 3.33 2.72 2.78 3.39 3.33 3.16
Median 2.00 3.00 2.00 5.00 4.00 3.50 2.50 3.00 3.00 3.50 3.00
Mode 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 3.00
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 Figure 4-4: Percentage distribution use of risk factors in credit monitoring. Source: Author’s own.  
For credit analysis and credit monitoring the range of the five point scale is utilised 
more diversely than is the case for the scoring levels assigned for the importance of risk 
factors, where a heavy concentration was present in the scoring levels of four and five.  
For credit analysis, only 62% of all scoring levels assigned across the various risk 
factors received a scoring level of four or five for the degree to which they are 
considered in credit analysis. In credit monitoring, this is only the case for 42% of all 
scoring levels assigned, and here half of responses saw the degree to which the risk 
factors were used at scoring levels two or three. What the data shows is that the 
utilization of risk factors is not as significant in credit monitoring as it is in credit 
analysis. Also, despite the different matters measured (importance vs. use), the data at 
least hints that the degree to which risk factors are used in credit analysis and credit 
monitoring does not correspond to their importance for the default and the recovery 
risk. This is based on the assumption that given the high importance seen for the risk 
factors for credit risk, one would expect them to be considered to a high degree in total. 
The qualitative responses relating to the LBO cycle support this further. As the charts 
show, the LBO cycle is rated relatively low in terms of its use in credit analysis and 
credit monitoring compared to the other factors.  
“The cycle is only noted when it happens (author’s comment: the overheating and 
subsequent rise in default). This would make a lot of sense, but requires continuous 
monitoring of the cycle and requires to take advantage of experience.” 
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LBO Cylce! Sponsor 
Quality!
Type of 
Transaction!
Leverage! Financial 
Covenants!
Debt 
Compos.!
Jurisdiction! Collateral ! Industry 
State!
Overal State 
of Economy!
Totals !
Scoring 1! 5.56%! 5.56%! 22.22%! 0.00%! 0.00%! 5.56%! 11.11%! 11.11%! 0.00%! 11.11%! 7.2%!
Scoring 2! 50.00%! 38.89%! 38.89%! 0.00%! 0.00%! 16.67%! 38.89%! 33.33%! 16.67%! 5.56%! 23.9%!
Scoring 3! 16.67%! 27.78%! 22.22%! 16.67%! 27.78%! 27.78%! 22.22%! 33.33%! 44.44%! 33.33%! 27.2%!
Scoring 4! 27.78%! 27.78%! 16.67%! 27.78%! 55.56%! 38.89%! 22.22%! 11.11%! 22.22%! 38.89%! 28.9%!
Scoring 5! 0.00%! 0.00%! 0.00%! 55.56%! 16.67%! 11.11%! 5.56%! 11.11%! 16.67%! 11.11%! 12.8%!
Percentage distribution use of risk factors in credit monitoring    
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Another participant in the interviews explained that the cycle would be an important 
risk factor, but it was mainly taken into account with view to the ability to redistribute 
risks. It was explained that once syndication abilities are present, the tolerance level for 
risk rises. This actually confirms that an increased ability to redistribute risks is also a 
signal for an increasingly aggressive market and that this may lead to a reduction in 
independent analytical efforts.  
The wider diffusion of scoring levels is supported by the distribution free tests that were 
conducted. The Friedman Test for the use of risk factors in credit analysis and in credit 
monitoring rejected the hypothesis that the scoring levels are the same. Reverting back 
to the data analysis section, the results can be summarised as follows: 
 
 Table 4-13: Friedman Test use of risk factors in credit analysis. Source: Author’s own (using XLSTAT) 
 
 Table 4-14: Friedman Test use of risk factors in credit monitoring. Source: Author’s own (using 
XLSTAT) 
Scoring levels for the use of risk factors in credit analysis:  
Ho (CA): There is no difference between the scoring levels assigned to use 
of individual risk factors in credit analysis. -> Rejected. 
Ha (CA): There is a difference between the scoring levels assigned to use of 
individual risk factors in credit analysis. -> Accepted.  
Ho (CM): There is no difference between the scoring levels assigned to use 
of individual risk factors in credit monitoring. -> Rejected. 
Friedman Test use of risk factors in credit analysis
Q (Observed value) 49.602
Q (Critical value) 14.684
DF 9
p-value (two-tailed) <0.0001
alpha (Level of significance) 0.1
Friedman Test use of risk factors in credit monitoring
Q (Observed value) 61.796
Q (Critical value) 14.684
DF 9
p-value (two-tailed) <0.0001
alpha (Level of significance) 0.1
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Ha (CM): There is a difference between the scoring levels assigned to use of 
individual risk factors in credit monitoring. -> Accepted 
 
 Table 4-15: Significant differences based on a Friedman Test and a Nemenyi procedure (credit 
analysis). Levels of significance: *at 10%; **at 5%, ***at 1%. Source: Author’s own (using XLSTAT).  
 
 Table 4-16: Significant differences based on a Friedman Test and a Nemenyi procedure (credit 
monitoring). Levels of significance: *at 10%; **at 5%, ***at 1%. Source: Author’s own (using 
XLSTAT).  
Table 4-15 and Table 4-16 illustrate where the major differences between the risk 
factors lie. For credit analysis and credit monitoring, both of them involve leverage, 
which is driven by the particularly high scoring levels that leverage receives in both 
credit analysis and credit monitoring. Other than this, for credit analysis, those 
comparisons that show most discrepancies are the LBO cycle and sponsor quality and 
type of transaction. 
For credit monitoring, the most frequent counts of inconsistency other than those 
involving leverage was found in financial covenants.  
The relatively low consideration given to the LBO cycle has already been discussed. 
Discrepancies relating to sponsor quality are worth investigating in more detail. This 
specific factor appeared to be particularly relevant with regards to recovery risk. In 
terms of what was important about sponsor quality, seven participants did mention that 
Significant differences based on a Friedman Test and a Nemenyi Procedure (credit analysis) 
LBO Cycle
Sponsor 
Quality
Type of 
Transaction Leverage
Financial 
Covenants
Debt 
Composition Jurisdiction Collateral
Industry 
State
LBO Cycle
Sponsor Quality No
Type of Transaction No No
Leverage Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Financial Covenants No No No No
Debt Composition Yes** No No No No
Jurisdiction No No No Yes*** No No
Collateral No No No Yes* No No No
Industry State No No No No No No No No
Overall State of Economy No No No Yes** No No No No No
Significant differences based on a Friedman Test and a Nemenyi Procedure (credit monitoring) 
LBO Cycle
Sponsor 
Quality
Type of 
Transaction Leverage
Financial 
Covenants
Debt 
Composition Jurisdiction Collateral
Industry 
State
LBO Cycle
Sponsor Quality No
Type of Transaction No No
Leverage Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Financial Covenants Yes* Yes* Yes*** No
Debt Composition No No No No No
Jurisdiction No No No Yes*** Yes** No
Collateral No No No Yes*** Yes* No No
Industry State No No No No No No No No
Overall State of Economy No No No No No No No No No
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it was the track record of the sponsor, but in five cases this was directly linked to the 
ability to provide additional funds when needed, i.e. when financial distress occurs. For 
credit monitoring, there was a view that at this stage it is too late to be concerned about 
the sponsor, since it can no longer be changed. However, four participants suggested 
that an area of improvement would be some systematic approach based on common 
criteria. Debt composition was also geared significantly to the higher end of the scoring 
scale in credit analysis, so the effect is the same as for the comparison with leverage. 
The main reason stated for why it is receiving so much attention is that there are likely 
to be conflicting views from different lender groups. This supports the importance of 
debt composition for default risk and recovery risk, as outlined in the literature review 
(Section 2.3.5, p. 34) by inferring from Demiroglu (2008), Halpern et al. (2008) and 
Deutsche Bundesbank (2007). It was argued in the literature review that particularly 
complex financing structures could increase the probability of default and lower 
recovery prospects.  
On credit monitoring, the type of transaction receives very little attention. Looking at 
the response categories for this risk factor and the elaboration pertaining to this factor, 
10% of the responses fell into the categories that the type of transaction would not be a 
decisive factor in credit analysis and credit monitoring. Moreover, it was explained by 
four participants that in credit monitoring it would be too late to worry about what type 
of transaction one is facing. Three entries from different participants into the research 
notes are illustrative of this:  
“Secondary transactions are much more aggressively structured….Very limited 
attention given in analysis and monitoring…however would make sense… 
This (author’s comment: the more aggressive structures) has been recognised now and 
for some time, this is an exclusion criteria…but only applicable in credit analysis.  
Sometimes banks say that they have had poor experience (author’s insertion: with 
secondary/recap transactions”)….therefore business case validation is an important 
aspect but is a binary decision.   
Similar responses were received in relation to jurisdiction, collateral, industry state and 
overall state of the economy. For jurisdiction, it was explained that this is typically a 
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“YES” or “NO” decision and once made, it cannot be altered. Two statements from 
interviewees illustrate this:  
“In monitoring (author’s insertion: Jurisdiction) is only considered when things go 
worse”.  
“No importance at all in credit monitoring. Once in a deal, cannot change it”.  
Similar arguments were found for industry state, which for this reason came out at a 
median of four for its degree of use in credit analysis and only three for credit 
monitoring.  Collateral was neither at the forefront of analysis nor of monitoring and the 
overall state of the economy was only considered to some degree in credit monitoring. 
All these latter factors were only evaluated with regards to recovery risk for the reasons 
explained earlier.  
This low level of attention paid to some risk factors in credit monitoring has obvious 
consequences for aspects of portfolio management. For portfolio management to 
provide useful data to credit analysis and credit monitoring, this would have to be 
constantly updated.  Being asked about whether the portfolio was clustered according to 
some covenant measure, one participant commented:  
“I do not think anyone is doing this; covenants are just checked for their presence and 
compliance”. On a subsequent question whether this could be achieved easily the 
response was a clear “yes”.   
Summary of research findings relating to the use of risk factors in credit analysis and 
credit monitoring:  
 
• Overall, there is high consistency between those risk factors viewed as important 
and those considered in credit analysis and in credit monitoring. 
• Within credit analysis and credit monitoring, the degree to which risk factors are 
considered varies significantly.  
• Risk factors viewed to be particularly relevant for recovery risk are used to a lower 
degree than those viewed to be relevant for default risk and recovery risk.  
• The degree to which the risk factors are used is higher in credit analysis than in 
credit monitoring. 
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• Within credit monitoring, the moderate degree of is frequently explained by there no 
longer being a chance to alter the state once a transaction has been entered into. This 
is the case for sponsor quality, jurisdiction, collateral and type of transaction. 
4.2.4 Results Relating to the Use of Aspects of Portfolio Management 
Results in this section relate to the following research objective: 
• Research objective A6: To investigate whether credit monitoring and credit 
analysis take advantage of aspects of portfolio management.  
 
This research objective was addressed by the various questions indirectly and by 
directly asking for the scoring scale of the use of aspects of portfolio management with 
regards to the risk factors as well as question 3.0, which asked whether overall LBOs 
would be viewed within a wider portfolio.  
 
 
 Table 4-17: Are LBO credits assessed with regards to the characteristics of a wider portfolio?. Source: 
Author’s own.  
The intuitive thinking was that a single transaction would be viewed within a portfolio 
context, yet six participants thought that this was not the case and two had no specific 
view on this. This provided a first data point suggesting that there may not be full 
integration with portfolio management.  
The next step was to investigate the detailed distribution of the scoring levels with 
regards to the risk factors and in aggregate, in the same manner as was done for the 
other dimensions. 
Participants %
Yes: 10.00 55.56%
No: 6.00 33.33%
No view: 2.00 11.11%
18.00 100.00%
Are LBO credits assessed with regards to the characteristics of a wider portfolio? 
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 Table 4-18: Degree of use aspects of portfolio management in credit analysis/credit monitoring with 
view to risk factors. Source: Author’s own.  
 
 Figure 4-5: Percentage distribution degree of use of aspects of portfolio management in credit 
analysis/credit monitoring with view to risk factors. Source: Author’s own.  
The charts show that lower scoring levels appear more frequently than was the case for 
credit analysis and credit monitoring.  Even the lowest scoring level of one was utilised. 
This data already suggests that the use of aspects of portfolio management in the credit 
analysis and credit monitoring appears to be relatively moderate.  
The Friedman Test for the degree to which credit analysis and credit monitoring take 
into account aspects of portfolio management with regards to each of the risk factors 
was also performed.  
LBO 
Cylce
Sponsor 
Quality
Type of 
Transaction Leverage
Financial 
Covenants
Debt 
Compos. Jurisdiction Collateral 
Industry 
State
Overal State 
of Economy Totals 
Number of Data Points 18.00 17.00 18.00 18.00 16.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 17.00 16.00 174.00
Frequency Distribution 
Scoring 5 1.00 0.00 0.00 8.00 0.00 3.00 4.00 1.00 4.00 2.00 23.00
Scoring 4 2.00 2.00 4.00 7.00 6.00 10.00 3.00 1.00 8.00 6.00 49.00
Scoring 3 11.00 6.00 4.00 3.00 7.00 3.00 3.00 9.00 4.00 4.00 54.00
Scoring 2 4.00 6.00 7.00 0.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 4.00 1.00 2.00 33.00
Scoring 1 0.00 3.00 3.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 3.00 3.00 0.00 2.00 15.00
Degree of use of aspects of portfolio management in credit analysis/credit monitoring with view to risk factors
Measures of Location / 
Dispersion
Max. 5.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
Min. 2.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00
Range 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 4.00
Arithmetic mean 3.00 2.41 2.50 4.28 3.13 3.78 3.00 2.61 3.88 3.25 3.18
Median 3.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 3.50 3.00
Mode 3.00 3.00 2.00 5.00 3.00 4.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 3.00
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Jurisdiction! Collateral ! Industry 
State!
Overal State 
of Economy!
Totals !
Scoring 1! 0.00%! 17.65%! 16.67%! 0.00%! 6.25%! 0.00%! 16.67%! 16.67%! 0.00%! 12.50%! 8.6%!
Scoring 2! 22.22%! 35.29%! 38.89%! 0.00%! 12.50%! 11.11%! 27.78%! 22.22%! 5.88%! 12.50%! 19.0%!
Scoring 3! 61.11%! 35.29%! 22.22%! 16.67%! 43.75%! 16.67%! 16.67%! 50.00%! 23.53%! 25.00%! 31.0%!
Scoring 4! 11.11%! 11.76%! 22.22%! 38.89%! 37.50%! 55.56%! 16.67%! 5.56%! 47.06%! 37.50%! 28.2%!
Scoring 5! 5.56%! 0.00%! 0.00%! 44.44%! 0.00%! 16.67%! 22.22%! 5.56%! 23.53%! 12.50%! 13.2%!
Percentage distribution degree of use of aspects of portfolio management in credit analysis/credit monitoring                                     
with view to risk factors 
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Table 4-19: Friedman Test degree credit analysis/credit monitoring take into account aspects of portfolio 
management (with view to the risk factors). Source: Author’s own (using XLSTAT).  
The results dictate that the null hypothesis regarding the consistent use of aspects of 
portfolio management within credit analysis and credit monitoring needs to be rejected.  
Ho (APFM): There is no difference between the scoring levels assigned to the 
degree to which credit analysis and credit monitoring take into 
account aspects of portfolio management relating to the risk 
factors. -> Rejected 
Ha (APFM): There is a difference between the scoring levels assigned to the 
degree to which credit analysis and credit monitoring take into 
account aspects of portfolio management relating to the risk 
factors. -> Accepted 
 
 
 Table 4-20: Significant differences based on a Friedman Test and a Nemenyi procedure degree of the 
use of  aspects of portfolio management in credit analysis/credit monitoring (regarding risk factors). 
Levels of significance: *at 10%; **at 5%, ***at 1%.. Source: Author’s own (using XLSTAT).  
For leverage, what was said for all other dimensions remains the case: It is constantly 
rated highly. For the use of aspects of portfolio management, industry state also 
achieved very high scoring levels, explaining why the pair-wise significant differences 
Q (Observed value) 42.059
Q (Critical value) 14.684
DF 9
p-value (two-tailed) <0.0001
alpha (Level of significance) 0.1
Friedman Test degree credit analysis/credit monitoring take into account aspects of portfolio 
management  (with view to the risk factors)
LBO Cycle
Sponsor 
Quality
Type of 
Transaction Leverage
Financial 
Covenants
Debt 
Composition Jurisdiction Collateral
Industry 
State
LBO Cycle
Sponsor Quality No
Type of Transaction No No
Leverage Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Financial Covenants No No No No
Debt Composition No No No No No
Jurisdiction No No No Yes* No No
Collateral No No No Yes*** No No No
Industry State No Yes*** No No No No No Yes*
Overall State of Economy No No No No No No No No No
Significant differences based on a Friedman Test and a Nemenyi Procedure degree of the use of aspects of portfolio management in 
credit analysis/credit monitoring (regarding risk factors) 
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frequently include industry state. Eight of the 20 qualitative responses received on 
industry state explained that cyclicality is an important driver of recovery in a default 
case, which is consistent with the literature (see Section 2.3.8, p. 37) and an equal 
number indicated that cyclicality was an important aspect of portfolio management. 
However, the discussion held with participants then showed that industry state was 
mainly used for sector classification in general and with regards to default risk. The 
literature review, in contrast, pointed out that the risk factor would be particularly 
important for recovery risk in a sense that recoveries are significantly lower in 
distressed sectors due to constraints on other companies in the sector not having 
available finance to take over stakes in distressed companies; nor would there be an 
interest to invest in additional capacity. Sponsor quality, on the other hand received low 
scoring levels. This was supported by the qualitative elaboration with regards to this 
risk factor. Eight responses (24% of all responses) stated that aspects of portfolio 
management would not be considered in a structured way and yet 21% (seven) of 
responses made the point that only a negative selection based on a “poor experience” 
with some sponsors would take place (see Appendix 4, p. 187). A more systematic 
approach based on common criteria was put forward in 12% (four) of the responses.  
 
Two participants explained that a sole view of the LBO portfolio in terms of a portfolio 
management approach would not be feasible, as it would typically represent a relatively 
small share of a bank’s credit book. This is accepted, but it is argued that the 
management of the LBO credit book could be improved if the risk factors were 
analysed by utilizing some aspects of portfolio management.  
 
Summary of research findings relating to the use of aspects of portfolio management in 
credit analysis and credit monitoring: 
 
• Results indicate that the use of aspects of portfolio management in credit 
analysis and credit monitoring is moderate to low.  
• However, a few risk factors make heavy use of aspects of portfolio management, 
in particular leverage, industry state and debt composition. However, for 
industry state this was likely to have a different focus than what the literature 
would suggest.  
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4.2.5  Results Relating to Any Additional Weaknesses and Areas for Improvement 
 Present in Credit Functions’ Management of LBOs 
The research objective addressed by the results stemming from question 1.5 in the 
questionnaire is A7. 
Research objective A7:  Are there any (additional) weaknesses and areas for 
improvement present in credit functions’ management of LBOs? 
 
 Table 4-21: Overview of major interview results regarding “what could be done better”. Source: 
Author’s own.  
The most frequent response to this question was that there should be more of an 
independent, long-term view taken by banks participating in LBO financing. This 
validates what was stated about the LBO cycle. There, the overall result was that there 
would be an awareness of the LBO cycle and also that there was an impact this has on 
the risk factors, but it would not be taken into account to a great degree in credit 
analysis and monitoring. 
Despite the disparity between what was found in the literature regarding business 
fundamentals and the high importance ascribed to it by the participants, seven 
participants did mention that there should be even a deeper analysis of business 
fundamentals.   
While not mentioned by many participants, it is still worth elaborating on the fact that 
there was some mention of more active management. During the discussions it was 
explained that this meant that there should be consequences drawn from the results of 
credit analysis, credit monitoring and the inclusion of portfolio management.  
No. category 
hits: 
% category 
hits:
% of 
interviewees 
mentioning 
category
Take more independent / long-term view: 9.00 45.00% 50.00%
Deeper analysis of business fundamentals: 7.00 35.00% 38.89%
More pro-active management of risks: 3.00 15.00% 16.67%
More focus on management: 1.00 5.00% 5.56%
20.00 100.00%
Overview of major interview results regarding"what could be done better"
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Finally, one person mentioned that there should be more focus on the management, 
since the constraints and the specific targets imposed by an LBO structure requires 
special management skills. This is a valid point and was not investigated in the literature 
review and this is not the place to investigate this further. However, it represents a 
further interesting topic for future research.  
4.3 Research Results Synthesis 
The overall research aim had been stated as: 
• To identify potential areas for improvement in the credit management process of
LBO credits by credit functions and – provided they can be identified – deduce
potential measures how to address them.
Research objectives A1-A7 and research objective B were established to fulfil the above 
research aim. Research objective B provides the bridge between research objectives A1-
A7 and the overall research aim.  
• Research objective B: To integrate the results from research objectives A1-A7
and deduce potential measures to address identified areas for improvement.
This section aims to synthesize the results and to provide an interpretative discussion on 
them. This provides the basis for conclusions drawn, which represents the final step in 
achieving research objective B.  
The results of the research can be synthesised as follows: 
• Credit functions are well aware of the risk factors driving the credit risk of 
LBOs. This is supported by the high level of consistency between those risk 
factors initially mentioned in response to the open question 1.2 and those found 
in the literature (Section 4.2.2, p. 88, Table 4-3, p. 89) as well as the consistency 
with the aspects related to the experience that banks made in the LBO market 
(Table 4-2, p. 86).
• There is significant recognition for an LBO cycle and it is recognised that some
of these factors change substantially in an adverse direction during an upward
cycle. This is supported by:
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- The cyclicality in the LBO market being mentioned initially in 
response to question 1.1 (asking about the experience banks have 
had) by nine out of 18 participants (see Section 4.2.1, p. 84; Table 4-2 
p. 86).  
- The high number of participants (15 out of 18) clearly agreeing on 
the existence of an LBO cycle when directly asked about it (see 
Section 4.2.1, p. 84, Table 4-1, p. 85) 
- Clear awareness of signals for an increasing LBO cycle (see Section 
4.2.1, p. 84, Table 4-1, p. 85). 
- The claim for a more independent view (as in response to question 
1.5, asking what could be done better) also indicates that there is a 
cyclical phenomenon and behaviour by participating banks (Section 
4.2.5, p. 109, Table 4-21, p. 109; details to individual questions 
shown in Appendix 4, p. 187).  
- The literature (see Section  2.3.10, p. 39).  
• The LBO cycle is, despite its existence, not systematically taken into account as 
part of the credit management process. This is supported by: 
- The interpretation of the results of the survey performed by the BSC 
(see Section 2.5, p. 47).  
- Relatively low scoring levels assigned for the use of the LBO cycle in 
credit analysis and credit monitoring, with the majority being 
concentrated between two and four (see Section 4.2.3, p. 97, Table 
4-11, p. 99; Table 4-12, p. 99).  
- Low scoring levels assigned for the use of aspects of portfolio 
management in credit analysis/credit monitoring with regards to the 
LBO cycle (see Section 4.2.4, p. 105; Table 4-18, p. 106) 
- Qualitative comments relating to the LBO cycle, with statements 
from ten participants having been classified as a “lack of consistent 
monitoring” (see Section 4.2.1, p. 84, Table 4-1, p. 85). The same or 
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similar comments were also made for a number of individual risk 
factors, which are representative of the LBO cycle (see Appendix 4, 
p. 187).
• The risk factors found in the literature review are generally viewed as important
for both default risk and recovery risk. This is supported by:
- 81% of all scoring levels for the importance of risk factors for the 
default risk being scored a four or five (Section 4.2.2, p. 88, Table 
4-4, p. 92).   
- 79% of all scoring levels for the importance for the recovery risk 
being given a four or five (Section 4.2.2, p. 88; Table 4-5, p. 93). 
- For the default risk, the scoring levels are generally very homogenous 
with the exception of leverage, which was an outlier on the positive 
side (Section 4.2.2, p. 88; Table 4-4, p. 92; Table 4-6, p. 94; Table 
4-8, p. 95).  
- The rejection of the hypothesis test for the importance of the recovery 
risk being driven by a few outliers, which achieved very high scoring 
levels. For recovery risk, besides leverage these jurisdiction and debt 
composition (Section 4.2.2, p. 88, Table 4-14, p. 101). For these, the 
scores very high in particular in relation to financial covenants, which 
achieved low scoring levels.  
• Not all of the risk factors received a high level of attention in the credit analysis
and credit monitoring and potentially there are cases where the degree to which
they are used in credit analysis and credit monitoring does not match the
importance they have on the credit risk. This is supported by:
- Testimony of more aggressive structuring towards the financial crisis 
(2007), which suggests some greater tolerance of the risk factors 
(Section 1.1, p. 1, Section 2.7, p. 50 as well as research by Cao, 
Mason and Song (2010), Section 2.5, p. 47). This is further supported 
by the focus on distribution by major arranging banks (Section 
2.3.10, p. 39).  
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- The more dispersed scoring levels for the use of risk factors in credit 
analysis and credit monitoring (Section 4.2.3, p. 97, Table 4-11, p. 
99; Table 4-12, p. 99). Only 64% of all the scorings assigned for the 
use of risk factors in credit analysis were at the levels of four and 
five. 
- The rejection of the hypothesis testing consistency of scoring levels 
for the use of risk factors in credit analysis and credit monitoring 
(Section 4.2.3, p. 97) which is driven by several risk factors showing 
strong dispersion between the risk factors (Table 4-13, p. 101; Table 
4-14, p. 101).  
- Responses relating to individual risk factors also point in this 
direction (see Appendix 4, p. 187 for a full overview). For example, 
the response categories for sponsor quality, type of transaction or 
financial covenants indicate that they do not play a major role in 
credit analysis and credit monitoring.  
- Albeit with limitations as to the interpretation, there is a disparity 
between the scoring levels assigned for the importance of risk factors 
and those regarding their use (compare Table 4-4, p. 92 and Table 4-
5, p. 93 and Table 4-11, p. 99 and Table 4-12, p. 99) 
• In particular when considering credit monitoring, many of the risk factors are
viewed as a given, as they cannot be altered once a transaction has been entered
into. This leads to them receiving less attention in credit monitoring compared to
the attention they receive in credit management. This is supported by:
- Relative low scoring levels assigned for the use of some risk factors 
in credit monitoring, such as for sponsor quality, type of transaction, 
collateral and jurisdiction (Table 4-12, p. 99).   
- Rejection of the hypothesis that the scoring levels are the same for 
the risk factors in credit monitoring, which cannot be traced back to 
an individual outlier factor Table 4-14, p. 101, Table 4-16, p. 102). 
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- Qualitative statements relating to these scoring factors (see Appendix 
4, page, p.187). 
• Aspects of portfolio management were not considered to a great degree overall.
This is supported by:
- The literature review quoting the results of a survey by the BSC (see 
Section 2.5, p. 47). 
- Only 42% of all scoring levels assigned for the degree to which credit 
analysis and credit monitoring take into account aspects of portfolio 
management were at the levels of four and five (Section 4.2.4, p. 105, 
Table 4-18, p. 106).  
- Responses to question 3.0 where six participants responded that these 
exposures were not analysed with regards to a wider portfolio 
(Section 4.2.4; Table 4-17, p. 105). That six participants responded in 
this way appears high given that the question was phrased as a “yes 
or no” question and their was a subsequent request for explanation.  
- Comments received to sponsor quality, type of transaction and 
financial covenants indicate that these are not viewed within a wider 
portfolio (Appendix 4, p. 187). 
• Recovery risk is of less concern, despite the risk factors also generally receiving
high scoring levels for their importance for the recovery risk. This is supported
by:
- Scoring levels for the importance of risk factors for recovery risk are 
more widely dispersed (Section 4.2.2, p. 88, Table 4-4, p. 92, Table 
4-5, p. 93).   
- Recovery risk not being mentioned frequently within the qualitative 
comments, in particular those received in relation to questions 1.2 
and 1.3 (Section 4.2.2, p. 88 and 4.2.3, p. 97, Table 4-2, p. 86; Table 
4-3, p. 89).   
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4.4  Plausibility Checks 
The research had used a mixed approach to ensure a level of built-in validation. Further 
triangulation and validation is one of the areas recommended for further research (See 
Section 5.5, p. 133) and could not have been completed within this research based due 
to the time requirement involved as well as access requirements which could not have 
been met. Yet, it was viewed sensible to expose the key points of the research, at least 
for a plausibility check to further experts. Therefore, the results were exposed to:  
• Four independent senior credit executives. 
• The credit function of a bank.  
4.4.1 Discussion with Four Independent Senior Credit Executives 
These four senior credit executives all had substantial experience in the LBO market, 
which was received from various banks. None of them had been part of the main study.  
Using the table employed in Section 3.3.4 (p. 63), the experience can be described as 
follows.  
 
 Table 4-22: Overview of background of participants in the plausibility check. Source: Author’s own.  
The participants had a total of eight employments in banks. As with the main study, 
there was some overlap in terms of which bank participants had worked for, albeit this 
was usually at different times in the past. This broadens the perspective of the research 
from a total of nine different banks to a total of 12 following these discussions, albeit 
the set-up was different.  
Most recent position with exposure NoE LBO
to LBOs Ex. Thereof Banks Banks
Participant 1 Division Head / MD Structuring Team 2 2 I, K
Participant 2 Division Head / MD Structuring Team 1 1 G
Participant 3 Department Head / MD Syndication Team 3 3 A, E, J
Participant 4 Senior Structuring Professional 2 2 A, E, L. 
Totals of Participants Plausibility Check: 8 8 I, J, K, L:    4
Relating to Total Participants in the Study: 42 29 A-L: 12
Overview of background of participants in the plausbility check 
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Division heads were both at banks with significant European LBO activity, based in 
Germany. Due to their position being close to the board of management (one or two 
levels away), these executives did have oversight of LBO teams as part of a wider scope 
that includes other specialised lending products. This was also the case for the 
syndication professional. The three aforementioned participants all had more than 15 
years of credit experience, with significant oversight roles for LBO structuring or 
syndication teams. The person with the least experience was a senior structure at a large 
international investment bank. This person’s total experience with LBOs from the two 
banks she worked for was approximately ten years. Broken down by geography, the 
three banks not included in the main sample had their headquarters in Germany, France 
and in a Nordic country.  
The discussions took place between October 2012 and January 2013. Prior to the 
discussions, the executives received a presentation (See Appendix 5, p. 191) that 
summarised the main research results by email in advance. The conversations lasted 
about 45-60 minutes on each occasion and notes were taken during the presentation by 
the researcher. Two meeting took place at the executives’ office and the other two at 
restaurants during lunchtime. The conversations were held in German and comments 
have therefore been translated into English. For the same reasons as discussed for the 
main study, these meetings were not recorded (see Section 3.3.5, p. 68).  
Overall, there was a high level of agreement with the analytical results of the research 
and the potential measures provided to enhance effectiveness of the credit management 
process by credit functions. The risk drivers were generally agreed with and there was 
clear agreement from all four participants that there would be an LBO cycle. Two 
statements are particularly illustrative of this:  
 “During the last upside cycle, the majority of the transactions came to the 
market with (very) high multiples, no matter what sector they were operating in. 
There was a time where leverage was at 6x or 7x, no matter what the company 
did.”  
“I think this was largely driven by the ability of banks to sell-down their 
exposure and significant credit had (wrongfully) been given to the main 
 	  
117 
arranging banks having taken care in matching fundamentals to capital 
structure.”  
Another person highlighted that the current market environment already points at a high 
cyclical point again, with back-loaded structures again becoming commonplace. Asked 
why there were no consequences drawn from this, an interesting response was received 
along the lines of that this would not be possible due to the repeat borrowing behaviour 
of some sponsors and therefore it would be difficult to withdraw from the market 
temporarily. This reinforces the case that the LBO cycle is actually recognised, but does 
not present a main driver in the decision making process.  
Also, all participants agreed strongly that the risk factors were relevant for both default 
risk and recovery risk generally, but that recovery risk would not receive equal attention 
compared to default risk in credit analysis and credit monitoring. In part, this was 
explained by a general view not to bother about recovery, because loans would only be 
entered into if there was a strong expectation that they would perform. However, given 
that LBOs by their nature have an above average risk of default risk, this is actually 
surprising. One participant explained this in more specific terms, outlining that this is 
just not the guidance credit functions would be given. Their evaluation would be based 
on incurring limited defaults (and hence limited provisions), whereas net debt 
provisions would not be the focus of their governance structure in the first place. 
Regarding the relatively low attention paid to some risk factors in credit analysis and 
credit monitoring, or the inconsistent treatment of them, the participants did not fully 
agree with the results outlined in the study. For example, sponsor quality was one point 
where one participant outlined that this would receive significant attention in credit 
analysis and credit monitoring and that experiences a bank had with regards to certain 
sponsors would exert strong influence on credit decisions. Similar comments were 
received from the other participants. However, only one participant explained that this 
goes beyond a negative selection process in the sense that sponsors are evaluated with 
regards to their expertise in certain sectors for example.  
Overall, the view was that the risk factors all receive significant attention in credit 
analysis and monitoring, which is not 100% consistent with the results of the primary 
study. However, there was an explanation that the degree to which factors are dealt with 
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depends on the individual transaction structure and circumstances at the time. This 
actually adds to the argument that there is frequently a lack of consistent application of 
risk factors i.e. transactions are not evaluated systematically based on the risk factors 
and conclusions are not drawn consistently from the risk factor analysis.  
With regards to the low consideration of aspects of portfolio management, there was 
also a good level of agreement despite one participant opposing the conclusion. It was 
explained that the whole portfolio would regularly be reviewed on a case-by-case basis 
and decisions drawn from this and this would also include the view on certain risk 
factors within the context of the wider portfolio. However, it was admitted that this 
could be improved by including more parameters over time. None of the participants 
commented in any respect that there was a systematic feedback-loop with portfolio 
management in place, for example. This is partly attributed to organisational matters, 
such as where to allocate an LBO portfolio management team.  
An interesting reasoning put forward as to why there was limited consideration of 
portfolio aspects with regards to LBOs was that up to the crisis they had been viewed as 
a tradable asset and the experience so far was also positive. Instead, refinancing 
frequently took place after two-three years and there was a perception that it would 
simply go on like this. Another executive explained that portfolio management would 
generally be viewed a highly regarded subject and would increasingly produce valuable 
information. However, this would not necessarily be the case for the evaluation of an 
individual transaction and the parameters of measurement would not be particularly 
geared to LBOs. One person commented that there would be significant volumes of data 
available, but little guidance as to what to do with it.  
4.4.2 Presentation of Results to the Credit Function of a Bank  
As a final step to enhance the reliability and validity of the study, the results were 
presented to a group of credit function analysts of one bank at its headquarters. The 
bank is a sizeable bank with its headquarters in Germany and amongst the banks from 
which participants were included. The bank had noticeable LBO activities in the last 
decade, both as a participant and an arranger of transactions. For reasons of anonymity, 
no further details can be provided here.  
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The group consisted of a total of seven participants, including the head of the team. Of 
the seven participants, two were also interviewees in the main study. The remaining five 
participants were not previously involved in the study.  
All participants had analysed LBO credits before and had several years of credit 
experience. The meeting lasted approximately one hour. As with the exposing of results 
to the credit executive, research findings were presented in a power-point presentation 
and comments were invited. Research notes were taken and summarised subsequently 
and were then shown to the team head to ensure they were correct. As a general 
statement, what was found is that comments were rather scarce. For a large part of the 
meeting, there was a silent absorption of what was presented and it required some 
encouragement to engage people in the discussion. One potential factor for this is the 
culture of credit functions, where members frequently work on their own in quiet 
atmospheres. Another factor that was likely to have an impact was the presence of their 
boss, which could lead to hesitation about commenting (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3.5, p. 
68 for a discussion to this effect).  
One of the areas where comments were received was in the area of recovery risk. It was 
agreed that this should be a comprehensive part of the overall credit work, which 
supports the requirement to include recovery risk as part of the regular credit analysis 
work. The other two aspects mentioned are closely linked. There was a view that it 
would be very difficult to argue against the market momentum in an upward cycle. This 
is consistent with the view of the LBO cycle resulting from the main study and also 
from the discussion with the four credit executives. This relates to results having to be 
authoritative. It was agreed that the majority of the risk factors would deteriorate in such 
an environment, but even the flagging by some portfolio management tools would be 
unlikely to stop this because at such times these more aggressively structured 
transactions are the only ones available. This is also consistent with what one of the 
credit executives explained, in a sense that sponsors cannot be disinvited temporarily.  
The results are interpreted collectively and some inter-dependencies become apparent. 
The fact that the LBO cycle is not systematically monitored makes it difficult to view 
market developments in the risk factors. This leads to transactions being benchmarked 
against the most recent deals, which are viewed as the standard. This means that there is 
a drift in the acceptability of the risk factors with a slow trend to more tolerance.  
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This in consequence means that credit analysis and credit monitoring do not take into 
account all the information that would be useful to fulfil the task of risk assessment. 
This is exacerbated by not all risk factors receiving the same level of attention and 
generally the focus being reduced in credit monitoring. An information gap can also be 
identified, as recovery risk is not considered to the same extent as default risk is. This is 
further discussed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion, Limitations and Further Research 
5.1 Conclusion 
Within this chapter, the results from Chapter 4 are utilised to draw the conclusions from 
the study, which ultimately leads to achieving the research aim.  Interpreting the results 
concurrently, the following picture emerges. The graph will be discussed in more detail 
below here.  
 
 Figure 5-1: Overview of interdependencies of research findings. Source: Author’s own.  
The literature (Section 2.3.10, p. 39) as well as available data about debt-multiples and 
development of covenants (e.g. Deutsche Bundesbank, 2006 and 2007, Ernst & Young 
2013) has provided strong evidence that there is a cyclical phenomenon in LBO 
activity. This was clearly supported by the responses received (see Section 4.2.1, p. 84 
and 4.2.2, p. 88). Against this, while signals are noticed, the data suggested that these 
were not always taken into account in a systematic manner. This is likely a key area for 
improvement as the LBO cycle is associated with changes in the remaining risk factors. 
When referring to the LBO cycle alone as a risk factor, it is one that appears to be 
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overarching, but the attention that has been given to it in credit monitoring (mean 3.16, 
mode and median 3.0; see Table 4-12, p. 99) and credit analysis (mean 3.74, mode and 
median 4.0, Table 4-11, p. 99) did not match its importance.  This is supported by 
statements made by several participants, for example, that the point in the LBO cycle 
would not be a sufficient reason to decline a transaction (Section 4.1.2, p. 87) and that 
this was overridden by fundamental of the business. However, the rise in defaults (e.g. 
PWC, 2010) as well as the previous rise in leverage (e.g. Deutsche Bundesbank, 2007, 
Ernst & Young 2013, FSA 2006) in these transactions combined with fewer covenants; 
Deutsche Bundesbank 2006, Acharya 2007; Demiroglu and James, 2010) and the low 
correlation of capital structure with business fundamentals (Axelson, 2013 / Brinkhuis 
and De Maeseneire, 2012) in tandem with the rise in secondary and tertiary buyouts 
(Kaplan / Strömberg, 2009) which tend to be more levered (Brinkhuis and De 
Maeseneire, 2012 and Bergström 2007) clearly suggests that these risk factors are 
subject to cyclical moves.  
The individual risk factors are generally well known, as evidenced by the high score 
regarding their importance (mean score default risk 4.19, mean score recovery risk 4.18 
with median and mode at 4.0 and 5.0 respectively for both cases, see Table 4-4, p. 92 
and Table 4-5, p. 93) and the frequency with which they were mentioned in the open 
questions (Section 4.2 or for full overview see Appendix 3, p. 187). Interviewees 
mentioned seven out of the ten risk factors in response to question 1.2 (see Table 4-3, p. 
89). The only ones missing were type of transaction, debt composition and overall state 
of the economy. Leverage, type of transaction, financial covenants, debt composition 
have been reported to vary with cyclical moves both in the literature review and based 
on this research. Amongst them, higher leverage, lower documentation standards (which 
includes covenants) as well as type of transaction (more secondaries/tertiaries) were 
also named as variables showing the state of the LBO cycle. This further supports the 
awareness of the importance of an LBO cycle on the risk (see Section 4.2.1, p. 84). 
In terms of importance for the default and the recovery risk, the risk factors are judged 
differently. For default risk, leverage is the risk factor that achieves the highest scoring 
level (see Table 4-4, p. 92) and the dispersion of the responses also shows that this is the 
least controversial (with a range of 1) and almost 90% of respondents scoring the 
importance at a level of five. Referring to the literature, this shows the importance of 
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debt quantum and linked to this debt composition for the default risk in LBOs. This is 
consistent with Axelson et al. (2013, 2010) in so far as they found that capital structure 
is not correlated to business fundamentals of a company, which indicates that it is an 
important driver in the default risk on its own. The next most important risk factors for 
default risk was sponsor quality in the viewpoint of the participants. A total of 84% of 
respondents have allocated a score of four or five for this risk factor. The literature had 
also suggested that sponsor quality was an important factor for the default risk and the 
recovery risk (Section 2.3.1, p. 24). The next most important risk factor is the type of 
transaction which approximately 83% of all respondents allocating scoring levels of 
four or five. Financial covenants and debt composition are viewed to be of lower 
importance, albeit still at high levels (average scoring level at 3,94 and 3,89 
respectively; see Figure 4-1, p. 92). However, overall the risk factors are all viewed 
important for the default risk, as reflected by their high average scoring level for the 
entire sample.  
Where the LBO cycle is not considered systematically, it is also difficult to interpret the 
development of individual risk factors and take decisions based on this and important 
turning points may not be realized. In contrast, transactions would only be benchmarked 
against most recent transactions and a drift in the risk factors compared to long-term 
standards is unrecognised or if noted, not necessarily acted upon.  
Regarding recovery risk, leverage is also the most important factor, where scoring levels 
of five account for approximately 94% of the total scoring levels allocated (see Figure 
4-2, p. 93). This is consistent with the basic assumption that less debt means more 
economic value cushion and therefore more value to distribute and more re-structuring 
options available once a default has occurred. Other than that, the most important 
factors were debt composition, jurisdiction, collateral and industry state; which is 
broadly in line with what the literature suggests (see Sections 2.3.5, p. 34; 2.3.6, p. 35; 
2.3.7, p. 37 and 2.3.8, p. 37). On industry state, this needs to be qualified as the 
literature was not strongly supportive and suggested mainly that recoveries are low in 
distressed sectors (see 2.3.8, p.37) but that there was no pattern of certain sectors 
receiving structurally lower recoveries. Still, 79% of all participants have allocated a 
scoring level of four or five to the importance of industry state for recovery risk. What 
also becomes apparent is that the distribution of the scoring levels for recovery risk is 
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much wider (see Figure 4-2, p. 92; Figure 4-1, p.92). This indicates that the opinions 
vary more on recovery risk; which was supported by qualitative comments received 
such as “recovery risk being under-represented” (p. 91).  
Turning to the use of risk factors in credit analysis, credit monitoring and the degree to 
which these use aspects of portfolio management with view to the risk factors, the first 
observation that can be made is that the scoring levels are generally lower than those 
provided for the importance of risk factors. At the minimum, this indicates that the use 
of the risk factors and the degree to which credit analysis and credit monitoring take 
into account aspects of APFM are not consistent with the importance seen for them. 
However, some caution is required with regards to such an interpretation since the 
scales measured different things (i.e. the importance of vs. the use of). Nevertheless, the 
picture gives rise to assume this. Irrespective of the scoring levels, one would assume 
that the risk factors that have received the highest scoring levels for the importance 
would also be the ones that receive the most attention in credit analysis and credit 
monitoring. At the same time, it would be expected that simple measures of portfolio 
management are applied with view to these risk factors.  
Figure 5-2: Comparison measures of location for the importance and use of risk factors. Source: Author’s own. 
The table on the next page shows the three highest scoring levels (based on the 
arithmetic mean) assigned to risk factors in each category. The consistency is only 
present for leverage.  
Importance for default 
risk  
Importance for recovery 
risk  Use in credit analysis  Use in credit monitoring 
Use  of APFM with view
to risk factors  
Arithmetric Mean 4,19 4,18 3,74 3,16 3,18 
Median 4,00 4,00 4,00 3,00 3,00 
Mode 5,00 5,00 4,00 3,00 3,00 
1,00 
1,50 
2,00 
2,50 
3,00 
3,50 
4,00 
4,50 
5,00 
Comparison measures of location for the importance and use of risk factors  
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Top three risk factors relating to their importance and use in the     
credit management process (based on arithmetic mean scoring levels) 
Importance for 
Default Risk 
Importance for 
Recovery Risk 
Use in Credit Analysis Use in Credit 
Monitoring 
Use of Aspects of 
Portfolio 
Management 
(CM/CA)  
• Leverage
• LBO Cycle
• Sponsor
Quality
• Leverage
• Jurisdiction
• Industry State
• Leverage
• Debt Composition
• Industry State
• Leverage
• Financial
Covenants
• Debt
Composition
• Leverage
• Industry
State
• Debt
Composition
Table 5-1: Top risk factors relating to their importance and use in the credit management process. Source: 
Author’s own. 
The scoring level of five is not utilised frequently as far as the use in credit analysis is 
concerned (see Figure 4-3, p. 99) with the exception of leverage, which has 78% of all 
responses allocated to this level.  Sponsor quality was viewed to receive only moderate 
attention in credit analysis, despite its high importance for default risk (and still for 
recovery risk). Also, the type of transaction received relatively low levels with view to 
its use in credit analysis, despite this was an important factor for default risk as well. 
Other than leverage, the factor that received most attention based on average scoring 
levels was debt composition with an arithmetic mean of 4.11 and approximately 83% of 
scoring levels allocated at a level of five or four. This also shows that debt composition 
together with leverage as the overall capital structure are important risk determinants; 
irrespective of the individual business risk, which was stated to be an overriding factor.  
However, the overall LBO cycle achieves the lowest level of average scoring in the 
whole distribution for credit analysis.   
Those factors that were important for recovery risk, in particular jurisdiction and 
collateral have also received relatively lower scoring levels then one would assume 
given their high importance. They receive arithmetic mean scoring levels of 3.5 and 
3.72 respectively for their use in credit analysis and “only” 2.72 and 2.78 for the use in 
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credit monitoring (see Table 4-11, p. 99 and Table 4-12, p. 99). This is consistent with 
the overall assessment that recovery risk is less of an aspect considered.  
The most heavily used risk factors in credit monitoring are leverage, debt composition 
and financial covenants (Figure 4-4, p. 100). The LBO cycle, sponsor quality, type of 
transaction, jurisdiction and collateral receive relatively low scoring levels (see Figure 
4-4, p. 100), despite their acknowledged importance for credit risk. In part this was 
explained by many of these factors not being subject to change. For example a tertiary 
buyout remains a tertiary buyout and a transaction undertaken in a certain jurisdiction 
does normally not change unless in the exceptional case that the business is moved.  
The low consideration of the LBO cycle as such as well as the relatively low 
consideration of some risk factors in credit analysis and credit monitoring (see above) 
means that both may be lacking important information on the credit risk. This is 
exacerbated by the overall lower attention paid to recovery risk (Section 4.2.3, p. 97). 
Two consequences emerge from this. One is that it is difficult to draw consequences 
from the development of the risk factors. For example, if sponsor quality or type of 
transaction receive relatively little attention, then it is also difficult to see how 
consequences in terms of the credit management can be drawn from this. For example, 
the treatment of a secondary buyout is unlikely to differ from that of a primary buyout if 
the type of transaction is not considered as part of the credit analysis/credit monitoring. 
However, this might be justified based on different performance improvement 
characteristics or the sponsor involved which can have an impact. A directly related 
consequence of this is that this constrains the availability of data for the uses of aspects 
of portfolio management. For example, a portfolio management could track the number 
of secondary and tertiary buyout and they may be measured on a different set of 
variables then primary transactions. However, these are unlikely to be discovered if the 
type of transaction does not play an important role in credit analysis and credit 
monitoring. Also, signals indicating an increasingly aggressive LBO market are 
unlikely to be recognised if there is not a consistent and rigor evaluation of this as the 
level of the credit monitoring and credit analysis. This in consequence limits the use of 
aspects of portfolio management. For example, headroom under covenants or the 
performance of secondary buyouts and their average credit duration or the seniority 
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measure (both discussed in Section 2.4, p. 44) cannot be taken into account if not 
consistently analysed and input at the level of credit analysis and credit monitoring.   
The data confirms this argument. The mode level score for the degree to which aspects 
of portfolio management are used is three for seven out of the ten risk factors (see Table 
4-18, p. 106). The only risk factor achieving scores of five and four are leverage (five) 
and industry state as well as the overall state of the economy. Regarding industry state, 
the responses were frequently related to broad industry classifications. While these are 
analysed with view to their overall prospects and risk, the analysis would not typically 
look at recoveries in the industry specifically. In particular, limited capacity of 
competitors to acquire businesses (which impacts recoveries) would not be taken into 
account. Overall state of the economy was stated to be a key-factor; but one participant 
also explained that there would not be something like a clustering of the portfolio 
depending on their sensitivity to economic cycles (for example: very strong, strong, 
moderate defensive). Important factors such as type of transaction, financial covenants 
or debt composition all receive low scores with view to the degree the analysis or 
monitoring takes into account aspects of portfolio management. This despite this could 
easily be achieved, such as clustering covenants on such as strong, moderate, weak for 
example or clustering the portfolio’ debt composition based on a seniority measure or 
duration measures.  
The discussion above remains indicative as the research was purely exploratory and had 
some limitations (see Section 5.4, p.132). With this qualification in mind the areas for 
improvement and potential ways to address them can be summarised as follows:  
• Inclusion of systematic risk (i.e. LBO cycle) in the credit risk assessment of new
transactions but also in the credit monitoring since its importance has been clearly
demonstrated and confirmed by this research. For this purpose, changes in risk
factors would have to be calibrated against the wider LBO cycle. Ideally, the focus
would be on leading indicators. The interviewees have described the signals have
described the signals for an LBO cycle exhaustively and this is largely backed by
the findings in the literature. This is also supported by the response that many
participants gave with regards to what banks could do better (Table 4-21, p. 109)
where nine of the participants stated that a more independent / longer term view was
an area for improvement. This can be interpreted as a view that is detached from the
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most current market momentum, but takes into account the longer-term picture. 
However, what remains open is which of these signals listed in Table 4-1 (p. 85) are 
leading indicators, which are concurrent indicators and lagging indicators. For this 
purpose, the measurement of the risk factors has to be operationalized and then a 
backward test of their development towards cyclical peaks (last 2007; before then 
2001) would have to be performed. In order to ensure that those factors are chosen 
that clearly change towards the cyclical peaks, this back testing would have to be 
replicated to non-peak levels as well for control purposes. Only those factors that 
change only for the peak-level, but show relative stability towards the non-cyclical 
peaks should be chosen. At a later stage, such an indicator model may be refined to 
avoid intra-correlation between the risk factors; i.e. translated into a multiple-
regression analysis.  
• Completeness of LBO credit risk assessment giving using them to a degree that is 
commensurate with their importance. For the factors sponsor quality, type of 
transaction, debt composition and financial covenants the research suggests that they 
are similar important as is leverage. The data and the synthesis suggest that these 
factors should receive more attention in all areas of the credit management process. 
Minimum standards regarding their analysis and objectively measureable data about 
these factors could be derived (for example development of covenant headroom; 
seniority measure as outlined by Cotter and Peck, 2001) and used. For the factors 
relating purely to recovery risk on the other side, the analysis suggests that industry 
state is a factor that needs to be analysed within a very specific context, i.e. if the 
default is likely to be in a sector that is regarded distressed. A wider, systematic 
differentiation of recoveries by sector had not been found. Overall, there was 
agreement in the empirical part of this research that recovery should be an important 
aspect of the credit management process; standardized recovery analysis would be a 
sensible step to this end.
• Integration of credit analysis, credit monitoring and the use of aspects of
portfolio management. This systematic inclusion of portfolio-considerations in the
assessment of individual exposures and the feeding back of information from the
credit analysis/credit monitoring to portfolio-management is a requirement for this
to become a close circuit type of system. Information derived in credit analysis for
example needs to be fed to portfolio management so that the development of the risk
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factors within the portfolio can be measured. Credit monitoring also needs to 
provide information to credit portfolio management, for example such as observed 
performance of secondary transactions vs. primary transactions; this can then be 
used to continuously re-define guidelines or minimum standards.  
The description above would lead to an integrated credit management process for 
LBOs, which is conceptually illustrated by Figure 5-3 below.  
 
Figure 5-3: Integrated credit management process. Source: Author’s own.  
• Utilisation of Results. Finally, if the above was accomplished then the results 
would need to lead to some consequences. In absence of such, this would remain a 
pure analysis tool without implications. Albeit few participants mentioned this (see 
Table 4-21, p. 109), it is an important consideration.  
Before the above is addressed, further triangulation and validation of the results would 
be required. If those confirmed the results of this research, a first step would be to 
operationalize the individual risk factors; that is how are they measured and integrated.  
5.2 Summary of the Study 
The study took the phenomenon of increasingly aggressive LBO transactions and in 
parallel the expansion of LBO lending by banks as a starting point. As soon as the 
financial crisis of 2007/2008 emerged, the results were an increasing number of defaults 
and write-offs on banks’ balance sheets.  It was decided that the role of credit functions 
within this is worthy of analysis. The literature review looked at risk factors in LBOs 
      Integrated credit management process  
 !!!! Credit portfolio management 
Credit analysis Credit monitoring 
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and highlighted the existence of an LBO cycle that represented an area of systematic 
risk. The literature also flagged some easy-to-use tools of portfolio management and 
took advantage of a survey that was related to risk management practices with regards 
to LBOs by banks. Here, an inconsistency was discovered. If the risk management 
practices had been as the survey results suggested, then much of the expansion in LBOs 
may not have occurred. This suggested that the work of credit functions offers areas for 
improvement. Research questions and a research aim were formulated which were then 
broken down into a series of specific research objectives.  
The research aim was formulated as: 
• To identify potential areas for improvement in the credit management process of 
LBO credits by credit functions and – provided they can be identified – deduce 
potential measures how to address them.  
To meet its research aim and objectives, an interview questionnaire was developed and 
interviews with 18 participants were carried out. The data collected and subsequent 
analysis was quantitative and qualitative to enhance the reliability of the study. The 
results have indicated that there are several areas for improvement in the work of credit 
functions. The most relevant from this research are at a conceptual level and centre 
around the following four aspects: 
• Inclusion of systematic risk. 
• Completeness of credit risk evaluation.  
• Systematic integration of credit analysis, credit monitoring and credit portfolio 
management. 
• Utilisation of results. 
The thesis argued that addressing these points would be likely to enhance the 
effectiveness of LBO credit risk management. The areas for improvement are 
interrelated and inefficiencies in one area are likely to reinforce problems in another 
area.  
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5.3 Contribution to Knowledge  
While the research remains exploratory and the results must be viewed as indicative, it 
is unique so far in terms of access and as it confronts the importance of risk factors and 
opinions on how important credit functions view them in their work. It also highlights 
how credit functions actually use of the risk factors in the management of LBO credit 
risk. To the best knowledge of the author, no prior research exists that has combined the 
fields in this manner, albeit this is surprising. Credit functions are the organisational 
units where the actual analysis work on individual exposures takes place and ultimately, 
the sum of individual exposures makes up the whole banks risk position (prior to any 
hedging activities).  
The indicative results of this research make several contributions to knowledge in the 
field of LBO credit management. First, they provide an up-to-date overview and critical 
discussion of the empirical evidence on LBO risk factors, which has a value of its own. 
Moreover, they have been validated by the views of a number of experts.  
Secondly, the research provided indicative results of the work of credit functions in 
relation to LBOs. Important results are that there appears to be lack of consideration of 
systematic risk in LBOs, that the credit assessment takes less advantage of risk factors 
in credit monitoring, that recovery risk is not at the forefront of the analysis and that 
aspects of portfolio management play a subordinated role in the work of credit functions 
when they assess LBO credit risks on individual transactions. It has been argued that 
this combination of factors contributes to unintended inefficiencies in the work of credit 
functions that ought to be addressed. The thesis argues that the identified areas for 
improvement could be addressed by operationalizing the risk factors and stronger 
integration between credit analysis, credit monitoring and the use of credit management. 
The relationship between the areas for improvement that were identified has been 
illustrated in an interdependency chart (see. Figure 5-1, p. 121).   
Finally, the research offers several avenues for further research to be undertaken. These 
are discussed further below.   
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5.4 Limitations of the Study 
Research results are commonly subject to limitations and this study is no exception to 
this. The most important limitations are discussed in this section.  
5.4.1 Sample Selection and Composition 
The selection and the composition of the sample were based on convenience aspects. 
The specific access made the study unique. This was discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 
3.3.4, p. 63) in detail and some elements are there to prevent the study from becoming 
unacceptably skewed. The number of participants with a total of 18 in the main study 
remains limited, albeit them having a total experience from nine different banks and 
many years of individual experience.   
5.4.2 Geographic Focus  
Participants in the study had worked for European banks (with one bank having its 
headquarters outside Europe, but a regional headquarter in the UK), whilst some of the 
academic literature related to US data. There could be structural differences in these 
markets at the level of the LBOs as well as at the level of the credit functions 
performing the credit management process. However, in particular with view to LBOs 
these are unlikely to be so significant as this business field has become very 
international in recent years with many US PE houses being active in Europe and vice-
versa. In addition, while all the banks had sizeable European LBO activity, the 
participants were based in Germany with one exception.  
5.4.3 Interview Process and Timing  
The interviews took place over a period of 13 months, with the last once in April 2012. 
The banking sector is dynamic and changes may have occurred. This is somehow 
guarded against by the presentation of the results to the four independent senior 
executives and to the credit function of one bank, which only took place end of 2012. 
Nevertheless, some of the findings of this research may actually have been addressed 
already. One participants’ comment illustrated this:  
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“The role of the credit function has changed. It is less a question of how well one thinks 
a deal can be sold. The focus has shifted towards the acceptance of permanent 
holding”.  
Furthermore, for the reasons outlined in Section 3.3.5 (p. 68), the interviews were not 
recorded. The procedure applied with the taking of notes and the subsequent production 
of summaries in English language creates a risk of losing information or introducing 
biases. While the researcher has made strong efforts to keep the research free of biases, 
this risk remains present.  
5.4.4 Lack of Triangulation Processes 
Due to time and access constraints owed to the exploratory nature of this study, there 
was no possibility to triangulate the results. This is partly mitigated by the additional 
plausibility checks that have been undertaken, but the study results would benefit from 
further triangulation.   
5.5 Recommendations for Further Research 
Broadening the scope of the research would be useful. Triangulating the results of the 
study by using different data generation methods and different analytical techniques 
would also be beneficial. For example, researchers could try to validate and triangulate 
the data of this study by performing reviews of credit analysis papers produced by credit 
functions. Methodological triangulation continues to enhance reliability of research 
results (Modell, 2009) and therefore remains highly desired.  
A parallel application of this research to other specialised lending products could also 
provide useful additions to the knowledge base. If the overall results were similar, then 
that would hint towards a more overall disconnection between the importance of risk 
factors and their use in the credit management process.  
Provided results could be confirmed, research could be focused on how to specifically 
address the areas for improvement, i.e. how to operationalize them and to develop a 
detailed proposal for such a system. This could then be tested based on action research 
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utilizing a before and after implementation analysis or by creating a group within a 
credit function utilizing the system and a control group not utilizing the system.  
Finally, less focused on the implementation and still provided the results of this study 
can be confirmed, a further interesting avenue for research would be to investigate the 
causes behind these identified potential areas for improvement.  
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Appendix 1: Summary of supporting literature regarding risk factors 
LBO cycle a) Axelson et al. (2013, 2010) show changes in the financing structures of LBOs over time and indicate that firm characteristics are not a
driver of leverage in LBOs, while the activity shows significant cyclical patterns.
b) Acharya et al. (2007) compared the most recent LBO cycle with the previous LBO cycle and demonstrated that in both cases, a bank’s
ability to redistribute risks played an important role. Demonstrate high purchase multiples and leverage measures at peak.
c) Deutsche Bundesbank (2007): Highlighted an increasing use of back-ended facilities and increased leverage at the same time as covenant
levels decreased.
d) Deutsche Bundesbank (2006): Saw warning signals of an overheated market.
e) Kaplan/Schoar (2005) based on their analysis of PE performance found suggestive evidence that there are pronounced LBO cycles (based
on fund-flows).
f) Kaplan/Stein (1991) showed that towards the end of the previous LBO cycle (early 1990s) the debt market had evolved towards more
back-ended structures.
Summary: LBO cycle is present and influences several other risk factors, which impact both default risk and recovery risk. 
Sponsor Quality a) Gao (2014) found substantial performance contributions from the involvement of PE firms in LBOs.
b) Liu (2013) finds no direct contribution from PE firms to performance, but states that LBOs with high reputation PE firms are more likely
to be exited successfully.
c) Acharya et al. (2013, 2008) showed that PE-firms that get involved deliver stronger performance, the source of which depends on the
skills of the partner.
d) BCG/IESE (2010): Increasingly, the engagement of a PE-firm in the fundamentals of the business is seen as a value driver.
e) Brinkhuis de De Maeseneire (2012): Showed that there is a relationship between bank debt levels and the reputation of a PE; suggesting
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that strong reputation is viewed as a risk-mitigating factor. 
f) Hotchkiss et al. (2012) show that financial distress is more likely to result in going concern and tends to be resolved faster if PE firms are
involved.
g) Cao, Mason and Song (2010) show that during the time of strong credit supply, high quality sponsors kept focusing on stronger
businesses.
h) Cohn and Towery (2013) show that private companies post LBO increased leverage and sales, therefore sponsors removed a growth
barrier.
i) Cohn, Mills and Towery (2014) could not find support for the claim that sponsors contributed to performance improvements.
j) Demiroglu (2008) demonstrated that the reputation of the investor reduces the risk of a company experiencing financial difficulties.
k) Cotter and Peck (2001) showed that transactions with high reputation PE-firms also show more aggressive characteristics but are less
likely to default.
l) Denis (1994) compared to highly leveraged transactions and concluded that the LBO showed better performance, which he attributed to
the organizational form of an LBO. By inference, a high quality sponsor must be expected to be in a better position to implement such
structure.
m) Opler (1993) tested and found support for the hypothesis that PE-firms reduce the cost of borrowing to support the overall argument that
PE-firms can protect interest of debt providers.
Summary: a) - f) show importance for default risk; g) indicates importance for recovery risk. Importance for recovery risk can also be 
inferred, e.g. from c, as it is likely that the expected behaviour of a PE-firm will be taken into account in bank lending decisions.  
Type of Transaction a) Wang (2012) found that secondary buyouts show higher prices (compared to primary buyouts) and that while EBITDA increases strongly 
in absolute terms, profitability and asset efficiency ratios (EBITDA/fixed assets) decline.  
b) Bonini (2012) found little further improvements in operating performance in secondary buyouts but higher leverage and less liquidity.
c) Brinkhuis and De Maeseneire (2012) showed that secondary buyouts show higher leverage than primary transactions.
151 
d) Sousa and Jenkinson (2010) compared the performance of secondary LBOs to IPO and found that IPO firms perform stronger. Asset
efficiency reduces in both cases, but stronger in secondary LBOs.
e) Bergström et al. (2007) found a tendency for secondary buyouts to deliver lower improvements in performance, albeit this was not
statistically significant.
f) Deutsche Bundesbank (2007) reported that secondary and tertiary transactions are financed with higher debt multiples.
Summary: a) – f) highlight the importance for default risk, based on more debt (see below) and lower improvements in operating 
performance. Importance for recovery risk can be inferred. In the case of a default, more debt means that the economic value is distributed 
amongst more debt claims, lowering recovery rates (ignoring any seniority aspects). Unreached performance targets (b) make a trade 
sale/going concern sale more difficult.  
Leverage a) Halpern et al. (2008) concluded that debt structure and debt loads are important determinants of a default.
b) FSA (2006) stated that leverage ratios are high and not prudent and some defaults are likely.
c) Deutsche Bundesbank (2006) saw the rise in the debt/Ebitda ratio as a warning sign.
d) Andrade and Kaplan (1999) performed an analysis of the factors contributing to financial distress in LBOs. The dominant factor they
found was leverage.
e) Asquith et al. (1994) investigated the contributing factors to distress in the high-yield market. Albeit other factors were more important,
21% was still contributed from leverage.
Summary: Generally accepted as a risk factor of very high importance for default risk. The studies above support this. Importance for 
recovery risk can be inferred. In the case of a default, more debt means that a higher proportion of debt shares into the economic value of the 
business. 
Financial 
Covenants 
a) Axelson et al. (2013, 2010) found a correlation between debt market conditions and leverage. Debt market conditions were also tested
using a qualitative measure “tightening”, of which covenants were one factor.
b) Liu (2013): Found that tight financial covenants are found in transactions that show higher improvements in operating performance / and
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are related to successful exits. 
c) Demiroglu (2008) found that covenants confer useful rights in the monitoring of transactions.
d) Acharya (2007) stated that towards the end of the last LBO cycle some deals have had little covenant protection and that this could be a
reflection of aggressive lending policies.
e) Deutsche Bundesbank (2007): Pointed out that a lender’s rights are negatively impacted by looser covenant structures.
f) Cotter/Peck (2001) stated that PE houses not controlled by an experienced PE-firm would benefit from constraining debt terms.
g) Carey and Gordy (2007) found that a higher proportion of bank debt leads to higher recovery rates, which they argue is partially based on
the rights provided by covenants.
h) Khieu and Mullineaux (2009) argue that financial covenants are positively linked to recovery rates.
Summary: a), c) show that in more optimistic credit markets, covenants are looser. This is likely a reflection of more aggressive lending, i.e. 
less concern about a default risk. b) and d) point at the monitoring effect of covenants. Generally, covenants provide a means for intervening 
at an early stage, which is also relevant for default risk. f) and g) support importance for recovery risk, which can also be inferred. If no means 
to step-in against adverse developments exists, this is likely to impair the economic value of the business for a longer period of time.  
Debt composition a) Demiroglu (2008) found that larger shares of bank debt as part of the overall debt package is associated with fewer defaults. 
b) Halpern et al. (2008) found that larger shares of private debt (which mainly is bank debt) is associated with fewer instances of financial
distress.
c) Deutsche Bundesbank (2007) highlighted that long-dated instruments are likely to show lower rates of recovery.
Summary: a), b) support importance for default risk. c) supports importance for recovery risk. 
Jurisdiction a) Franks et al. (2004) found substantial differences in the recovery rates between countries.
b) Grunert and Weber (2008): provide a summary of other studies on recoveries by country that suggests substantial differences.
Summary: Studies support importance for recovery risk. 
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Table A1: Summary of supporting literature regarding risk factors. 
Source: Author’s own based on the review of relevant literature. 
Collateral a) Grunert and Weber (2008) highlighted the importance of collateral as a driver of recovery rates.
b) Franks et al. (2004) clearly showed the impact of collateral on recovery rates.
c) Bos et al. (2002) found that collateral and debt cushion (debt below a group of lenders) are the most important contributors to recovery.
d) Gupton (2000) saw collateral as a main driver of recovery rates.
e) Asquith et al. (1994) found that a bank’s decision to support a business is not solely based on company fundamentals. This makes
collateral an even more important consideration of the credit management LBO cycle.
Summary: Studies support importance for recovery risk. 
Industry State a) Acharya et al. (2007, 2005) highlighted that recovery rates might well be lower in industries that are depressed because potential strategic
buyers may not be able to fund takeovers as an exit route. Except where industries are in distress, there are no significant differences
between sectors (except Utilities).
b) Franks et al. (2004) did not find a significant influence of the industry on recovery rates.
Summary: Opposing views, but argument that recovery rates are lower in depressed sectors is plausible. 
Overall State of 
the Economy  
a) Khieu/Mullineaux (2009) found that good macroeconomic conditions support recover rates.
b) Grunert/Weber (2008) found no significant impact of economic activity on recovery rates.
c) Archarya (2007) was unable to confirm significant influence from macroeconomic conditions on recovery rates.
d) Franks et al. (2004): Viewed overall status of the economy as a factor worth considering, but not highly relevant. Based on their recovery
rates during different timeframes one can infer that recoveries are lower in a recessionary environment.
e) Bos et al. (2002) show lower recoveries are present in recessionary times.
Summary: Appears to be of some relevance, albeit not a dominant factor. 
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Appendix 2: Final Questionnaire  
 
Contact:  Karsten Frankfurth 
Tel.: xxxxxxxxxx 
Email: xxxxxxx@xxxxxx.de 
Purpose: Empirical Part of a Doctoral Research Project   
Date:   XXXXXX 
Participant Area of 
Expertise and Years of 
Experience with LBOs 
 XXXXXX 
 
Important Information: This research interview/questionnaire is part of a doctoral project at Edinburgh 
Business School, Heriot-Watt-University. The subject of the research is to investigate how LBO 
exposures could be managed more effectively by credit functions.  Before commencing the 
interview/questionnaire, please make sure you read and agree to the research rules and that you 
understand the explanations outlined below. 
Research Rules 
• Your name as a participant/respondent in this research will not be recorded in the questionnaire 
and it will not be released to any other person unless you specifically agree or request to be 
mentioned as a participant/respondent. Data regarding you as an individual (i.e. field of work, 
years of experience) that is recorded in the questionnaire will only be processed in an 
anonymous format.  
• You are under no obligation to answer any questions. If you prefer not to answer a question or if 
you are unable to answer a question, just say so. You may also abort the interview at any time.  
• You have been selected as a potential participant in this research due to the view that you have 
substantial experience in the LBO market. The purpose of this research is to receive a generic 
picture. Therefore, it is important that you provide your answers in terms of your personal view 
of how something is generally done in practice by credit functions. This means that the view you 
have expressed should not be that of any specific organisation, nor should it be how a specific 
organisation does something. Instead, the questions are based on your view as to how important 
certain factors are and how much weight is given to them when people (performing credit work) 
do credit analysis or monitoring and to what degree they take into account aspects of portfolio 
management. However, you may want to check with your employer in advance if you think your 
participation in this research could be a concern.  
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• One purpose of this interview/questionnaire is to validate whether the questions are clear and can 
be used for a wider group. Comments regarding the questions themselves are therefore 
particularly welcome. 
• Prior to the publication of the thesis, you may withdraw your participation in the research by 
giving notice to the above-mentioned contact person. Provided your questionnaire can be 
identified (it does not carry your name) based on the responses that you have given, it will be 
destroyed.  
• As a participant in the research, you may request a free hard copy of the thesis if and when it is 
published. If you wish to receive this document, please indicate so to the interviewer. Your name 
will be registered on a list separate from the questionnaire and will not be matched against the 
questionnaire. Over time this list will also include the names of non-participants, hence your 
participation in the interview cannot be inferred from you having received a copy of the thesis. 
Once all requests to receive a thesis have been met, the list will also be destroyed.  
Explanations 
The explanations provided below are listed in the same order in which they appear in the 
questionnaire instead of alphabetical order.  
• Credit risk within this questionnaire refers jointly to default risk and recovery risk.  
• Credit Analysis means the analytical work that is performed as part of a new LBO exposure to 
be entered into or the evaluation of a major amendment of an existing exposure. 
• Credit Monitoring refers to the analytical work performed as part of the regular review process 
of LBO exposures. 
• Default risk refers to the risk that a borrower in an LBO transaction is unable to meet its 
financial obligations in the contractually agreed manner. 
•  Recovery risk means the risk that the amount of principal outstanding and/or unpaid interest 
that can be recouped once a default has occurred is low.  
• Portfolio Management refers to the analytical work performed to put individual credits into 
perspective against their peer-group, to detect trends and patterns in credit quality. The overall 
aim of these activities is to avoid concentration risks and the early recognition of deteriorating 
credits and a deteriorating credit environment. Please remember that the viewpoint is that of a 
credit function and not of a centralisedd portfolio management group.  
• LBO cycle refers to a claim that LBO activity follows pronounced cycles which show certain 
characteristics (i.e. development of purchase prices) which repeats itself over time. The overall 
assumption is that at peak times, LBO transactions exhibit higher credit risk.  
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• Sponsor quality refers to the ability of a private equity investor to successfully lead an LBO
transaction so that default is avoided and to the ability of the sponsor to provide support (in
whatever form) to an LBO transaction if it experiences financial distress.
• Type of transaction refers to the question of whether a transaction represents a first-time
transaction (Primary transaction) or whether the business is undergoing an LBO repeatedly
(Secondary or Tertiary Buyout) or whether the private equity investor is taking out a special
dividend (so-called Recap).
• Leverage describes the share of debt in the overall capital structure of an LBO transaction.
Frequently, this is measured by the ratio of debt/ebitda, but other measures are used as well.
• Financial covenants are contractually agreed financial ratios that a borrower needs to adhere to
during the life of a loan contract.
• Debt composition refers to the structure of the debt within an LBO transaction. Typically, LBOs
have debts consisting of different layers with regards to maturity, seniority and investor group.
• Jurisdiction refers to the question of which country’s legal system is the most applicable in a
distressed situation.
• Collateral is security provided as credit protection against a loan.
• Industry state is the overall financial condition of a group of companies within one industry.
• Overall state of the economy is a measure of the performance of the economy relevant to an
LBO transaction, normally measured as GDP growth.
1. General Questions
1.1 How would you describe the experience that banks have had in the leveraged loan market 
over the last decade and in particular since the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007? 
1.2 In your view, what are the most important factors contributing to default probability and to 
recovery risk in LBO transactions? 
1.3 In your view, what are the factors that people performing the credit analysis and monitoring 
mainly focus on when evaluating LBO transactions? If there are discrepancies between the 
factors mentioned in 1.2, please explain why you think these discrepancies exist.  
1.4 In your view, is there anything that the banks and in particular their units in charge of 
evaluating credit risks should do differently? If so, what and how? 
1.5 Do you think that an LBO cycle exists and are there signs that you would describe as 
signalling an “overheated” market? 
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2. Risk Factors 
2.1 Potential LBO cycle 
2.1.1 How would you rate the importance of the LBO cycle on the credit risk (default 
risk & recovery risk)? If you are of the opinion that no LBO cycle exists, then 
please leave the question blank. 
Rating: Very 
Important 
(5) 
Important 
 
(4) 
Some 
Importance 
(3) 
Very 
Limited  
Importance 
(2) 
No 
Importance 
at all  
(1) 
 
Influence 
on:  
Default risk      
Recovery 
risk 
     
 
2.1.2 Could you please briefly explain why you have answered as you have done? 
2.1.3 To what degree do you think the LBO cycle is taken into account when credit 
analysis or credit monitoring activities are performed and to what degree do credit 
analysis and monitoring take into account aspects of portfolio management relating 
to this factor (i.e. point in the LBO cycle, concentration of transactions by vintage 
year, etc.?)  
Rating “taken into 
account” 
To a very 
high degree 
(5)  
To a high 
degree  
(4)  
To some 
degree  
(3) 
To a very 
limited 
degree  
(2) 
 
 
Not taken 
into account 
at all  
(1) 
 
 
Credit Analysis      
Credit Monitoring      
Analysis/Monitoring 
takes into account 
considerations of 
portfolio management 
     
 
2.1.4 Could you please briefly explain your answer?  
2.1.4.1 If the degree to which the LBO cycle is taken into account is (4) or five (5) in 
any area, where do you see this coming in practically and do you think there is 
room for improvement/a more systematic way to consider this?  
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2.1.4.2 If the degree to which the LBO cycle is taken into account is (3) or less, do 
you think that an increased consideration would contribute positively to the 
management of credit risk and how do you think this could be achieved?   
2.1.5 Is there anything else you want to say about the importance or role of the LBO 
cycle when evaluating LBO transactions?  
2.2 Sponsor Quality 
2.2.1 How would you rate the importance of sponsor quality on the credit risk (default 
risk & recovery risk)?  
Rating: Very 
Important 
(5) 
Important 
 
(4) 
Some 
Importance 
(3) 
Very 
Limited  
Importance 
(2) 
No 
Importance 
at all  
(1) 
 
Influence 
on:  
Default risk      
Recovery 
risk 
     
 
2.2.2 Could you please briefly explain why you have answered as you have done? How 
do you think sponsor quality could reasonably be measured?  
2.2.3 To what degree do you think sponsor quality is taken into account when credit 
analysis or credit monitoring activities are performed and to what degree do credit 
analysis and monitoring take into account aspects of portfolio management relating 
to this factor?  
Rating “taken into account” To a very 
high degree 
(5)  
To a high 
degree  
(4)  
To some 
degree  
(3) 
To a very 
limited 
degree  
(2) 
 
Not taken 
into account 
at all  
(1) 
 
 
Credit Analysis      
Credit Monitoring      
Analysis/Monitoring takes into 
account considerations of 
portfolio management 
     
 
2.2.4 Could you please briefly explain your answer?  
2.2.4.1 If the degree to which sponsor quality is taken into account is (4) or five (5) in 
any area, where do you see this coming in practically and do you think there is 
room for improvement/a more systematic way to consider this?  
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2.2.4.2 If the degree to which the sponsor quality is taken into account is (3) or less, 
do you think that an increased consideration would contribute positively to the 
management of credit risk and how do you think this could be achieved?   
2.2.5 Is there anything else you want to say about the importance or role of the sponsor 
quality when evaluating LBO transactions?  
2.3 Type of transaction 
2.3.1 How would you rate the importance of the type of transaction on the credit risk 
(default & recovery risk)? 
Rating: Very 
Important 
(5) 
Important 
 
(4) 
Some 
Importance 
(3) 
Very 
Limited  
Importance 
(2) 
No 
Importance 
at all  
(1)  
 
 
Influence 
on:  
Default risk      
Recovery 
risk 
     
 
2.3.2 Could you please briefly explain why you have answered as you have done? What 
types of transactions would you see as more risky than others and why?  
2.3.3  To what degree do you think the type of transaction is taken into account when 
credit analysis or credit monitoring activities are performed and to what degree do 
credit analysis and monitoring take into account aspects of portfolio management 
relating to this factor (i.e. transaction parameters related to the peer group of 
Transaction Types, Experience with Types of Transactions so far, Total Exposure 
in any type of transaction, etc.?)   
Rating “taken into 
account” 
To a very 
high degree 
(5)  
To a high 
degree  
(4)  
To some 
degree  
(3) 
To a very 
limited 
degree  
(2) 
 
Not taken 
into account 
at all  
(1) 
 
 
Credit Analysis      
Credit Monitoring      
Analysis/Monitoring takes 
into account considerations 
of Portfolio Management 
     
 
2.3.4 Could you please briefly explain your answer?  
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2.3.4.1 If the degree to which the type of transaction is taken into account is (4) or five 
(5) in any area, where do you see this coming in practically and do you think 
there is room for improvement/a more systematic way to consider this?  
2.3.4.2 If the degree to which the type of transaction is taken into account is (3) or 
less, do you think that an increased consideration would contribute positively 
to the management of credit risk and how do you think this could be achieved?   
2.3.5 Is there anything else you want to say about the importance or role of the type of 
transaction when evaluating LBO transactions?  
2.4 Leverage 
2.4.1 How would you rate the importance of leverage (debt load) on the credit risk 
(default & recovery risk)?  
Rating: Very 
Important 
(5) 
Important 
 
(4) 
Some 
Importance 
(3) 
Very 
Limited  
Importance 
(2) 
No 
Importance 
at all 
(1) 
 
 
 
Default risk      
Recovery 
risk 
     
 
2.4.2 Could you please briefly explain why you have answered as you have done? What 
leverage (total vs. senior) do think is the more relevant figure from a banking 
viewpoint? 
2.4.3  To what degree do you think leverage is taken into account when credit analysis or 
credit monitoring activities are performed and to what degree do credit analysis and 
monitoring take into account aspects of portfolio management relating to this factor 
(i.e. clusters of transactions with certain debt loads, comparison to peer-groups, 
etc.?)   
Rating “taken into 
account” 
To a very 
high degree 
(5)  
To a high 
degree  
(4)  
To some 
degree  
(3) 
To a very 
limited 
degree  
(2) 
 
Not taken 
into account 
at all  
(1) 
 
 
Credit Analysis      
Credit Monitoring      
Analysis/Monitoring takes 
into account considerations 
of Portfolio Management 
     
 
2.4.4 Could you please briefly explain your answer?  
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2.4.4.1 If the degree to which the debt load is taken into account is (4) or five (5) in 
any area, where do you see this coming in practically and do you think there is 
room for improvement/a more systematic way to consider this?  
2.4.4.2 If the degree to which the debt load is taken into account is (3) or less, do you 
think that an increased consideration would contribute positively to the 
management of credit risk and how do you think this could be achieved?   
2.4.5 Is there anything else you want to say about the importance or role of the leverage 
when evaluating the credit risk in LBOs? 
2.5 Financial covenants 
2.5.1 How would you rate the importance of financial covenants on the credit risk 
(default and recovery risk)?  
Rating: Very 
Important 
(5) 
Important 
 
(4) 
Some 
Importance 
(3) 
Very 
Limited  
Importance 
(2) 
No 
Importance 
at all            
(1)  
 
 
 
Default risk      
Recovery 
risk 
     
 
2.5.2 Could you please briefly explain why you have answered as you have done? Which 
type of covenants do you think are of particular importance in this regard?  
2.5.3 To what degree do you think financial covenants are taken into account when credit 
analysis or credit monitoring activities are performed and to what degree do credit 
analysis and monitoring take into account aspects of portfolio management relating 
to this factor (i.e. levels compared to the average in the portfolio, quality of the 
covenant package)?   
Rating “taken into 
account” 
To a very 
high degree 
(5)  
To a high 
degree  
(4)  
To some 
degree  
(3) 
To a very 
limited 
degree  
(2) 
 
Not taken 
into account 
at all  
(1) 
 
 
Credit Analysis      
Credit Monitoring      
Analysis/Monitoring takes 
into account 
considerations of Portfolio 
Management 
     
 
2.5.4 Could you please briefly explain your answer?  
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2.5.4.1 If the degree to which financial covenants are taken into account is (4) or five 
(5) in any area, where do you see this coming in practically and do you think 
there is room for improvement/a more systematic way to consider this?  
2.5.4.2 If the degree to which financial covenants are taken into account is (3) or less, 
do you think that an increased consideration would contribute positively to the 
management of credit risk and how do you think this could be achieved?   
2.5.5 Is there anything else you want to say about the importance or role of the financial 
covenants when evaluating LBO transactions?  
2.6 Debt Composition 
2.6.1 How would you rate the importance of debt composition on the credit risk (default 
risk & recovery risk)?  
Rating: Very 
Important 
(5) 
Important 
 
(4) 
Some 
Importance 
(3) 
Very 
Limited  
Importance 
(2) 
No 
Importance 
at all  
(1)  
 
Influence 
on:  
Default risk      
Recovery 
risk 
     
 
2.6.2 Could you please briefly explain why you have answered as you have done? Are 
there any constellations of debt composition that you would describe as particularly 
risky?  
2.6.3 To what degree do you think debt composition is taken into account when credit 
analysis or credit monitoring activities are performed and to what degree do credit 
analysis and monitoring take into account aspects of portfolio management relating 
to this factor  (i.e. overall exposure to tranches, clustering of complexities in 
structures etc.?)   
Rating “taken into account” To a very 
high degree 
(5)  
To a high 
degree  
(4)  
To some 
degree  
(3) 
To a very 
limited 
degree  
(2) 
 
Not taken 
into account 
at all  
(1) 
 
Role in:  
Credit Analysis      
Credit Monitoring      
Analysis/Monitoring takes 
into account considerations of 
Portfolio Management 
     
 
2.6.4 Could you please briefly explain your answer?  
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2.6.4.1 If the degree to which debt composition is taken into account is (4) or five (5) 
in any area, where do you see this coming in practically and do you think there 
is room for improvement/a more systematic way to consider this?  
2.6.4.2 If the degree to which debt composition is taken into account is (3) or less, do 
you think that an increased consideration would contribute positively to the 
management of credit risk and how do you think this could be achieved?   
2.6.5 Is there anything else you want to say about the importance or role of debt 
composition when evaluating LBO transactions?  
2.7 Jurisdiction 
2.7.1 How would you rate the importance of the jurisdiction on the recovery risk?  
Rating: Very 
Important 
(5) 
Important 
 
(4) 
Some 
Importance 
(3) 
Very 
Limited  
Importance 
(2) 
No 
Importance 
at all  
(1) 
 
Influence 
on:  
Recovery 
risk 
     
 
2.7.2 Could you please briefly explain why you have answered as you have done?  
2.7.3 To what degree do you think the jurisdiction is taken into account when credit 
analysis or credit monitoring activities are performed and to what degree do credit 
analysis and monitoring take into account aspects of portfolio management relating 
to this factor (concentration of transaction in jurisdictions, clustering of 
jurisdictions by lender friendliness etc.?)  
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Rating “taken into 
account” 
To a very 
high degree 
(5) 
To a high 
degree 
(4) 
To some 
degree 
(3) 
To a very 
limited 
degree 
(2) 
Not taken 
into account 
at all 
(1) Role in: 
Credit Analysis 
Credit Monitoring 
Analysis/Monitoring takes 
into account considerations 
of Portfolio Management 
2.7.4 Could you please briefly explain your answer? 
2.7.4.1 If the degree to which jurisdictional aspects are taken into account is (4) or five 
(5) in any area, where do you see this coming in practically and do you think 
there is room for improvement/a more systematic way to consider this?  
2.7.4.2 If the degree to which jurisdictional aspects are taken into account is (3) or 
less, do you think that an increased consideration would contribute positively 
to the management of credit risk and how do you think this could be achieved? 
2.7.5 Is there anything else you want to say about the importance or role of jurisdictional 
aspects when evaluating LBO transactions? 
2.8 Collateral 
2.8.1 How would you rate the importance of collateral on the recovery risk? 
Rating: Very 
Important 
(5) 
Important 
(4) 
Some 
Importance 
(3) 
Very 
Limited 
Importance 
(2) 
No 
Importance 
at all 
(1) Influence 
on: 
Recovery 
risk 
2.8.2 Could you please briefly explain why you have answered as you have done? Is 
there any type of collateral that you would find particularly useful or not? 
2.8.3  To what degree do you think collateral is taken into account when credit analysis 
or credit monitoring activities are performed and to what degree do credit analysis 
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and monitoring take into account aspects of portfolio management relating to this 
factor (i.e. type of collateral, value developments etc.?)  
 
Rating “taken into 
account” 
To a very 
high degree 
(5)  
To a high 
degree  
(4)  
To some 
degree  
(3) 
To a very 
limited 
degree 
(2) 
 
Not taken 
into account 
at all  
(1) 
 
 
Credit Analysis      
Credit Monitoring      
Analysis/Monitoring takes 
into account considerations 
of Portfolio Management 
     
 
2.8.4 Could you please briefly explain your answer?  
2.8.4.1 If the degree to which collateral is taken into account is (4) or five (5) in any 
area, where do you see this coming in practically and do you think there is 
room for improvement/a more systematic way to consider this?  
2.8.4.2 If the degree to which collateral is taken into account is (3) or less, do you 
think that an increased consideration would contribute positively to the 
management of credit risk and how do you think this could be achieved?   
2.8.5 Is there anything else you want to say about the importance or role of collateral 
when evaluating LBO transactions?  
 
2.9 Industry state  
2.9.1 How would you rate the importance of the industry state on the recovery risk?  
Rating: Very 
Important 
(5) 
Important 
 
(4) 
Some 
Importance 
(3) 
Very 
Limited  
Importance 
(2) 
No 
Importance 
at all  
(1) 
 
Influence 
on:  
Recovery 
risk 
     
 
2.9.2 Could you please briefly explain why you have answered as you have done? 
2.9.3 To what degree do you think the industry state is taken into account when credit 
analysis or credit monitoring activities are performed and to what degree do credit 
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analysis and monitoring take into account aspects of portfolio management relating 
to this factor (i.e. number of transactions in an industry that could easily go into 
distress, which industries are likely not to have financial resources to rescue 
companies on a going concern basis, etc.?)  
 
Rating “taken into 
account” 
To a very 
high degree 
(5)  
To a high 
degree  
(4)  
To some 
degree  
(3) 
To a very 
limited 
degree  
(2) 
 
Not taken 
into account 
at all  
(1) 
 
 
Credit Analysis      
Credit Monitoring      
Analysis/Monitoring takes 
into account considerations 
of Portfolio Management 
     
 
2.9.4 Could you please briefly explain your answer? 
2.9.4.1 If the degree to which the industry state is taken into account is (4) or five (5) 
in any area, where do you see this coming in practically and do you think there 
is room for improvement/a more systematic way to consider this?  
2.9.4.2 If the degree to which the industry state is taken into account is (3) or less, do 
you think that an increased consideration would contribute positively to the 
management of recovery risk and how do you think this could be achieved?   
2.9.5 Is there anything else you want to say about the importance or role of the industry 
state when evaluating LBO transactions?  
 
2.10 Overall State of the Economy 
2.10.1 How would you rate the importance of the overall state of the economy on the 
recovery risk?  
Rating: Very 
Important 
(5) 
Important 
 
(4) 
Some 
Importance 
(3) 
Very 
Limited  
Importance 
(2) 
No 
Importance 
at all  
(1)  
 
Influence 
on:  
Recovery 
risk 
     
 
2.10.2 Could you please briefly explain why you have answered as you have done? 
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2.10.3  To what degree do you think the overall state of the economy is taken into account 
when credit analysis or credit monitoring activities are performed and to what 
degree do credit analysis and monitoring take into account aspects of portfolio 
management relating to this factor (i.e. transactions that have assets that are highly 
sensitive to economic fluctuations)?  
 
Rating “taken into 
account” 
To a very 
high degree 
(5)  
To a high 
degree  
(4)  
To some 
degree  
(3) 
To a very 
limited 
degree  
(2)  
 
Not taken 
into account 
at all  
(1) 
 
 
Credit Analysis      
Credit Monitoring      
Analysis/Monitoring takes 
into account 
considerations of Portfolio 
Management 
     
 
2.10.4 Could you please briefly explain your answer?  
2.10.4.1 If the degree to which the overall state of the economy is taken into account is 
(4) or five (5) in any area, where do you see this coming in practically and do 
you think there is room for improvement/a more systematic way to consider 
this?  
2.10.4.2 If the degree to which the overall state of the economy is taken into account is 
(3) or less, do you think that an increased consideration would contribute 
positively to the management of recovery risk and how do you think this could 
be achieved?   
2.10.5 Is there anything else you want to say about the importance or role of the state of 
the overall economy when evaluating LBO transactions?  
3. Integration with Credit Analysis, Monitoring and Portfolio Management 
3.1 In your view, overall, are LBO exposures analysed with regards to their 
characteristics and compared to a wider portfolio?  
(Yes)    (No) 
3.1.1 If “Yes” to 3.1, please explain how is this done.  
3.1.2 If you answered “No” to the above,  
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-  could you please explain what the reasons are in 
your view.  
 - do you think this would be worth the exercise and 
if so, how could this practically be achieved?  
3.2 Would you prefer any specific measure for the purposes of portfolio 
management? If so, please explain why.  
 
4. Other Remarks 
4.1 Is there anything else you want to state about the credit risk and the management of such 
exposures?  
4.2 Is there anything else you think should be added to this questionnaire/any further suggestions for 
the research?  
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Appendix 3:  Process details qualitative data analysis and examples of summary 
  notes 
 
During the interviews, notes were taken and subsequently summaries in English 
language were produced. From these summaries, the researcher formed response 
categories following a careful analysis of the content. The categories were based on 
comments relating to the same subject, i.e. those that could be summarised by a 
common heading. Gillham (2000) describes a similar procedure. Gillham also states that 
the focus should be on the substantive data. For this research, the focus has been on the 
key points that participants mentioned during the interview process.  
Sometimes, interviews conducted later in the process led to additions of categories or to 
revisions of previously defined categories where new themes were discovered.  For each 
of the questions a response grid was formed and maintained in a Word file. The 
example illustrated in this Appendix relates to question 1.5 (Appendix 2, p. 154) of the 
questionnaire. The content of the file for the LBO cycle is shown on the next page.  
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 Response Category Grid Question 1.5 (LBO Cycle) 
 Existence of 
a cycle 
Weaker 
documentation 
standards 
Increase in 
Purchase 
Multiples 
More risks being 
distributed 
Leverage More 
Secondary/Tertiary 
Transactions 
LBOs of 
unsuitable 
businesses 
Lack of consistent / 
systematic 
monitoring at 
credit function 
level 
Mitigated by 
other factors 
IW1 Cycle exists Documentation 
standards erode 
Purchase 
multiples go 
in tandem 
with 
leverage. 
Currently, 
syndication market is 
definitely back. 
Documentations 
allow for “free 
selling”.  
Shortly after the 
crisis, a 
transaction with 5x 
EBITDA was 
placed; all B-
structures come 
back to the market.  
  Limited at this level  
IW2     Typical sign is that 
de-leveraging is 
only possible in 
growth scenarios. 
  No influence on this 
once a deal is 
transacted. 
 
IW3 Cycle exists  Strong 
cyclical 
changes in 
purchase 
multiples. 
    Area for wider 
portfolio-
management.  
Transactions may 
be sold because 
they deteriorate 
but not because the 
overall market is 
aggressive. 
IW4 Cycle exists Documentation 
standards erode (in 
upward cycle) 
 Driven by 
institutional 
investors, who have 
different refinancing 
sources and can 
invest more on a 
long-term basis. 
     
IW5 Cycle exists  Higher 
purchase 
multiples 
observed in 
More risks can be 
sold.  
Higher Leverage More secondary and 
tertiary transactions 
occur. 
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 Response Category Grid Question 1.5 (LBO Cycle) 
 Existence of 
a cycle 
Weaker 
documentation 
standards 
Increase in 
Purchase 
Multiples 
More risks being 
distributed 
Leverage More 
Secondary/Tertiary 
Transactions 
LBOs of 
unsuitable 
businesses 
Lack of consistent / 
systematic 
monitoring at 
credit function 
level 
Mitigated by 
other factors 
upward 
markets.  
IW6 Cycle exists   Strong appetite for 
LBOs / many 
participants.  
In an upward 
market, there is 
little equity left in 
the structure 
    
IW7 Cycle exists   Main driver is 
availability of cheap 
financing. 
    Exiting from the 
cycle before it 
reaches its peak 
difficult to do in 
practice, focus still 
on individual 
business 
performance. 
IW8 Cycle exists   Driven by market 
liquidity.  
    Market strongly 
driven by liquidity, 
as long as liquidity 
is in the market 
transactions can be 
made. 
IW9 Cycle exists Weaker documentation 
standards.  
 There is lots of 
money waiting for 
opportunities. 
(comment: in the debt 
market).  
Lower equity 
contribution 
occurs, leverage is 
higher 
Strong emergence of 
secondary/tertiary 
transactions. 
   
IW10 Cycle exists Weakening of 
documentation 
standards. 
 Strong lending 
capacity in the last 
cycle. 
Excessive leverage 
by long-term 
standards. 
Overall overheated 
market (with view to 
tertiary transactions)  
 Clusters of 
transactions are 
considered, but 
more by central 
portfolio 
Focus is on the 
company.  
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 Response Category Grid Question 1.5 (LBO Cycle) 
 Existence of 
a cycle 
Weaker 
documentation 
standards 
Increase in 
Purchase 
Multiples 
More risks being 
distributed 
Leverage More 
Secondary/Tertiary 
Transactions 
LBOs of 
unsuitable 
businesses 
Lack of consistent / 
systematic 
monitoring at 
credit function 
level 
Mitigated by 
other factors 
management groups.  
IW11 Cycle exists Covenant-lite structures 
already in the market, 
more in an aggressive 
market.  
  Typically, 
leverage goes up 
but at present the 
banking market is 
very robust. 
   Important to build 
ones own opinion. 
Transaction not 
declined because 
done in too 
aggressive market.  
IW12 Cycle exists        Many 
implications; other 
aspects are 
considered. 
IW13      The market then shows 
a fast evolution of 
transactions with a lot 
of “churning”.  
 Only a sector view 
and the 
developments of 
these sectors, but 
not a view on a 
specific product and 
how viewed.  
 
IW14    There are many 
participants in the 
upward market.  
Low equity 
contribution. 
  Recognizing the 
cycle would require 
constant monitoring 
which does not take 
place and would 
require substantial 
experience. 
 
IW15 “Erratic 
moves in 
certain 
factors, but 
different 
      This requires 
anticipation of 
certain 
developments, 
which is not done to 
Erratic 
moves…but 
different sources. 
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 Response Category Grid Question 1.5 (LBO Cycle) 
 Existence of 
a cycle 
Weaker 
documentation 
standards 
Increase in 
Purchase 
Multiples 
More risks being 
distributed 
Leverage More 
Secondary/Tertiary 
Transactions 
LBOs of 
unsuitable 
businesses 
Lack of consistent / 
systematic 
monitoring at 
credit function 
level 
Mitigated by 
other factors 
sources over 
time” 
this degree. 
IW16 Cycle exists 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Higher 
prices paid.  
Depressed margins 
due to strong 
competition. 
High leverage, low 
equity 
contributions. 
  No systematic 
monitoring of these 
factors.  
 
IW17 Cycle exists Absence of covenants, 
loser covenants. 
 Some banks bid 
aggressively for the 
business; based on 
large appetite for 
LBOs. 
High leverage 
multiples. 
 Unsuitable 
businesses 
being subject 
to an LBO.  
No full evaluation 
and consequences 
drawn, albeit it is 
considered where 
the cycle stands.  
 
IW18 Cycle exists 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Structures also become 
weaker 
Higher 
purchase 
prices paid. 
 Strong use of 
leverage. 
 Quality of the 
transactions 
(the underlying 
businesses) 
deteriorates.  
No focus on the 
cycle as such; the 
cycle on its own 
does not influence 
the risk.  
Business model 
takes precedence.  
Totals:  15 7 5 11 11 4 2 10 8 
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The detailed response grid above was then transformed into the category grid shown in 
the main body of the thesis and in the Appendix 4 (p. 187) for the questions relating to 
individual risk factors. For the LBO cycle the following grid was displayed based on the 
analysis of the above: 
 
Reproduced Table 4-1: Overview of major interview results regarding the LBO cycle. 
Source: Author’s own. See p. 85.  
From the total of the 18 participants, a total of ten response categories were formed. The 
number of categories does not have to correspond to the number of responses. Another 
point worth noting is that the total number of interviewees mentioning the categories 
can exceeds 100%. This is because some interviewees gave responses that would fall 
into several categories and have been counted as such. Therefore, the response grid also 
shows how many times a certain category was mentioned in relation to the total 
mentioning of the categories. In total, in this case 73 responses have been distributed 
across the categories; most of them relating to the existence of the LBO cycle, followed 
by “More risks being distributed”.  
To illustrate how the interview summaries were allocated to the response grid, notes 
from two interview scripts are shown below here. Comments relating to the 
interpretation or where further details were viewed required are included in the grey-
shaded boxes (italics).  
Existence of a cycle:
Signals: 
More risks being distributed: 
Increase in leverage multiples:
Increase in purchase prices:
Weaker documentation standards:
More secondaries/tertiaries:
LBO of unsuitable businesses:
Credit Management Process: 
Lack of consistent / systematic monitoring at 
credit function level:
Mitigated by other factors:
Overview of major interview results regarding the LBO Cycle
No. category 
hits % category hits
% of interviewees 
mentioning 
category
15.00 20.55% 83.33%
11.00 15.07% 61.11%
11.00 15.07% 61.11%
5.00 6.85% 27.78%
7.00 9.59% 38.89%
4.00 5.48% 22.22%
2.00 2.74% 11.11%
10.00 13.70% 55.56%
8.00 10.96% 44.44%
73.00 100.00%
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Example 1 Interview Summary 
 
Interview Transcript / Field Notes 
Questions Section 1 
GENERAL QUESTIONS 
On the experience in the LBO Market 
• There were three critical points over the last decade I think.  The first dip in the 
market when leveraged credits became difficult was in 2001, post the dot.com 
bubble. After a short upswing then, the next critical point occurred post 9/11. 
The market then became aggressive, that is borrower friendly from 2004 
onwards and peaked in 2007.  
 
This was on the question relating to the experience in the LBO market. This is one of the 
nine responses received in relation to question 1.1 and classified as Cyclicality in the 
LBO Market (see Appendix 4, p. 187).   
The borrower friendly structure was clearly visible in the documentation standards. 
Credit documents became more US-High-Yield bond-style documents and covenants 
fell away. The rally in the market – with higher multiples all the time – ended abruptly 
in 2007, with the outbreak of the financial crisis.  
Following discussion on the point above, this was counted as a response to 1.5 for the 
signals of the LBO market. This entered into as one of the seven responses that stated 
an upward cycle would lead to weaker documentation standards (Table 4-1, p. 85). The 
allocation was supported by what was then explained below.  
There was a concern that LBOs would be hit hard then, but amazingly, nothing 
happened for a long time. Anyway, activity did not start again until 2009 in Germany 
and I think at least in Europe, the picture is similar here. And the first “new” LBOs, 
were structured extremely conservatively.  
This supports the cyclicality argument.  
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They did not contain an equity cure possibility, and they did require significant sponsor 
equity, sometimes up to around 50%, so very conservative structures. However, around 
Mai 2010, we have seen deals coming back to the market containing mezzanine and 
banks started to do underwriting these transactions again (as opposed to club deals). The 
senior debt multiple in one deal has been seen in excess of 5; covenant headroom has 
come to 20-22% again with an upward tendency.  
Provides further support for lower documentation standards in an upward cycle; see 
below. 
We also see “all B Structures” coming back to the market. The market develops and 
changes very quickly these days.  
Q: Why do you think this market development is taking place, has nothing been learned 
from the experience? 
A: I think something had been learned, but for a short period of time. Competitive 
pressures are back in the market and after a few years without new business, some of 
these teams had a desire to take on new transactions. Also, there is significant pressure 
from financial sponsors who want to invest funds.  
Q: And what are the current trends that you see despite what you have already 
described: 
A: Documentations are still evolving towards typical bond documentations, which have 
historically been structured according to US law. Actually, not many market 
participants have detailed experience with this and they are quite complex to structure. 
Also, the development of can be quite fast.  
Q: So in your view, is the market to distribute the risk – the syndication market back? 
A: Definitely. Institutional investors, who typically have an appetite for the long-dated, 
no amortisation tranches have pressure to invest. And also, smaller asset-taker type of 
banks are back, as outlined before. Also, documentations allow for more or less free 
selling. Some of them contain a “White-List”. That is a list of names to whom the credit 
maybe sold without seeking prior consent. If an institution to whom another institution 
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wants to sell is not on the list and an application is made and granted, than that buying 
institution will be on the list going forward.  
The discussion above has been categorized as  “More risks being distributed”, as there 
is a lot of reference to selling in the market/syndicating exposures. This is one of the 
total of 11 counts for more risks being distributed in response 1.5 to provide a 
signalling function for an increasingly aggressive LBO market and cyclical momentum 
(Table 4-1, p. 85). In the response grid, this had been entered into with a respective 
comment for interviewee the interviewee. It had been agreed during the interview 
process that this best describes the cyclical momentum in the market. As many 
interviewees, this person did focus mainly on the open question and only provided 
comments occasionally on those relating to the scoring levels.  
Q: 1.2 In your view, what are the most important factors contributing to default 
probability and recovery risk in LBOs? 
Default Risk: I think an important aspect is the sector. Cyclical sectors which are asset 
heavy are particularly vulnerable.  
The above response has been classified as industry-state, as cyclicality is relating to 
this and as the interviewee had linked the term with the sector. This is one of the three 
responses categorized as industry state in response to question 1.2; (see Table 4-3, p. 
89).   
Q/C: Yes, but that is not particular to LBOs? The question was more on the specific 
drivers of LBOs, instead of the overall credit risk. 
A:  I think then covenants play an important role. If there is a large business, then 
covenants maybe adjusted. Also they clearly serve an early warning system.  
The interviewee was, without realizing this, projecting to question 2.5 with his response. 
This was discussed during the interview and caused this to be classified as a response to 
question 2.5. This is one of the responses accounting for the total of 11 responses that 
highlighted that financial covenants would provide a mechanism for early intervention 
when matters deteriorate (Appendix 3, p. 169).  
On recovery: Collateral is positive, particularly a share-pledge, since it makes a going 
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concern sale of the business possible. However, in Germany this does not work very 
well. For this aspect, the most creditor friendly jurisdiction is Luxembourg. However, 
recoveries is a subject that is difficult to assess, since most banks have departed from 
the “hard approach”. Rather, every attempt is made to restructure the business without 
insolvency proceedings.  
The comment led to an entry into the category Collateral in response to question 1.3, so 
is responsible for the one response received for this category (Table 4-10, p. 98). The 
remainder is interesting commentary, which has been used in the thesis. 
1.2 In your view, what are the factors that people performing the credit analysis and 
monitoring mainly focus on when evaluating LBO transactions? If there are 
discrepancies between these factors mentioned in 1.2, please explain why you think 
these discrepancies exist.  
Most important is leverage, and leverage combined with the industry. Capex intensity is 
also an aspect that is normally associated with credit risk.  
The response provided above led to entries in three categories in response to question 
1.3. The first one was recorded for leverage and the second one for industry state (as 
specific sector characteristics were touched on). The third one, however, was classified 
as business fundamentals as the interviewee also explained that the attitude of the 
company/sponsor towards capex would be important. Therefore, it was more an aspect 
of the individual business rather than a sector consideration, albeit the sector has an 
influence on the capex intensity, but this was not what the interviewee was mainly 
referring to (the entries were included in Table 4-10, p. 98).  
 
The following question was put in between as it fitted the discussion at this point:  
Q: And do you think that the overall portfolio one carries plays a role? 
I do not think that the overall portfolio is important, but the comparators are the 
transactions that are in the market currently or most recently. In addition, some sectors 
(comment: based on business fundamentals) will simply be declined.  
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1.4 / 1.5: In your view, is there anything that the banks and in particular their units in 
charge of evaluating credit risks should do differently? If so, what and how?  / Do you 
think an LBO cycle exists and are there signs that you would describe as signalling an 
“overheated market”? 
A: Already answered earlier. Amplitude of the cycle becomes stronger and the periods 
between them become shorter. Recently spoke to someone who has been in credit for 
more than 25 years and he said he had probably experienced 4 sharp dips in the market. 
I have only worked in the credit field for slightly more than 10 years and I would say I 
saw 2-3 dips. Comment: Explained that business fundamentals played should be 
detached from the market.  
Interviewee referenced the earlier response; there the LBO cycle had been recorded in 
response to the question 1.1 (experience made by banks). The response to question 1.1 
but also this one, clearly confirm that the interviewee thought there was an LBO cycle, 
which led to an entry in this category. So this is one of the 15 entries for this category in 
Table 4-1, p. 85).  The response also led to an entry in the category for business 
fundamentals as in question 1.4 (Table 4-21, p. 109) This was decided in the context of 
the intermitted question above, where the interviewee explained that the transactions 
are compared against most recent ones. 
2.1 Only Scoring Levels only for these questions, no particular comments.  
2.2 Sponsor Quality 
Important to avoid default, very limited importance with view to recovery risk.  
Explained in the open part, although sponsors frequently take a passive role when it 
comes to a business that is defaulted. Then the restructuring is largely in the hands of 
lenders.  
The above comments did not lead to entries into any category as they did not relate to 
credit management.  
2.3 Important on Default Risk, Some Importance on Recovery Risk.  
However, effect at least on default risk not necessarily negative. Many advantages of a 
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secondary buyout, for example, there is already set-up a proper reporting needed for 
bank purposes, the business and its managers are accustomed to work under the 
constraints of an LBO. (Rest, only crosses).  
No comments made to the credit management process. The comment made in general 
on secondary/tertiary was a minority opinion and therefore has been classified a 
category for major research results.  
 
2.4 Most important – Scores 5 on both. High importance in credit analysis, monitoring 
and aspects of portfolio-management are taken into account.  
2.5 Financial Covenants, 4 on both. Intrinsically linked, if default occurs, the tighter the 
covenants the lower the threshold levels.  2.5.2: Leverage, Fixed Charge Cover, ICR 
and capex limits. 
2.6 Very Important for Both.  
Upon further discussion, explained that enforcements have been scarce; restructuring is 
the preferred route. Provided further information on hedging claims and their ranking.  
This led to a category “rarely enforced” for collateral. It is one of the eight comments 
made in this regard (See Appendix 4, p. 187). The remaining information provided was 
interesting, but not directly related to the questions.  
Q: 3 Yes, I think this is done to a degree. Whether this is a decisive factor in the 
decision making at the level of the credit function, I am not sure.  
 
Counted as a yes (box was clearly ticked in the survey part of the questionnaire); so one 
of the responses counting as a yes in relation to question 3.0 (Table 4-17, p. 105) albeit 
in the earlier part of the discussion stated that he thought it was not important. But the 
question here was more narrow; as it simply asked whether they are analysed with view 
to a wider portfolio. Whether that was then actually used in the decision making, the 
interviewee stated himself that he was not sure. Earlier, he made the comment that the 
transaction is compared to the most recent transactions. 
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Example 2 Interview Transcript / Field Notes 
Participant: Senior Credit Risk Analyst 
______________________________________________________________________ 
GENERAL QUESTIONS 
Question 1.1 
When Looking at PF-Analysis – one noted that ever more aggressive structures have 
been followed. “2nd and even 3rd-time buyouts have continued, with a level of 
aggressiveness in the structures.  (C: PF referred to a portfolio the person had observed 
over the past years).  
This response was not counted in any of the categories shown for bank’s experience; it 
was more of a description of what signalled a cycle; but did not specifically mention 
this.  
Question 1.2  
Too high debt levels, driven by the attractiveness of the business. Very little attention 
has been given to debt capacity.  
This response was classified into two responses with view to question 1.2 (Table 4-3, p. 
89). The categories in which this responses are included are “Leverage” (based on 
high debt levels) and “Issues with business fundamentals” as this ultimately is a driver 
of debt capacity. The comment for the reason for the high leverage has not been 
considered in the categorization, as this is not a risk factor in the sense of this research 
(it may be a cause of it, as reflected in the ability to re-distribute risk in an upward 
cycle).   
Question 1.3 
Credit analysis  has been focused on balance-sheet Analysis and modern tools of cash-
flow management (C: in relation to debt on balance-sheet). This is fine, but sometimes 
it was ignored where those cash-flows would come from – partial result 
(“Teilbetriebsergebnisse”) have not been considered anymore. Moreover, Analysis 
focused on the business-model.  
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This response was classified into two categories with view to question 1.3 (see Table 
4-10, p. 98). One was the focus on “Leverage” and the other one was on “Business 
fundamentals”. The comment about the source of cash-flows sometimes remaining 
unconsidered was interesting, but not directly related to this question.  
Question 1.4  
Definition of tight trigger-ratios and their consequent monitoring; consequent adherence 
to lending standards. Sometimes those exist, but frequently deals are still done, because 
“this one is an different based on….”. There is in fact limited accuracy in the planning 
horizon.  
The comment relating to the limited accuracy of the planning horizon was finally 
classified as “Deeper analysis with the business fundamentals” as during the discussion 
the interviewee expressed that more thorough analysis could enhance that accuracy. 
The comment regarding definition of “trigger-ratios” and consequences to be drawn 
from this has been classified as “More pro-active management of risks (the interviewee 
described that there should be threshold levels upon which the risk is managed actively 
or simply not entered into when introduced (Table 4-21, p. 109 for classification).  
Question 1.5  
Cycle certainly exists, reflected in higher multiples and increasing numbers of 
secondary, tertiary transactions. 
This response has been classified into four categories with view to question 1.5. These 
were “Existence of a cycle“, “Increase in leverage multiples”, “Higher purchase 
multiples” and “More secondary/tertiary transactions” (see Table 4-1, p. 85).  C: 
During the meeting it was explained that the comment on multiples related to both 
leverage and purchase multiples.  
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2.1 Credit Cycle  
Credit cycle is important both for default risk and recovery risk. Deals transacted in 
high markets are more likely to default and once they do, are likely to experience lower 
recoveries. Not taken into account / only short-term view 
No entry was made for this comment into any category. The view on the importance for 
the default risk and the recovery risk as well as the degree to which this was taken into 
account had been covered by the scoring levels.  
2.1.3  
Recovery Risk is clearly under-represented in credit analysis and monitoring; not the 
domain of classical credit functions (not used to perform this kind of performance).  
Within the Portfolio-Management Scope, a list of experiences with certain structures in 
certain periods of time would make sense, but have not seen it.  
The response did not lead to a separate category; it was not specific to the credit 
management process with and its relation to the LBO Cycle.  Instead, it provided a 
general comment that recovery risk is less of an aspect considered than default risk. 
This has been used as a quote in the thesis (Section 4.2.2, p. 91). The comment on 
portfolio management has informed the statement in the thesis (relating to little use of 
aspect of portfolio management). The statement has been taken into account with the 
responses to question 2.2 (Appendix 4, p. 187).  
2.2 Sponsor Quality  
Sponsor plays a very important role 
Negative Selection  
would make sense – List of experience with certain sponsors 
This response resulted in two counts for the categories assigned to sponsor quality. One 
was relating to the potential improvements (Systematic approach based on common 
criteria) and the other one to “APFM – Only negative selection” (Appendix 4, p. 187).  
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2.3 Type of Transaction 
Secondary transactions much more aggressively structured / more likely to default and 
less equity cushion available. 
Very limited attention given to in analysis and monitoring; some attention given in 
portfolio-management. However, would make sense, for example standards for 
secondaries or caps on total exposures/more rigor application.  
The response was allocated into two categories. These were “Higher Leverage” in 
Secondary/Tertiary/Recap Transactions. The comment regarding more use in portfolio 
management was already made with view to the previous question. The other category 
was then “No systematic consideration of APFM” as this was what the interviewee was 
referring to based on the discussion (Appendix 4, p. 187).  
2.4 Leverage 
Very important for both, for obvious reasons (default and more sharing).  
Looked at strongly within credit analysis, still in credit monitoring and the transactions 
within a portfolio are frequently compared based on Leverage.  
Within Business-Plans, de-leverage is sometimes forecasted very aggressively – critical 
evaluation needs to take place. Also in monitoring, a table showing the originally 
forecast leverage and the actually achieved leverage would make sense.  
The response was allocated into two categories. These were “Increased debt burden 
increases risk to default”; “Systematic consideration as part of PF” (comment: so takes 
into account APFM) and “Comparison of de-leverage vs. original forecast” (comment: 
as a proposal for improvement) (Appendix 4, p. 187).  
2.5 Covenants  
I have had cases where the covenants were structured poorly and those transactions 
went directly into default.  
Regarding recovery risk: Some importance, also recovery risk only comes when default 
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has actually occurred.  
When covenants are well structured, they have a considerable impact on the default risk. 
Regarding PM: Only possible, when there many transactions. Small participants in the 
market that have limited transactions on their books cannot do this. 
The response was allocated into one category only: “Provide an early option to 
intervene” (Appendix 4, p. 187).  The comment relating to PM has not been allocated 
to any category. While it is an interesting comment, it is not generally focused on the 
market. Moreover, the institutions to which the participants in this study had exposure 
to all would have had sufficiently large portfolios.  
2.6 Debt Composition 
Very important on both – have seen cases where junior-debt plays on “destructive” 
behaviour to receive an advantage. 
Considered carefully when in credit analysis. 
Not taken into account in credit – monitoring!  
Still importantly viewed with regard to portfolio-management 
This response was allocated into one category only: “Conflicting views of different 
lender-groups”.  The remaining comments were clearly covered by the scoring levels 
themselves and did not warrant any further allocation into categories.  
2.7 
Very important – have seen it. 
No importance at all in credit monitoring and with view to portfolio-management, 
“once-in the  deal, cannot change it”.  
This response did not lead to any classification. Arguably, the response could have been 
allocated into the statement relating to substantial differences between Jurisdictions; 
but the interviewee was not specific on this. He just stated that it was important without 
elaborating on the differences of the systems.   
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2.8 Collateral  
Limited Importance – only a soft-factor in negotiations. Little value when enforced.  
This response led to an inclusion in the category “rarely enforced” for collateral. 
Similar comments were made by eight participants (Appendix 4, p. 187). While this was 
also not directly related to the credit management process it was viewed interesting 
because it suggests that the value of collateral is not necessarily seen in the liquidation 
of collateral.  
2.9 Industry State  
Sector aspects very important 
High in Analysis and Portfolio-Management, limited view in Monitoring (because once 
in the deal, nothing can be done anymore).  
No category allocation has been made based on this; as all this information was 
covered by the scoring levels provided.  
2.10 Overall State of the Economy 
Very important, also limited view in credit - all areas. Argument “this one is different”.  
No category allocation was made based on this as all this information was covered by 
the scoring levels and no additional informational content was seen in the response. 
The comment referenced as “this one is different” relates to the proposal that this 
interviewee had made earlier when he suggested that there should be strict guidelines 
based on key-ratios/threshold levels in the monitoring and analysis of credits.  
3. Yes – Based on statistical data – but more important is that conclusions are drawn 
from this.  
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Appendix 4: Summary Response Categories to Open Questions 
 
 
 
No. Category hits 
% Category 
hits
% of 
interviewees 
mentioning 
category
Cyclicality in the LBO market: 9 29% 50%
Main focus on the ability to distribute risk: 9 29% 50%
Significant number of defaults: 7 23% 39%
Lack of understanding for the business: 6 19% 33%
31 100%
Overview of major interview results regarding banks' experiences 
No. Category hits
% Category 
hits
% of 
interviewees 
mentioning 
category
Issues within the business fundamentals: 13 28% 72%
Leverage: 11 23% 61%
Industry State: 8 17% 44%
Deal Structure: 5 11% 28%
Specifically for Recovery Risk 
Collateral: 3 6% 17%
Industry State: 3 6% 17%
Deal Structure: 2 4% 11%
Jurisdiction: 2 4% 11%
47 100%
Overview of major interview results regarding main risk factors
No. Category 
hits
% Category 
hits
% of 
interviewees 
mentioning 
Category
Business fundamentals: 13 30% 72%
Leverage: 10 23% 56%
Industry State: 8 19% 44%
Performance against plan / historical performance: 5 12% 28%
Deal Structure: 4 9% 22%
Specifically on Recovery Risk: 
Sponsor: 2 5% 11%
Collateral: 1 2% 6%
43 100%
Overview of major interview results regarding the main risk factors used in CA / CM
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No. Category hits: 
% Category 
hits:
% of 
interviewees 
mentioning 
category
Take more independent / long-term view: 9 45% 50%
Deeper analysis of business fundamentals: 7 35% 39%
More pro-active management of risks: 3 15% 17%
More focus on management: 1 5% 6%
20 100%
Overview of major interview results regarding"what could be done better"
Existence of a cycle:
Signals: 
More risks being distributed: 
Increase in leverage multiples:
Increase in purchase prices:
Weaker documentation standards:
More secondaries/tertiaries:
LBO of unsuitable businesses:
Credit Management Process: 
Lack of consistent / systematic monitoring at 
credit function level:
Mitigated by other factors:
Overview of major interview results regarding the LBO Cycle
No. Category 
hits % Category hits
% of interviewees 
mentioning category
15 21% 83%
11 15% 61%
11 15% 61%
5 7% 28%
7 10% 39%
4 5% 22%
2 3% 11%
10 14% 56%
8 11% 44%
73 100%
No. Category hits
% Category 
hits
% of 
interviewees 
mentioning 
category
Sponsor Track Record: 7 21% 39%
Ability to invest additional funds if needed: 5 15% 28%
Credit Management Process:
Credit Monitoring: "too late": 3 9% 17%
APFM - "Not in a structured way": 8 24% 44%
APFM - "Only negative selection": 7 21% 39%
Potential for improvement: 
Systematic approach based on common criteria: 4 12% 22%
34 100%
Overview of major interview results regarding Sponsor Quality 
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No. Category hits
% Category 
hits
% of 
interviewees 
mentioning 
category
Higher Leverage in Secondaries, Tertiaries, Recaps: 10 25% 56%
Further benefits more difficult to achieve: 6 15% 33%
Secondaries are "LBO-proven": 6 15% 33%
Loss of Sponsor Incentive in Recap: 2 5% 11%
Tired Management : 1 3% 6%
Credit Management Process:
No systematic consideration of APFM: 7 18% 39%
Knowledge of higher risk but not decive factor: 4 10% 22%
"Too Late" in CM 4 10% 22%
40 100%
Overview of major interview results regarding the Type of Transaction
No. Category hits: 
% Category 
hits:
% of 
interviewees 
mentioning 
category
Increased debt burden increases risk to default: 8 40% 44%
Increased debt at default lowers distributable value: 4 20% 22%
Credit Management Process:
Comparison based on peer-group: 4 20% 22%
Significant consideration in PF: 2 10% 11%
Proposal for Improvement: 
Comparison of de-leverage vs. original forecast: 2 10% 11%
20 100%
Overview of major interview results regarding Leverage
No. Category 
hits: 
% Category 
hits:
% of 
interviewees 
mentioning 
category
Provide an Early Option to Intervene: 11 32% 61%
Tight Covenants can Cause Problems: 2 6% 11%
Credit Management Process:
Structural Aspects Considered: 8 24% 44%
Check Limited to Standard: 4 12% 22%
Use of APFM Limited / Not systematically: 7 21% 39%
Proposals for Improvement:
Focus on Covenants "tailored" to the Transaction: 1 3% 6%
Clusterin of Covenants: 1 3% 6%
34 100%
Overview of major interview results regarding Financial Covenants
No. Category 
hits: 
% Category 
hits:
% of 
interviewees 
mentioning 
category
Conflicting views of diffrent lender-groups: 10 77% 56%
Credit Management Process: 
Key-point is the intercreditor-agreement: 3 23% 17%
13 100%
Overview of major interview results regarding Debt Composition
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No. Category 
hits: 
% Category 
hits:
% of 
interviewees 
mentioning 
category
Substantial differences in creditor friendliness: 10 59% 56%
Requirement of Knowledge: 3 18% 17%
Credit Management Process:
Typically Yes/No decision: 2 12% 11%
Only based on broader country limits: 2 12% 11%
17 100%
Overview of major interview results regarding Jurisdiction
No. Category 
hits: 
% Category 
hits:
% of 
interviewees 
mentioning 
category
Rarely Enforced / Mainly useful for negotiations: 8 100% 44%
8 100%
Overview of major interview results regarding Collateral
No. Category 
hits: 
% Category 
hits:
% of 
interviewees 
mentioning 
category
Cyclicality major driver of recovery in default case: 8 40% 44%
Credit Management Process: 
Cyclicality an important part of the CPM 8 40% 44%
APFM - Sector Classification 4 20% 22%
20 100%
Overview of major interview results regarding Industry State 
No. Category 
hits: 
% Category 
hits:
% of 
interviewees 
mentioning 
category
Impact on tolerance levels: 4 57% 22%
Credit Management Process:
Impact Analysis: 3 43% 17%
7 100%
Overview of major interview results regarding the Overall State of the Economy 
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Appendix 5: Presentation used for Plausibility Checks 
∗ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
* The version of the presentation shown here is a corrected version that reflects that the research aim was to provide potential 
measures to address any areas for improvement, but not to provide initial recommendations (see section 4.2, p. 57). No amendments 
to the content of the conclusions, key-findings and consequences were made.   
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